Cooperative strategies of producers in a stalemate industry and a hostile environment : a U.S.-Canada cross-cultural study of wheat marketing. by Fleming, Kent D.
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 
1-1-1991 
Cooperative strategies of producers in a stalemate industry and a 
hostile environment : a U.S.-Canada cross-cultural study of wheat 
marketing. 
Kent D. Fleming 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 
Recommended Citation 
Fleming, Kent D., "Cooperative strategies of producers in a stalemate industry and a hostile environment : 
a U.S.-Canada cross-cultural study of wheat marketing." (1991). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 
2014. 6109. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/6109 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 

COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES OF PRODUCERS 
IN A STALEMATE INDUSTRY AND A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: 
A U.S.-CANADA CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF WHEAT MARKETING 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
KENT D. FLEMING 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
September 1991 
School of Management 
© Copyright by Kent Donald Fleming 1991 
All Rights Reserved 
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES OF PRODUCERS 
IN A STALEMATE INDUSTRY AND A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: 
A U.S.-CANADA CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF WHEAT MARKETING 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
KENT D. FLEMING 
Approved as to style and content by: 
. Elliott Carlisle, Chair 
Bertil Liander, Mbmber 
UMe. 
ichael Sutherland, Member 
^Lawi^ncer^S. Zacharias, Member 
Ben Branch, Ph.D. Program Director 
School of Management 
ABSTRACT 
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES OF PRODUCERS 
IN A STALEMATE INDUSTRY AND A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: 
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Strategic management literature has given little atten¬ 
tion to purely competitive or "stalemate" industries, a 
large and important area of the economy. Stalemate indus¬ 
tries, extremely competitive and only marginally profitable, 
have many strategy related problems. It is relatively dif¬ 
ficult to develop effective strategies because there are few 
if any opportunities for differentiation or gaining a com¬ 
petitive advantage (Porter, 1980; Calori & Ardisson, 1988). 
Hostile environments, business environments which are 
exceptionally harsh and risky, aggravate the problem. Some 
argue that these conditions call for entrepreneurial 
strategic postures (SP) and organic organizational 
structures (OS) (Coven & Slevin, 1989). 
One source of the problems associated with stalemate 
and environmental hostility (EH) is the relatively high 
transaction costs which charterize many of these 
iv 
industries. Internalizing marketing functions often reduces 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1986; Harrigan, 1986), 
but vertical integration on an individual basis is rarely a 
viable option for commodity producers. A cooperative 
strategy of joint or collective vertical integration can 
internalize risky and confining aspects of the market. 
A typology of economic organizations is developed. 
This study focuses on the red spring wheat industry because 
producers in Canada and the U.S. share a similar growing and 
economic environment, but have adopted radically different 
marketing strategies. This study is exploratory, rather 
than confirmatory. It is oriented to producer strategic 
concerns, rather than to the perspective of the government, 
cooperative, or investor-owned firm. Four areas of 
investigation (tentative hypotheses) are articulated. In 
order to explore possible relationships, a sample of U.S. 
and Canadian producers is surveyed by telephone. 
Canadians have a pooling strategy. Conclusions for 
strategic management include: (1) pooling reduces adverse 
impacts of EH; (2) pooling strategy performance cannot be 
measured by price advantage; it is successful to the extent 
it reduces stress and other adverse effects of EH; (3) 
entrepreneurial SP & organic OS are not called for in this 
industry; (4) important U.S.-Canada cultural differences 
exist and must be considered before recommending a strategy. 
V 
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Wheat production is a complex, capital intensive, and 
highly asset-specific enterprise. The industry is 
characterized by exceptionally narrow profit margins and 
almost no room for strategic maneuvering. This "stalemate" 
condition is brought about by the large number of relatively 
small, individual producers, the "low barriers to entry, 
and the fact that wheat is a standardized commodity. 
Producers generally must accept the market price because 
there are few opportunities for them to enhance the price of 
wheat through firm or product differentiation. In these 
ways wheat is typical of many commodity-based industries, 
agricultural and non-agricultural. Together they comprise a 
large, important sector of the economy, and it would be 
useful to discover ways in which individual firms in these 
industries can generate a competitive advantage. 
The conditions of stalemate are further aggravated by 
"environmental hostility." Environmental hostility usually 
refers to business environments which are exceptionally 
harsh, stressful, and risky, but in the case of wheat (and 
In the sense of the term, as it is used in 
microeconomic theory and industrial organization economics, 
that entry is not blockaded (Martin, 1988). 
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most other agricultural commodities), elements in the 
physical environment (e.g., weather and disease) also 
include many sources of risk and stress. 
The focus of this dissertation is on ways in which 
collective strategies can increase the competitive advantage 
of firms who must operate within stalemate industries and 
hostile environments; in particular on ways in which wheat 
producers may gain a strategic advantage through 
internalizing aspects of the market through cooperative 
marketing efforts. There is a fairly well developed 
literature on the theories of cooperatives, and my research 
is undertaken within the context of this literature. 
However, the theories of cooperative organization, and the 
relatively few studies on cooperatives in the strategic 
management literature, concentrate on the cooperative entity 
itself and its strategy, rather than on the individual 
member firm's effort to gain a competitive advantage. This 
study is written from the perspective of the producer firm 
marketing its own commodity. Similarly there is a growing 
literature of competitive advantage theory (Porter, 1985, 
1990), but unfortunately it fails to make more than passing 
reference to firms in stalemate industries. In many ways the 
most useful literature for this strategic analysis is that 
of the transactional costs economic theory. 
A. Overview of the Wheat Industry: 
Stalemate and Environmental Hostility 
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Wheat production is a stalemate industry for many of 
the reasons that it is a classic textbook case of a 
perfectly competitive market. Even the largest grain 
producers, utilizing thousands of crop acres to generate 
over a million dollars of revenue annually, is a price-taker 
without individual market power. Grain producers have 
continued to decrease in number, while growing in size and 
sophistication (Cummins et al., 1984), but it remains 
impossible for an individual to gain a "volume” position by 
individual (as opposed to collective) horizontal 
integration. 
Grain is a truly homogeneous, well-defined, 
standardized product, and as a result there is almost no 
opportunity for differentiation.^ Canadians, through a 
government-mandated, national effort, have managed to 
^ At first glance, the fact that 48% of the U.S. wheat 
crop is produced by only 2.7% of the farms suggests a fair 
degree of concentration. However, when one realizes that 
this 2.7% consists of 2,700 farms, one gains some insight 
into the magnitude of the industry, at least in terms of the 
number of producers producing a homogenous product. 
^ There are five distinct varieties of wheat, of which 
hard red spring wheat is one. While this variety may be 
prefered by some buyers for a specific purpose, and these 
buyers will want it to have a standard protein and moisture 
content, there are very few other ways to distinguish the 
commodity. 
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provide cleaner wheat for the world market. This higher 
quality does earn a small but significant premium on the 
world market. American producers conform to lower U.S. 
standards. Individual producers in the U.S. who incurred 
the extra costs to provide a product of a quality equal to 
that which conforms to the Canadian standard, would not 
receive a premium. Their grain would be commingled with 
that of other American producers, none of whom would have 
provided cleaner grain. Therefore, their cleaner grain 
would be sold on the world market as American standard 
quality wheat, for which there is no premium. The 
individual producers who differentiate their product 
(whether by cleaning it more thoroughly or growing it 
organically), usually at a higher cost or lower yield, may 
not be able to extract a higher price on the world market. 
In effect, they will be producing for a market different 
from the standard world wheat market. 
Similarly, there are almost no opportunities for an 
individual producer to develop a volume strategy. The 
market is large enough for many competitors^ with 
operations of optimal-size, and most producers will be 
operating with economies of scale. 
Producer firms are competitors in the production of 
the commodity; they are cooperators only insofar as they 
collectively vertically integrate their operations for 
purposes of acquiring inputs or for marketing output. 
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Table 1: Size of U.S. Spring Red Wheat Industry (ERS,1990). 
AREA (Million acres): 
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 
(forcasted) 
Planted 10.9 13.4 14.3 
Harvested 9.6 12.0 13.0 
Yield (bu./acre) 49.3 45.7 47.0 
SUPPLY (Million bushels): 
Production 473 548 610 
Beginning Stocks 75 39 18 
Total Supply 547 587 628 
USE: 
Domestic 193 219 
Export 315 350 
Ending Stocks 39 18 
Increasing size of individual firms will not indefinitely 
provide increased economies of scale nor will acquiring a 
large number of other firms lead to effective horizontal 
integration of production. 
While technological advances continue to increase 
production efficiency, these improvements are incremental, 
and improvements, relative to the industry average costs per 
unit of yield, will be short-lived, i.e., the industry's 
average efficiency will soon reflect the innovations, and 
today's improvements in production will become tomorrow's 
expectation. For example, ten years ago early adopters of 
microcomputer technology were able to reap a substantial 
advantage in production control (e.g., computerized 
monitoring and regulation of grain drying) and financial 
control (e.g., computerized long-range planning, budget 
generation and cashflow monitoring.) Five years later, 
these levels of control are the expected norm. 
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Almost all agricultural research is conducted by the 
land grant universities and a relatively small number of 
large seed, chemical and agricultural machinery companies. 
Few producers are capable of funding their own research and 
development, so nearly all the management and technological 
improvements in the industry are available to all 
competitors. Similarly, cumulative experience is not a 
significant advantage, and lack of experience is not a 
barrier to entry. 
Environmental hostility in the grain industry is now 
pervasive and has been increasing for two decades. World 
production of wheat for export increased as Australia 
entered the market in the late 1960s and the European 
Community, once a major importer, became a major net 
exporter in the mid-seventies. Argentina became the fifth 
major exporter, happy to exploit the political differences 
between the U.S. and the USSR, the country which ironically 
had become the America's major market. 
After three decades of reasonably stable prices, grain 
prices became extremely volatile, especially when the USSR 
began importing huge amounts during its infamous "Great 
Grain Robbery" of 1973 (Morgan, 1980). With the subsequent 
increase in world grain production capacity, prices were now 
sensitive to relatively small decreases in world demand. 
Demand in turn was now more closely linked to global 
financial and political changes completely out of the 
control of the producer. 
Prior to 1970 the U.S. and Canada together had almost 
the entire world export market to themselves; at this time 
it was possible for economists to view the two countries as 
operating in effect as a duopoly (McCalla, 1967). 
Table 2: Export Volume (Million tons) (ERS,1990) 
EXPORTERS: 
87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 
U.S. 43.4 37.9 35.0 34.0 
Canada 23.6 13.5 16.5 19.0 
EC-12 14.8 21.0 21.0 22.0 
Australia 12.2 10.8 10.7 11.0 
Argentina 3.8 3.5 6.0 6.7 
Others 7.2 10.5 8.2 8.3 
Total foreign 
IMPORTERS: 
61.6 59.3 62.4 67.0 
USSR 21.5 15.5 14.0 15.0 
World Total 105.0 96.9 97.4 101.0 
One characteristic of a benign environment is that markets 
can be controlled and manipulated, as a dominant firm would 
operate in an industry with little competition. On an 
international level this describes the way in which Canada 
and the U.S. were able to behave. This is not to say that 
there was not serious competition on the firm level, the 
perspective from which, in this study, we are viewing the 
situation; it does however, account for the relatively 
strong demand for the firm-level output and the overall 
relatively high firm-level price which continued into the 
mid-1970s. 
But by the mid-1970s the increasing environmental 
hostility was already evident with increased input prices 
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(especially fuel and land) and the previously mentioned 
increasing level of world competition. Another turning 
point was the linking of commodity prices to international 
financial markets (especially interest and currency rates). 
With the 1979 grain embargo the situation reached crisis 
levels. In ten years the business climate for North 
American producers had moved from one which was relatively 
benign to one that was clearly hostile. 
Another important characteristic of hostile 
environments in general, and one that particularly affected 
the grain trading situation during the late 1970s to mid- 
1980s, is increased precariousness and riskiness of the 
industry as a whole. The sharp increase in demand for U.S. 
grain during the early 1970s very rapidly led to the 
expansion of existing loading and handling capacity, and to 
the building or acquiring of new facilities and equipment, 
especially by railroads and investor-owned trading firms. 
Cooperatives had to keep up with this very rapid expansion, 
and many decisions were made with only short-term 
considerations in mind. The increased grain transportation 
requirements led cooperatives to lease or purchase many rail 
cars. In the process most cooperatives became highly 
leveraged. When export demand leveled off in the 1980s, 
railroads were left with excess capacity, and many 
cooperatives were locked into paying leases on idle 
specialized grain hopper cars (Cummins et al., 1984). 
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Another factor which has contributed to the industry's 
current environmental hostility, and in particular to the 
overwhelming nature of the firm's business climate, is 
government deregulation of transportation. For example, the 
Staggers Rail Act (1980) adversely affected grain 
merchandising by increasing railroad pricing flexibility, by 
allowing secret rail contracts which benefited high volume 
shippers, and by increasing the ease with which railroads 
were able to abandon routes. Embargoes and rail 
transportation regulatory issues were major factors that 
made this "a difficult time," especially for producers and 
local cooperatives (Cummins et al., 1984). 
The Economic Research Service (ERS) of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) publishes a quarterly 
"Wheat; Situation and Outlook." This report (ERS, 1990) 
provides reliable information about the current and 
projected U.S. and world grain production and trading 
situation. The May 1990 issue reports on a number of 
conditions which provide further insight into the severity 
of the industry's hostile environment: 
(a) Excess capacity; "U.S. wheat production is projected to 
rise more than 650 million bushels^. ... [Total U.S.] 
production is projected at 2.7 billion bushels,...the third 
largest on record....World wheat production in 1990/91 is 
forecast at a record 568 million tons. While global 
5 
There are 36.67 bushels in a metric ton. 
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consumption is projected up almost 3 percent, it will trail 
production" (ERS, 1990, p. 3). This projection now appears 
to have been accurate. 
(b) Price volatility and low prices: "Wheat prices received 
by farmers during 1990/91 are forecast at $2.90-3.30 per 
bushel, down from $3.71 and $3.72 the last 2 years" (ERS, 
1990, p. 3). Wheat prices subsequently dropped from about 
$3.50 to their current levels of about $2.50, substantially 
lower than anticipated by the rather pessimistic ERS May 
projection. 
(c) Global economic influences; "Foreign exchange 
constraints could limit imports. China^ is facing peak 
years of debt repayment... and the government has already 
imposed austerity measures throughout the economy and could 
decide to hold down wheat imports to conserve foreign 
exchange..." (ERS, 1990, p. 8). 
(d) Intense global competition: "Major competitor production 
is forecast up 4 % overall due to projected increases in 
area (except EC) and yields (except Australia)....Increased 
area, higher yields, and the largest production since 
1984/85 in the competing exporting countries mean more 
The U.S is projected to export about 34 million tons 
of wheat (about 34% of the world's 101 million tons 
projected to be exported by all exporters.) In 1988/89 the 
U.S. exported 37.6 million tons, about 40% of the wheat 
traded on the world market. China is one of the two major 
importers; in 1988/89 it imported 15.5 million tons, the 
same as the USSR (ERS, 1990, p. 11). 
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competition and lower wheat export prices....[For example,] 
Canada is projected to increase production 9%" (ERS, 1990, 
p. 12). "Despite the larger U.S. crop, U.S. exports in 
1990/91 are projected 3% below 1989/90 as large competitor 
crops lead to increased competition... (ERS, 1990, p. 14). 
(e) Global and national political influences: Recent General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provisions will 
require changes in U.S. agricultural policy. Aspects of 
policy which would affect the grain industry include target 
prices and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan rate 
levels, and the funding and commodity coverage of the Export 
Enhancement Program (EEP) (ERS, 1990, p. 18). As the 
current GATT round comes to a close it does not appear that 
these projected provisions will be realized immediately, 
largely because the highly protectionist European Community 
failed to cooperate. The policy changes remain a high 
priority on the agenda. 
B. The Emergence of Two Grain Marketing Institutions 
In order to appreciate how two very different systems 
developed in North America, one needs to consider the recent 
history of the grain trade in the U.S. and Canada. Grain 
farmers in both countries prospered throughout and 
immediately after World War I. At this time most production 
was for domestic consumption; exports were not yet a major 
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factor. Throughout the 1920s and into the '30s, the North 
American wheat industry fell into deeper and deeper 
depression. With these unprecedented economic conditions, 
the two countries, while sharing the same physical and 
economic circumstances, ultimately responded differently to 
the crisis and permanently changed the organization of their 
grain trading. 
There was no significant Canadian or U.S. federal 
government involvement (i.e., agricultural policy as we know 
it today) in wheat production or marketing before World War 
I. With wheat supplies scarce in Europe and North America 
during the war, export quotas and fixed wheat prices were 
imposed. The U.S government pursued its price and 
production objectives through wheat purchases and sales. 
This approach successfully prevented runaway inflation and 
supported wheat prices at harvest. These successes 
subsequently inspired demands for similar programs (Harwood 
and Young, 1989). 
In Canada the government also took control of grain 
distribution. Canada established a national sales agency, 
the Board of Grain Supervisors, which marketed the 1917 and 
1918 wheat crops. The following year a new agency, the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), was established to help grain 
marketing revert to peace-time market conditions. It only 
operated during this transition year, but it was the first 
workable example of peace-time centralized marketing and 
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would later serve, in the minds of farmers, as the model for 
what they needed on a long-term basis (Canadian Wheat Board, 
1989) . 
In the U.S., with a strong member-owned cooperative (as 
opposed to government or investor-owned) marketing 
infrastructure in place and a politically experienced and 
active cooperative movement to influence the Congress^, the 
Federal government gradually responded to the post-war 
economic crisis by enacting supportive legislation. In 
Canada, the prairie farmers also recalled the boom years of 
"the Great War," and the government's successful role in 
helping to achieve this prosperity. Ottawa was pressured by 
farmer cooperatives (or "pools," as they were often referred 
to in Canada) into enacting economic crisis-inspired 
legislation. 
The goal of both governments regarding grain was 
similar: to restore economic prosperity to agriculture 
In post-civil War America, the severe agricultural 
depressions of the 1870s and '80s, and especially the 
monopolistic exploitation of grain farmers by the 
transcontinental railroad in concert with a few grain 
companies (Norris, 1901; Morgan, 1980), led to the rise of 
many "grassroots" political, economic, and social action 
organizations. Foremost among these was the Grange. Strong 
antitrust sentiments and viable cooperative organizations 
emerged from these organizing efforts. Although the Grange 
itself faded, its decades of effective political action 
helped lead to the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act 
(1914), and finally the Capper-Volstead Act (1924). This 
legislation legitimized agricultural cooperatives, and set 
them apart as a fundamentally different kind of corporate 
form, to be regulated differently for tax and antitrust 
purposes. 
14 
production and to introduce stability into the marketing 
system. However, the two governments introduced 
fundamentally different reforms, reforms which led to 
radically different grain marketing institutions. These 
differences have continued for over half a century to 
characterize the major difference between the two greatest 
wheat marketing systems in the world. 
1. The Organization of Wheat Marketing in the U.S. 
American wheat marketing is based on private, investor- 
owned firms (lOFs), for example, Cargill, and on 
farmer/member-owned firms (cooperatives), with the former 
marketing about 60% of the U.S. crop, and the latter 
marketing the remaining 40%. The government's particular 
role varies from farm program to farm program, but 
essentially, it supports grain marketing through direct 
subsidies, an Export Enhancement Program, subsidized loans 
to buyers, target prices, and other mechanisms designed to 
make the market work more smoothly and more equitably. It 
might logically be argued that these adjustments interfere 
with the free market, but the U.S. government's ostensible 
position is that the overall, long-range intent is to rely 
on the "free market." 
American cooperatives make a substantial contribution 
to the marketing of domestically produced grain. U.S. 
cooperative farm level purchases account for about 40% of 
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total grain sales. Most direct purchases are by local 
cooperatives (Cummins et al., 1984). The overall structure 
of the industry's cooperative marketing in the U.S. is 
fourfold: farmer-member, local co-op, regional co-op, and 
interregional co-op. 
a. Farmer-members sell to one of three buyers: to 
private domestic processors, that is, investor-owned 
firms (lOFs), to a local cooperative (usually a local 
elevator), or occasionally to a regional cooperative. 
b. The 2,339 locals (Cummins et al., 1984) receive 
grain from members and nonmembers. The main services 
are elevator and storage facilities. Locals sell grain 
to domestic processors, directly to farmers, directly 
into the export market, and most commonly to regional 
cooperatives. 
c. The primary purpose of regional cooperatives is to 
function as an assembly point for grain from local 
cooperatives. As the transportation system changed in 
the 1980s, mainly as the mode of rail transportation 
changed from individual carloads to unit trainloads, 
the regional became much more important. As the 
hostile environment of the late 1970s and 1980s forced 
farms to become larger, to build more on-farm storage 
facilities and to acquire their own trucks, it often 
became more feasible for these farms to sell directly 
to regionals. With the need to assemble ever larger 
16 
unit trainloads, it became essential for regionals to 
compete more intensively (often against other 
cooperatives) for the grain in the region, 
d. There are 16 interreaionals which function as very 
large regionals. Harvest States Cooperative is an 
example of an interregional cooperative organization. 
Interregional member-owners are the regional 
cooperatives, and the interregionals buy only from 
their affiliated regionals. Interregionals are 
important grain assembly areas, especially for grain 
export. Over two thirds of regional and interregional 
grain goes for export. Much of the remainder is 
processed (e.g., soy bean oil and meal) or mixed for 
livestock feed. Regionals handle one-third of all 
American off-farm grain sales (Cummins et al., 1984). 
The evolution of this complex structure can be viewed 
as developmental stages in an on-going collective vertical 
integration by farm managers, as an effort to internalize 
large segments of the market and thereby: (a) to take 
greater control of the marketing of their product, all the 
way into the international grain market, and consequently 
(b) to reduce some transaction costs. 
2. The Organization of Wheat Marketing in Canada 
The Canadian government organized the current Canadian 
Wheat Board in 1935. It is now a completely farmer-owned 
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corporation responsible to the government. The purpose of 
this organization is to reduce market risk for producers by 
providing a system whereby they can pool their wheat (and 
barley). The CWB takes possession of each participating 
producer's crop, and then works to obtain the best price for 
the total supply. The government determines what it expects 
the world price to be, and the CWB issues the grower an 
initial payment upon delivery of his grain to one of the 
provincial wheat pool elevators. After the final CWB sales 
are complete, the average price is calculated. Each 
producer then receives a supplementary payment to adjust his 
total payment to this price per ton , less CWB overhead. 
If the government miscalculates its price forecast, i.e., if 
the world price ultimately proves to be less than that 
initially forecasted by the government, the government 
absorbs the loss and the producer is not penalized. 
The Canadian Wheat Board is a unique North American 
institution. It cannot be categorized strictly as 
cooperative, lOF, or government agency, but it shares 
characteristics of all three. Unlike any of these three 
organization types as they are known in the U.S., the CWB 
does not own any storage, transporting, or processing 
assets; it is strictly limited to a coordinating function. 
Canadian cooperatives and private firms provide farmers 
Reference to tons will be to metric tons (2200 
pounds). 
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elevator, storage, and general grain crop assembly services, 
much as U.S. local and regional cooperatives and private 
firms do. In the U.S., as mentioned earlier, 16 "super¬ 
cooperatives," called interregional cooperatives, assemble 
trainloads and shiploads (as opposed to train hopper 
carloads) of grain from member cooperatives (i.e., locals 
and regionals) (Cummins et al,, 1984). In this way the 
coordinating role of the U.S. interregional cooperatives is 
somewhat analogous to the CWB's role. However, the CWB 
handles wheat on a much larger scale. The U.S 
interregionals account for only about one third of the U.S. 
exports; the other two thirds is handled by lOFs. The CWB 
is only marginally analogous to the lOF. They both deal 
directly with end-users, but again the scale is different: 
the CWB trades about as much wheat as all U.S. lOFs 
combined. 
There is no American marketing institution that 
approaches the scale of the CWB. Eight years after the CWB 
was established, the government banned trading on the 
Winnipeg Grain Exchange, and the CWB became a wheat (and 
later [1949] also barley) monopoly (Bothwell et al,, 1981). 
With few exceptions all wheat and barley produced in the 
country must legally be sold through the CWB.^ The CWB 
^ The two exceptions are grain that is used 
domestically for livestock feed and the minuscule amount of 
grain that is not grown in the prairie provinces. Although 
the CWB will handle these grains on request, the producer 
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organization is single largest merchandiser of both wheat 
and barley in the world. All grain exporting countries, 
excepting the U.S., organize their marketing through 
centralized marketing boards along the lines of the Canadian 
system, but the CWB is clearly the world's largest grain 
marketing board. In 1988-89, a poor yield year because of 
the drought, the CWB sold about 22 million tons of grain for 
Canadian growers. The CWB is also one of Canada's largest 
corporations, and it is the nation's single largest net 
exporter. It exports to over 70 countries, although two 
countries, China and the USSR, account for almost a third of 
the total volume (CWB, 1989). 
From the farmer's point-of-view, the CWB functions 
organizationally as a cooperative, that is, as a form of 
collective vertical integration of a grain producer's 
business in response to market failure. However, the origin 
and governance of the CWB, as opposed to that of the normal 
cooperative organizational form, reveal fundamental 
differences. Cooperatives are organized and governed by 
member-patrons, whereas the wheat marketing board was 
organized by the government and to a large extent is 
governed as a semi-autonomous government agency. The 
strategic control, i.e., governance, of the CWB is mid-way 
may legally, if he/she so wishes, sell these grains through 
an independent company. Private firms handle the small 
remainder of Canada's grain production: oats, rye, flax, and 
canula (CWB, 1988). 
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between a true cooperative and an lOF. The CWB is not 
directly governed by a board of directors representing the 
interests of the owners (farmer-members in the case of 
cooperatives, equity owners in the case of lOFs); however, 
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there is a Producer Advisory Board of 15 farmers. The 
CWB obviously has closer ties to government than U.S. 
agricultural marketing organizations (e.g., the CWB was 
formed by an act of Parliament, the government forecasts the 
initial price and guarantees it, the government appoints 
commissioners, etc.), but the CWB corporation is self- 
managed and self-financed (CWB, 1989). 
The different institutional origins of marketing boards 
and cooperatives are significant. Cooperatives emerge 
through voluntary, grassroots organizations, such as the 
grange; marketing boards are instituted through an act of 
Parliament. These different origins reveal fundamental 
national differences; geographical differences (wider 
This board is elected by farmers, and advisors 
serve for 4 years. Monthly board meetings are held, 11 of 
which are held in the 11 administrative districts in the 
prairie provinces for the convenience of farmers who wish to 
have direct input at least once a year. 
The CWB is administered by 5 commissioners who are 
appointed by the federal government. These appointees are 
selected from people in the industry, often former farmers, 
and they are advised by the advisory board. The CWB is 
required to report to Parliament through a designated 
Minister, and to publish an annual report on its operations. 
It is interesting to note that while there are other 
marketing boards in Canada, the CWB is the only marketing 
board that is not administered by a province (CWB, 1988). 
There is also a full time staff of about 500. These 
staff are not civil service employees; they are paid by the 
corporation from the gross grain sales revenues. 
21 
dispersal of farmers in Canada), cultural differences 
(greater positive attitude toward and reliance on government 
initiatives in Canada [Lipset, 1990]), and differences in 
industrial organization (one of the two railroads, the 
Canadian National, is nationalized in Canada). Unlike a 
cooperative organization, the CWB is not a voluntary 
collective vertical integration. Since 1943 (when as noted 
earlier, the government terminated the operations of the 
Winnipeg Grain Exchange) all Canadian producers, with few 
exceptions, have been required to market their wheat (and 
barley) through the CWB. 
The CWB therefore has an almost absolute monopoly in 
wheat. This effective monopoly position results in 
considerable monopoly power in domestic sales, as long as 
American wheat can be excluded from the Canadian market. 
The Free Trade Agreement allows this protection if it can be 
demonstrated that Canadian wheat subsidies for its producers 
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are lower than U.S. subsidies to American growers. The 
CWB's national wheat monopoly allows it to function 
effectively in the international grain market as one of the 
oligopolists. The international buyer has the advantage of 
"one stop shopping," and the seller (the CWB) enjoys the 
opportunity to arrange for some control over price. This 
At this time they are extremely close, within 
approximately 1%, and therefore there is considerable 
discussion in how one should calculate indirect subsidies, 
such as costs of research and extension efforts devoted to 
wheat farm production and management. 
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strength, in combination with the Canadian ability to 
differentiate its grain as a substantially cleaner, higher 
quality product, has enabled it to enhance the price for growers. 
C. The Pooling Strategy 
The single greatest strategic difference between U.S. 
grain marketing (whether cooperative or lOF) and Canadian 
grain marketing is that the CWB markets wheat by pooling, an 
approach that has been called "...the most fundamental of 
cooperative strategies" (Agricultural Cooperative Service 
[ACS], 1987, p. 36). "Pooling capital and volume to obtain 
economic benefits is the essence of cooperative effort" 
(ACS, 1987, p. 36). 
Pooling is contingency pricing. Examples of 
contingency pricing abound in American non-grain 
cooperatives. One example is the final price of goods from 
a supply cooperative. The final (net) price is contingent 
upon the ultimate cost of doing business, i.e., one pays the 
list price at the time of purchase, then at the end of the 
year, after the total revenues and costs have been 
calculated, the difference is returned to the member-owners 
as patronage refunds. Most non-grain cooperatives use the 
secure base provided by pooling programs to build successful 
domestic and international marketing efforts (ACS, 1987). 
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American grain cooperatives (excepting those few 
involved in the 1990 Harvest States Cooperative experimental 
efforts) are a notable exception. About 95% of American 
grain farm managers choose to operate in the cash market, 
either being paid the current market price at the time they 
make delivery, or through the government CCC program, being 
paid most or all of the market price immediately and, 
depending on how the market moves subsequently, the balance, 
if any, later. 
By contrast, the Canadian Wheat Board pays producers an 
initial amount upon delivery of their grain, and the balance 
(if any) when it determines what it will receive for the 
grain pool. A specific example using the most recently 
avaiable figures (per ton) for the wheat pool of the 1988-89 
crop year (CWB, 1989, p. 28) will illustrate the process: 
TABLE 3: Receipt from Producers (14.2 million tons HRSW) 
A. Final sales value per ton $204.26 
B. Initial payments to producers 167.21 
C. Gross surplus (A-B) 37.05 
DEDUCT OPERATING COSTS: 




Lease of 2000 rail hopper cars .536 
CWB administrative overhead 1.262_ 
D. TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 4.03 
E. Surplus on operations (C-D) 33.01 
F. DEDUCT: Interim payment 15.00 
G. Intermediate surplus (E-F) 18.01 
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H. ADD; Interest earned after 9/30 .80 
I. Balance for distribution 
to producers (G+H) $18.81 
Most non-grain producer marketing cooperatives 
distribute members' net revenues on a pool basis (Buccola & 
Saubaei, 1985). In a report to Congress entitled 
"Positioning Cooperatives for the Future" (ACS, 1987), a 
committee argues that pooling is the only marketing method 
done on a truly cooperative basis and that "buy-sell volume 
should be treated as non-member business." A group of 
agricultural producers may be allowed to incorporate as a 
cooperative and to enjoy the attendant advantages, such as 
special tax treatment and exemption from some regulations 
against collusive behavior. However, these producers must 
abide by a number of rules in order to qualify for and 
maintain their special status. One of the regulations is 
that they must not do more than 50% of the cooperative's 
business with non-members. In essence then, since U.S. grain 
cooperatives do not pool and all of their tranactions are 
straight buy-sell business, this proposal would take away 
the organizations cooperative status. 
Pooling has been shown to reduce risk and increase 
efficiency (Sporleder, Tough, & Malick, 1987). However, 
most grain farmers "apparently prefer independent decision¬ 
making, believing they can do significantly better by 
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themselves. This belief...[is] contrary to all available 
evidence" (ACS, 1987). 
D. The Firm as Production Function 
In order to appreciate the role of marketing strategy 
in relation to the firm-level business as a whole, it is 
worthwhile to briefly summarize the nature of production 
within the wheat industry. In order to achieve economies of 
scale, each firm requires relatively large tracts of land; 
the average production unit is about two square miles in 
area (1,280 acres). Substantial capital investments in 
technology (e.g., sophisticated equipment for tillage, 
harvesting, crop drying and storage), have enabled managers 
to keep paid labor to a minimum and often to keep it within 
the family. All economic and production decision-making is 
vested in the farm manager, and for the most part this 
manager is a manager-owner. 
Each year the manager arranges for the required 
operating capital, for the delivery of seed, fertilizers, 
fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, and growth regulators, 
if used, and for the spring tillage, planting, and growing 
of the crop. The growing crop is closely monitored for 
nutrient deficiencies and pest or disease problems. After 
the three to four month growing season, the crop is 
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harvested. The intensity of the harvest takes on 
characteristics of a military campaign coordinated (and 
often largely implemented) by the manager. By this time the 
manager will also have arranged for adequate crop drying and 
on-farm grain storage. 
This often dramatic, annual sequence of events 
constitutes the production cycle. At this point the average 
manager will control over one thousand tons of a salable 
commodity that must be sold in order to pay the operating 
loan, to service the longer term debt, and to provide some 
financial return to equity and management. It is at this 
stage in the overall process that the production phase per 
se has ended and the marketing phase becomes central. 
Microeconomic theory assumes the product will be sold in the 
market at a "market-clearing" price, that is, at a price 
which reflects the current total supply of and demand for 
this product. 
The supply and demand will be changing over time, but 
presumably there will at any particular time be an 
equilibrium price. The grower's cost of production is 
irrelevant to the market; what counts is how much grain in 
aggregate is put into the system. The traditional way for 
grower's to deal with this situation is to produce at the 
lowest cost. Profit-maximization manifests itself as cost- 
minimumization. Prices are critical in neoclassical 
microeconomic theory because they are viewed as signals 
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which indicate to producers how much they should produce, 
that is, what their output (q) decision should be. Producers 
in theory will only produce until marginal revenue (MR) 
(i.e., price in a purely competitive market) equals their 
marginal cost (me). Price (i.e., MR) is determined by the 
intersection of aggregated output (Q), i.e., the lower part 
of the supply (S) curve, and aggregated demand (D). 
Producer #1 Producer # 2 Market 
Market equilibrium price is determined by this intersection; 
in the "long-run" rational producers are expected to adjust 
their output accordingly. Strategy is reduced to long run 
output decisions. 
E. The Firm as Governance Structure 
The foregoing scenario may reflect what happens in 
aggregate in the long run (five or more years), assuming no 
market imperfections; it tells us nothing about how firms 
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operate in either the short run (the current growing season) 
or the intermediate run (one to four years) and therefore 
tells us little about the role of strategy. The problem of 
course lies in the fact that neoclassical microtheory has a 
severely limited theory of the firm. 
Neoclassical microeconomic theorists would agree that 
their theory does not have a rigorous, "realistic” theory of 
the firm. However, they would add that theory is meant to 
abstract from and therefore to simplify reality, in order to 
make reality more manageable. A realistic theory is not 
essential nor even desired for their purposes. It may be a 
gross oversimplification to treat the firm as a "black box," 
but it nevertheless allows for the development of price 
theory. The ultimate test of theory is not the realism of 
its assumptions but rather its ability to explain and 
predict. For the purposes of neoclassical theory, one may 
argue that whatever producers really are like in reality, 
they act as if they were omniscient, rational decision¬ 
makers operating in a perfectly functioning market. However, 
it takes very little field research or imagination to 
realize that in fact producers have relatively little 
information, and therefore cannot make totally rational 
decisions, and that the market is significantly flawed by 
opportunism. Also, if one has a more ambitious objective, 
such as to understand firm-level strategic behavior, the 
neoclassical theory of the firm is inadeguate. 
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The neoclassical approach, as Williamson (1985) has 
pointed out, is analogous to physicists ignoring friction 
when viewing mechanical systems and in so doing facilitating 
the articulation of the "laws” of physics. Williamson views 
transaction costs as being the economic counterpart of 
friction. 
The neoclassical view of the firm as a production 
function, that is, as a black box with a set of inputs, an 
internal production process, and one or more outputs, does 
facilitate price theory building. The price received for 
the output is a function of the aggregate output of the 
industry, i.e., the supply, and the aggregated demand. Most 
of the agricultural economics literature discusses the wheat 
industry in terms of price theory. It focuses on explaining 
the movement of prices at all levels and in predicting the 
impact of policy on prices. However, ignoring the fact that 
profit maximizing is limited by bounded rationality and 
opportunism, prevents one from adequately explaining firm 
strategic behavior or understanding the advantages of 
alternative market strucutres for a commodity such as wheat. 
Williamson's view of the firm as a governance structure 
offers greater insight into the strategic possibilities. 
"A transaction occurs when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically separate interface" 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 1), that is, transferred between two 
"technologically separable activities" which could 
potentially be run by separate firms. For example, a 
transaction occurs when wheat is transferred from farm to 
handler-processor. There may be no technical reason why the 
transaction should involve two firms, but there may be 
economic reasons why they should or should not be 
integrated. For example, there are costs of collecting data 
and processing the information necessary to making sound 
economic decisions regarding the transfer and to negotiating 
the transfer. Transaction cost analysis considers the costs 
of handling the transaction through markets or through a 
hierarchical organization, such as a cooperative. 
The firm, having completed the harvest, is now 






Figure 2: Simple Flow of Transactions 
Each alternative transaction arrangement will have different 
transaction costs, and a theory which is adequate for 
strategic management purposes will enable one to consider 
the goal of minimizing the production and transaction costs 
in selecting the preferred strategy. This study is 
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concerned with these strategic choices, and in particular 
with the implications of the fact that fundamentally 
different marketing institutions exist in Canada and the 
United States. 
We can focus on Hard Red Spring Wheat, a wheat grown in 
large parts of the Canadian prairie provinces (Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba) and the northern plains states 
to the south (Montana, North Dakota, and Minnesota). The 
production processes, the levels of technology, the growing 
conditions, and the quality of the farmgate commodity, are 
identical in the two countries. However, producers in the 
two countries face different alternative marketing 
strategies. 
All wheat and barley produced in these provinces (i.e., 
in effect, the entire national crop of these two 
commodities) is sold through the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). 
While the CWB takes ownership and takes full responsibility 
for sales, it does not actually physically handle grain. 
Growers deliver their grain to elevators operated by one of 
the three provincial wheat pools or by a private company, 
such as Cargill. These organizations store the grain and 
coordinate the transport of the grain to barge terminals in 
Vancouver and Thunder Bay. The CWB is a grain pool. 
Growers are paid an initial set payment upon delivery of 
their grain, and at the end of the sales period (i.e., when 
all of the national crop has been sold), the balance over 
32 
the total initial payments, less a relatively minuscule CWB 
overhead charge, is distributed proportionately to growers. 
All growers therefore receive the identical price per ton of 
grain, adjusted for their particular location relative to 
one of the terminals. 
By contrast, in the U.S. only one organization, the 
Harvest States Cooperative (HSC) headquartered in St. Paul, 
Minnesota but operating throughout the northern plains 
states, offers the services of a grain pool. This pool was 
instituted this year on an experimental basis for a very 
limited number of the members in HSC's 500 local affiliate 
cooperative elevators spread throughout the northern plains 
area. The American farmer has a number of marketing 
options, aside from the experimental grain pool. In almost 
all cases the initial step, as in Canada, is either to store 
the grain on-farm (and eventually to deliver the grain to 
a local elevator), or from the start to store the grain at a 
local private or cooperative elevator. (The very largest 
operators often have the ability to store all of their grain 
on-farm and to transport it directly to a large regional 
elevator, thus reducing some of the transaction costs of 
moving the grain into the market.) It is at this point that 
the marketing options in the two countries diverge sharply. 
Currently there is about 13 million bushels of on- 
farm storage capacity, as compared to about 9 million 
bushels of off-farm storage capacity (Dahl, 1990). 
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American producers who fail to pool have three basic 
options: to sell their grain in the cash market^^, taking 
full payment at that day's cash price; to seal their grain 
in a government CCC storage facility, taking the government 
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loan rate ; to hold the grain and hedge, either through 
futures contracts or options. (Only about 5% of growers use 
the commodities market to hedge.) Although only the first 
provides the full cash price immediately, the latter two 
have the advantage that the seller is provided a "floor" 
while he is able to wait to see if the cash market might 
rise. In short, it allows him a little longer before he 
must make the final decision, "to pull the trigger," as it 
were. There are of course various combinations of these 
three basic options, and these options can be exercised in 
light of varying amounts of marketing information and 
advice. But essentially, we are comparing two institutions: 
the "free" market (U.S.) and a more "planned," hierarchical 
structure of truly cooperative grain marketing. 
The failure to implement a pooling strategy in American 
grain marketing cooperatives suggests that a strategic 
choice not to pool has been implemented by the members 
through their board of directors. It is unclear as to what 
Growers can either sell to the cooperative or to a 
private company, such as Cargill. 
Growers who choose this option can subsequently 
either sell their grain on the cash market and repay the 
"loan" or simply forfeit the collateral grain, keeping the 
initial proceeds. 
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accounts for this apparently paradoxical behavior in 
American grain cooperatives. From the producer's point-of- 
view the overriding concern should be strategic control of 
this integrated phase of his business, and perhaps "control" 
is interpreted differently. Since in cooperative strategies 
control is delegated, the board of directors' strategic 
control role is critical. We have been able to trace the 
logic of the emergence of cooperative structures. While it 
manifests itself differently through contrasting structures 
in the two cultures, it appears to derive ultimately from 
the producer's own perception of his particular situation in 
relation to his environment. The effectiveness of the 
contrasting strategies should be revealed in the producer 
perceptions of the business environment, and this assumption 
underlies the approach of this dissertation's research. 
F. The Significance of this Study 
There are three major reasons why the subject of this 
dissertation is important to the field of strategic 
management. First, this study is concerned with cooperative 
strategy, an area which has until recently been ignored by 
strategic management studies.Stalemate industries offer 
Nielsen (1988), commenting on the dearth of 
material on cooperative strategy, observes that "there have 
only been two Strategic Management Journal articles that 
consider cooperative strategy at all (Wright, 1984; 
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almost no opportunities for product differentiation or 
competitive advantage, and as a result, have largely been 
avoided in spite of the fact that they compose a major 
component of advanced economies. Firms in stalemate compete 
on price alone. For most firms in a stalemate industry, 
cooperative strategies are perhaps the single most important 
means of gaining a competitive advantage, of acquiring 
greater market power, or of creating the possibility to 
compete in terms of what Best (1990) refers to as "the New 
Competition." Institutions to facilitate cooperative 
strategies have been developed in both countries, although 
to a much greater extent in Canada. Cooperative ventures 
can be viewed as joint vertical integration, and yet the 
extensive literature on vertical integration (e.g., 
Harrigan, 1986; Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1986) refers only to 
single, usually larger firms internalizing aspects of the 
market. The collective efforts of small firms to reap the 
obvious benefits of vertical integration through a 
cooperative strategy, deserve attention. Equally important 
are the accompanying solutions to governance problems of the 
resulting cooperative entity. These efforts have led to 
organizational designs which differ for historical and 
perhaps cultural reasons, and their specific marketing 
Thorelli, 1986). The PIMS research data base does not even 
record data concerning cooperative strategies." I will limit 
my comments to the concerns of Nielsen (1988) most relevant 
to agricultural marketing cooperatives. 
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strategies differ, but the strategic intent of joint 
integration is similar. It can be argued that a firm's 
fundamental strategic decision is whether to "make" or to 
"buy," i.e., to internalize an activity or to utilize the 
market. For small firms in a stalemate industry, often the 
only way to implement the choice will be to do so jointly 
with one's "competitors." 
The empirical research on which this study is based is 
important because it considers the conclusions of earlier 
strategy research within a different context, I will be 
looking at how firms in stalemate manage in hostile 
environments, in particular, how their experience appears to 
compare with that reported by other researchers in other 
industries. "Environmental hostility" is a strategic 
concept that is more encompassing than stalemate; it 
includes many of the environmental characteristics 
experienced by firms in stalemate but also emphasizes the 
high risk factor. While there has been relatively little 
empirical work on strategies for survival in hostile 
environments. Covin and Slevin (1989) concluded that small 
firms with organic structures and entrepreneurial strategic 
postures achieve higher performance levels in hostile 
environments. They further concluded that more mechanistic 
structures and "conservative" stances appear to yield better 
performance in benign environments. 
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From my own experience I personally do not find this 
conclusion intuitively appealing. First, Covin and Sievin's 
(1989) organic-mechanistic dichotomy is probably not a very 
useful distinction here. Williamson's market-hierarchy 
polarity would appear to be more relevant. Secondly, firms 
in hostile environments which adopt a more aggressive, 
riskier (so-called "entrepreneurial") strategic posture 
tend, it would appear, to increase stress and vulnerability. 
The Covin and Slevin (1989) findings need to be tested in a 
range of different industrial and cultural settings. 
Finally, this study will be important in terms of 
comparative strategy. It is a straightforward cross- 
cultural study of one industry. Its particular interest 
lies in the fact that firms (in this case, agricultural 
producers) in the same industry (wheat) and the same world 
market but on different sides of the border (and operating 
in differently structured markets), have chosen to implement 
very different cooperative strategies. The structure 
(Canadian Wheat Board) and strategy (pooling) are more 
cooperative in Canada. Cooperation in the market structure 
of the U.S. is generally limited to initial grain handling, 
and the strategy is largely shooting for the highs of the 
cash market. Strategic management generally concentrates on 
the alignment of organization structure with the business 
environment, in hopes of improving or at least explaining 
performance. This focus often helps to explain performance. 
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but it may be that the other components in the equation, in 
particular fundamental cultural differences, rather than a 
particular structure or strategic posture, deserve equal or 
greater attention. 
In retrospect almost any agricultural commodity could 
have served as a case study to illustrate the problem of 
developing competitive strategies in a stalemate industry 
engulfed in a hostile environment. Wheat has the advantage 
that it offers a particularly clear example, and it is a 
commodity of major economic importance to both the U.S. and w 
Canada.This study's overall approach is based on an 
underlying two-fold assumption: a. there are clear benefits 
from comparative institutional analysis (Williamson, 1986), 
and b. there is much to be gained from U.S.-Canadian cross- 
cultural studies (Lipset, 1990). 
In fact, the two countries compete with each other 




1, A Structural Definition 
In the early 1980s the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
and Michael Porter (1980) identified four generic types of 
competitive systems: "fragmented," "specialization," 
"volume," and "stalemate." These four differ according to 
their potentials for differentiation and competitive 
advantage. Fragmented systems have high possibilities for 
differentiation; volume systems provide rewards for 
economies of scale; specialization is possible with high 






SIZE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Figure 3i Competitive Systems According to the BCG 
(from Calori & Ardisson, 1988) 
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Stalemate industries appear to have neither 
differentiation nor competitive advantage opportunities. 
Economic recession or growth slowdown leads to worldwide 
over-capacity and price wars; in this situation stalemate 
industries are social and financial traps (Calori and 
Ardisson, 1988). Porter's strategic recommendation is 
facile; simply avoid stalemate industries. However, the 
discipline of strategic management has a responsibility to 
confront rather than to avoid the more perplexing marketing 
problems. "Stalemate industries still represent an important 
part of the economies of developed countries, and an 
important problem to solve" (Calori and Ardisson, 1988). 
Calori and Ardisson (1988) demonstrate that it is 
possible for individual producers to develop effective 
differentiation strategies in the stalemate industries of 
corrugated cardboard paper and stainless steel. Other 
examples of stalemate industries include cement, basic 
chemicals, many agricultural inputs (e.g., fertilizer), and 
nearly all agricultural commodities. 
There are four characteristics of a stalemate industry: 
1. The market is large enough for many competitors with 
operations of optimal-size (i.e., large enough to 
realize economies of scale), and most competitors have 
reached this size. 
2. The industry's production technology is available to 
all competitors. 
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3. Cumulative experience is not an advantage (i.e., 
lack of experience is not a barrier to entry.) 
4. The products or services are well defined and 
standardized. 
Competition in the industry is limited to price competition. 
Stalemate industries are "purely competitive" in the 
economic sense.^ Since the profit margins are extremely 
narrow, the industries are very sensitive to diminutive 
increases in cost of inputs and to any downturn in the 
economic environment. Supply and demand adjustments will 
occur, but only after a long time, after many years of 
losses. It is important to recognize that this structural 
definition of a stalemate industry is multidimensional and 
more precise than the usual marketing-oriented definitions 
based on demand growth rate. For example, the distinction 
between a so-called "declining industry" (i.e., demand 
decreasing) and a "mature industry" (i.e., relatively stable 
demand) does not contribute greatly to understanding the 
core nature of a stalemate industry. Calori and Ardisson's 
Economists use the term "purely competitive" to 
describe a market in which a homogeneous product is produced 
by many producers, each producer producing only a small 
amount of the product, relative to the total industry 
output, so as not to be able to exert market power. As a 
consequence of being unable to shape the market in which 
they operate, producers will be price-takers, incapable of 
earning an economic profit. Another characteristic of a 
purely competitive market, and one which aggravates this 
inability to earn an economic profit, is easy entry of other 
producers. 
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(1988) cardboard industry, for instance, is mature and their 
steel industry is declining, but both are stalemate 
industries. 
2. Producer Strategic Alternatives to Stalemate 
From the point-of-view of the individual producer in a 
stalemate industry there are a number of strategic 
alternatives, short of initially avoiding the industry. 
Each alternative has an inherent negative aspect which must 
be weighed against the advantages of the alternative (Calori 
and Ardisson, 1988). Six strategies follow: 
1. Exit: this is the most obvious solution to the 
stalemate. (The attendant disadvantage is the set of 
social and financial problems.) 
2. Horizontal integration (i.e., acquire competitors): 
this may provide industry leadership in production 
capacity and the ability to regulate price, but it is 
risky (because one is now more deeply involved in an 
already questionable industry) and there may be no 
acquisition opportunities. Furthermore, this strategy 
may have important Sherman antitrust implications. 
3. Organize a cartel or rely on government subsidies: a 
cartel may be illegal, and in any case it, like 
subsidies, is a short term solution. 
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4. Move to a lower cost of production area: This 
strategy, if possible, often presents social and 
financial mobility barriers. 
5. Focus on a local market: the future then depends on 
the local market's future. 
6. Innovate technologically (product or process): 
innovation requires large R & D expenditures, is rare 
in a technologically mature stalemate industry, and is 
usually incremental (rather than breakthrough). 
Process innovation ("de-maturing" an industry) is more 
likely to occur but is more difficult to protect. 
3. Moving toward the Volume Quadrant 
No producer desires to be in the stalemate quadrant. 
The problem is to determine a means of escaping it. In the 
previous section I reviewed six alternative escape routes. 
The escape route of choice for Calori and Ardisson (1988) is 
product differentiation. This route will not be viable for 
most individual producers of agricultural commodities. 
Fleming (1989), following Calori and Ardisson's (1988) lead, 
demonstrates how individual producers in the apple and dairy 
sectors have managed to escape the stalemate quadrant by: 
(a) differentiating their products (using a niche 
strategy), and 
(b) becoming volume producers, or rather least-cost 
producers by introducing low cost production processes. 
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In general however, there are few opportunities for small 
producer firms in stalemate industries to escape stalemate 
as individuals. Noticeably absent from Porter's (1980) or 
the BCG's recommendations or Calori and Ardisson's (1988) 
list of strategic responses (except implicitly in item 3), 
is any reference to collective strategic action by producers 
in the same industry. 
From the point-of-view of the individual agricultural 
producer, differentiation is extremely difficult. And it is 
impossible for everyone else simultaneously to implement it. 
The prospects for moving toward the volume quadrant are 
almost as dismal. The volume quadrant is at least possible, 
although extraordinarily unlikely on an individual basis. 
There are at least three ways it might come about. 
First, collectively producers might turn to the 
government to lock in a competitive advantage for themselves 
by limiting the supply that can legally be produced. The 
mechanism is simple: each producer is allocated a production 
quota, and total production is maintained at or slightly 
below demand. In effect the producers take control of the 
market and are then able to regulate the price. Supply 
management is regularly practiced in Canada (and the E.C.), 
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but it has usually been rejected in the U.S. for political, 
2 
economic and legal reasons. 
A second way to achieve a volume position is through 
horizontal integration by acquisition. This approach, 
however, would be infeasible for an individual to implement 
in agriculture on a national level. A possible exception 
would be the case in which one had a natural monopoly.^ 
Simply developing economies of scale for one's firm is not 
enough to achieve a volume position; in stalemate all of 
one's major competitors are already at their optimal size. 
Creating a cartel to achieve horizontal integration is, as 
noted above, (a) impractical (given the number and 
geographic dispersion of producers), and (b) probably 
illegal. History tells us it would also be short-lived. 
A volume position is, however, achievable for small 
firms which, through collective action, vertically 
integrate. If a significant number of producers chose to 
market their commodity collectively (or in the case of a 
supply cooperative, to purchase their inputs collectively), 
they can take greater control of price, to the degree that 
The policy of tobacco production quotas is a notable 
exception to the American reluctance to implement supply 
management. 
^ Cranberry production, for example, is limited by the 
number of bogs, and there are no more bogs being developed. 
It is conceivable although extremely unlikely that an 
individual could gain control of the existing bogs and have 
a natural monopoly. Very few examples of potential natural 
monopolies in agriculture come to mind. 
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they can sell (or buy) in volume. Collective vertical 
integration by definition subsumes effective, even if not 
primarily intended, horizontal integration. 
Each producer can continue to produce individually 
(i.e., to make the operational farm management decisions), 
but each would join together to market the homogeneous 
product collectively (i.e., to make the strategic decisions 
cooperatively.) This hierarchical approach is in contrast 
to the conventional procedure of an individual marketing 
from the farmgate to an investor-owned commodity 
corporation. A review of the conditions which lead to 
vertical integration (Section C below) suggests that 
vertical integration will often be an appropriate strategy 
in stalemate industries. 
B. “Environmental Hostility” 
1. "Environmental Hostility” 
Hostile environments are characterized by precarious, 
risky industry settings, intense competition, harsh, 
overwhelming (i.e., dominating) business climates, and the 
relative lack of exploitable opportunities. By contrast, 
benign environments provide a safe setting for business 
operations with many investment and marketing opportunities. 
Benign environments can be controlled and manipulated as a 
dominant firm would in an industry with little competition. 
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(Covin and Slevin, 1989; Khandwalla, 1977; Miller and 
Friesen, 1983). Covin and Slevin (1989) conclude that 
hostile environments are particularly damaging to small 
firms due to their limited resource bases. 
2. Organization Structure and Environmental Hostility 
Hall (1980) investigated the "survival strategies" of 
manufacturing firms in "hostile" environments. He observed 
that high performing firms responded to hostile environments 
by developing internal administrative structures which 
allowed effective and efficient management of any necessary 
strategic repositioning. Covin and Slevin (1989) cite 
earlier studies which suggest that threatening environments 
cause organizations to emphasize discipline and authority 
(i.e., control issues) and to become more hierarchical. 
Mintzberg (1979) observed that: 
Hostility affects structure through the 
intermediate variables of the predictability of 
work, in that hostile environments are 
unpredictable ones. But of greater interest is 
its relationship with the intermediate variable of 
speed of response, since very hostile environments 
generally demand fast reactions by the 
organization. (p. 269) 
Organizational designs which are relatively more 
heirarchical and which emphasize communications up and down, 
along rather than across the lines of authority, are 
referred to as "mechanical," as opposed to "organic," 
structures. Organic structures are "shorter" and would seem 
to permit rapid organizational responses to changing 
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external forces in unpredictable environments. The "taller” 
mechanistic structures would be more appropriate to 
predictable environments (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967). It would follow that organic structures 
would be effective for firms operating in hostile 
environments, and this expectation is supported by 
Khandwalla (1977). The research of Covin and Slevin (1989) 
demonstrated that small firms with organic structures 
performed better in hostile environments whereas small firms 
with mechanistic structures performed better in benign 
environments. 
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3. Strategic Posture and Environmental Hostility 
Covin and Slevin (1989) define a firm's strategic 
posture as its overall competitive orientation, and 
therefore its entrepreneurial vs. conservative orientation 
is indicative of its strategic posture. A firm's 
entrepreneurial-conservation orientation is reflected in the 
extent to which management is inclined: 
(a) to take business-related risks, 
(b) to favor change and innovation in order to achieve 
a competitive advantage, and 
(c) to compete aggressively with other firms 
(Miller,1983). 
Management of entrepreneurial firms is innovative, pro¬ 
active, and risk-taking. The strategic orientations of 
these firms is analogous to those of Miles and Snow's (1978) 
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prospector firms and Mintzberg's (1973) entrepreneurial 
organizations. Conservative firms, on the other hand, are 
non-innovative, reactive, and risk-averse, and are analogous 
to Miles and Snow's (1978) defender firms and Mintzberg's 
(1973) adaptive organizations. Covin and Sievin's (1989) 
research concludes that small firms which have 
entrepreneurial orientations performed best in hostile 
environments whereas more conservative firms perform best in 
benign environments. 
It is important to note that this research concludes 
that "neither organization structure (i.e., organicity) nor 
strategic posture are significant independent predictors of 
firm performance" (p. 81). What is significant is the 
interactive effect of structure and strategy in the context 
of degree of environmental hostility. The conclusions of 
their research can be summarized graphically in Figure 4; 











Figure 4: Organization Performance as an Interactive 
Function of Organization Structure and Strategic 
Posture (from Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
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Although the above typology is useful, it implies that 
the role of strategy is simply to choose an organizational 
form (structure) and a strategic posture appropriate to the 
environment. The population ecology perspective (see Section 
D below: Collective Strategies) might argue that small firms 
would find a truly hostile environment to be totally 
incapacitating and that "strategic choice" (Child, 1972) 
would not be an option. 
C. Vertical Integration 
Producers in a stalemate (i.e., "purely competitive") 
industry in a hostile environment are usually passive 
"price-takers," but individuals may come together to form 
bargaining cooperatives and become price-makers. Producer 
cooperatives are a means for producers to ensure fair prices 
for their products (Bunje, 1980). Agricultural producers, 
organized as an agricultural marketing cooperative, can 
negotiate price, quality of the commodity, and delivery 
schedule, and in so doing take an active role in shaping 
their market and gaining market power that they would not 
otherwise have. 
The central strategic advantage of cooperation is that 
small firms in a hostile environment can create a 
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hierarchical structure to achieve greater market power, 
usually enough to shape the market to some degree for their 
mutual advantage. Cooperatives may emerge primarily for 
social reasons or for economic reasons. In the latter case, 
cooperatives arise out of market failure, and the formation 
of cooperatives can then be viewed as analogous to vertical 
integration (Emelianoff, 1942; Nourse, 1922; Sexton, 1984, 
1986). Williamson (1985) is useful in describing the 
underlying motivation and the evolution of this market 
structure. 
1. Transaction Costs 
Transactional cost analysis hypothesizes that an 
economic enterprise will develop a structure that will allow 
it to minimize its production and transaction costs in a 
given environment. Organizational forms or "governance 
forms" which are most successful in reducing these costs 
will have a competitive advantage in their environment 
(Williamson, 1981). The transactional cost approach helps 
to identify those situations in which agricultural producers 
will find it beneficial to organize collectively so as to 
reduce their transaction costs and increase their 
competitive advantage, i.e., move away from of the stalemate 
quadrant. 
As noted earlier, a transaction occurs whenever "a good 
or service is transferred across a technologically separate 
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interface" (Williamson, 1981, p. 1544). The act of moving a 
commodity from the farmgate to the buyer provides many 
examples of these transaction costs. Included here are all 
the costs associated with gathering and processing of data 
to create information useful for decision-making, for 
contract negotiation, and for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance. Transaction costs arise from : 
a. bounded rationality, implying imperfect information 
and one's limited ability to comprehend and analyze it; 
b. opportunism, that is, "self-interest seeking with 
guile" (Williamson, 1981). 
If one had perfect information about the future, all 
contracts would be complete. Or if people were never 
opportunistic, contracts would not have to be complete; when 
unforeseen problems arose, people would simply agree to 
workout the problem amicably. 
Williamson (1981) developed four principles for 
"efficient"^ organizational design. These principles will 
determine the organizational design that will provide a firm 
the greatest competitive advantage. This section of the 
study will review those transactional cost approach concepts 
which, from the farm manager's point-of-view, are relevant 
to the strategic decision to integrate the operation 
^ Efficient is used here as the ability to minimize 
transaction costs. 
vertically by creating or joining a cooperative 
organization. 
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2. Asset Fixity Principle 
This principle states that as assets become more fixed 
(i.e., more specialized or "specific”), autonomous market 
contracting will becomes less efficient (Williamson, 1981). 
An asset is more specific the less easily it is able to be 
sold to another user or used for an alternative purpose. 
That is, the higher its transfer cost, the greater is its 
specicifity; the greater its specicifity, the more its 
resale or market value will differ from its historic 
purchase cost. Transfer costs can arise from the asset's 
technological characteristics, its location, or 
dysfunctional factor markets. The higher the asset fixity, 
the higher are the barriers to exit. This principle has 
broad implications for competitiveness in agriculture 
because almost all agricultural assets used in the 
production of commodities are highly fixed in Williamson's 
sense. 
The consequences of this situation are vulnerability of 
producers to opportunistic behavior by their trading 
partners. This vulnerability is pervasive in agriculture^, 
^ A simple grain farming example will illustrate the 
principle and its applicability to a farm manager 
considering agricultural cooperatives. Suppose a farmer 
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and it is one of the main reasons the industry's environment 
can be termed hostile. Benign environments would allow 
producers a reasonable degree of control in their markets. 
To the extent that integrating forward reduces a producer's 
vulnerability, involvement in a cooperative will be an 
attractive strategy. As one would therefore expect, 
cooperatives have historically increased membership and 
market share during recessions, when markets have shrunk or 
stagnated, that is, when it has become more difficult to 
escape the stalemate quadrant, and when environmental 
hostility was increasing. 
There is also the possibility of asset fixity on the 
buyer's part. The theory of contestable markets (Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig, 1982) argues that the immobility of 
assets, rather than industry concentration per se, leads to 
market power. Only if assets are immobile on both sides of 
the market will excessive market power of the buyer exist. 
The reason the trader is able to offer low prices to the 
farmer is that there are barriers to exit (because of asset 
acquired a grain farm and specialized grain production, 
harvesting and drying equipment. His intent is to supply a 
local grain elevator; this elevator has a degree of local 
monopsonistic power. If the ownership costs of these assets 
is $300,000 and his variable costs of production are 
$100,000, and if he had been led to believe that the grain 
trader would purchase his annual crop for $500,000, he would 
be anticipating a $100,000 profit. Once the grain producer 
has made this commitment, the trading partner may be tempted 
to renege on the agreement. In the short run, all the buyer 
needs to pay is an amount large enough to cover variable 
costs and contribute something towards the asset ownership 
costs, the annual rental-equivalent price of those assets. 
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fixity), and therefore potential competitors for the buyer 
will not enter the market. Collective vertical integration 
by the farmers affected (i.e., an agricultural marketing 
cooperative) is thus a logical strategic alternative. With 
this strategy of countervailing power producers can 
counterbalance the market power of buyers, leading to a more 
equitable and efficient market (Galbraith, 1956). 
A cooperative may increase efficiency by transforming 
the market relationship from one approaching simple 
monopsony to one of bilateral monopoly (Henderson and 
Quandt, 1971). Such competition may also reduce market 
segmentation because owner-members of cooperatives may 
pressure management to provide information that aids the 
farm manager in making decisions. This is a direct benefit 
to the farmer; it would not be forthcoming from an lOF and 
it does not increase the cooperative's profit. Finally, in 
terms of increased economic efficiency, the greatest benefit 
of the cooperative to farmers is in reducing the threat of 
opportunism in the face of asset fixity, and thereby 
encouraging their investment in specialized production and 
marketing facilities. 
3. The Uncertainty Principle 
The uncertainty principle states that the greater the 
uncertainty surrounding a transaction, the greater the 
likelihood the transaction will be efficiently mediated by 
56 
the autonomous market (Williamson, 1979). Recall that one 
of the three main characteristics of environmental hostility 
is high degrees of uncertainty in the market. Transaction 
cost analysis argues that the potential for opportunistic 
behavior increases with increasing uncertainty. This 
potential provides farm managers an incentive to shift from 
market institutions (e.g., the spot market) to contingent 
contracts (e.g., patronage refunds and "pooling") and 
collective vertical integration. 
Contingent pricing has many advantages for a farm 
manager in an uncertain, often volatile market (i.e., 
hostile environment). It prevents both sides from 
committing too early to prices that prove ultimately to be 
too high or too low in the light of imperfect knowledge 
about ever-changing supply and demand conditions. 
Contingency pricing (in effect a promise to pay the grower 
what the buyer can afford) could also benefit lOFs. lOFs 
could implement contingency pricing, but contingency pricing 
will likely work more smoothly in a member-owned marketing 
cooperative. Since producers own the cooperative 
corporation and thus have access to its financial records, 
and since producer-owners can control management through the 
board of directors, producers are "less likely to believe 
that the cooperative is using contingency contracting to act 
opportunistically" (Staatz, 1987). 
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4. The Externality Principle 
The externality principle states that a firm is 
motivated to integrate vertically when those in adjacent 
marketing stages impose negative externalities on the firm 
(Williamson, 1981). If growers were having difficulty 
obtaining a needed input of a certain quality, they may have 
a further incentive to integrate vertically. In general, 
the strategic motivation for adopting vertical integration 
will derive from the grower's desire to assure the quality 
of subsequent stages. 
Kirkman's (1975) description of Sunkist's^ strategy 
provides an excellent example of the externality principle. 
During the early 1900s California citrus growers noticed 
that poor handling of their product through the distribution 
system was reducing demand for their fruit in eastern 
markets. Recognizing the need for quality control, and 
understanding that it is often easier to control product 
quality within a firm than across market boundaries, these 
growers integrated vertically in order to gain tighter 
control over the distribution network (also Mueller et al., 
1987) . 
A primary reason for farm managers to adopt the 
collective organization strategy is to create greater 
competition for lOFs. If successful in increasing 
^ The original name of the cooperative effort was the 
California Fruit Growers' Exchange. 
58 
competition, the cooperative will generate "public good" 
benefits for all farmers in the area. By contrast, "no 
independent lOF has an incentive to generate such positive 
externalities (although the logic of the competitive market 
often forces such behavior)" (Staatz, 1987). 
5. The Hierarchial Decomposition Principle 
Williamson (1981) describes the hierarchical 
decomposition principle as follows: 
Internal organization should be designed in such a 
way as to effect quasi-independence between the 
parts, the high frequency dynamics (operating 
activities) and low frequency dynamics (strategic 
planning) should be clearly distinguished, and 
incentives should be aligned within and between 
components so as to promote both local and global 
effectiveness (p. 1550). 
Decomposing the firm's activities into relatively 
independent functions frees top management from being 
overwhelmed with tactical, operational details. Farm-level 
managerial decision-making is especially time and site 
specific. For example, the more intensive livestock 
production activities need to be tightly controlled. It is 
likely that a farm manager would integrate forward, joining 
or collectively forming a cooperative, in order to separate 
marketing, buying and other longer-term strategic decisions 
from daily operations. 
At the same time it is equally unlikely that an lOF 
would integrate backward into farming; this move would 
require allowing more autonomy to farm managers than most 
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lOFs are prepared to delegate. "The more decentralized 
nature of cooperatives make them a more efficient means of 
carrying out... integration [of production-level and 
i 
strategic marketing decisions] than an lOF (Staatz, 1987). 
Harrigan (1984, 1985, 1986), perhaps more than anyone 
else in strategic management, has developed the concept of 
vertical integration as a competitive strategy. One of her 
major contributions is to recognize the dynamic of vertical 
integration strategies relative to the changing competitive 
conditions. While Harrigan does not explicitly consider 
collective vertical integration, and she does not give 
attention to the unique problems of stalemate, her 
implications for managers (Harrigan, 1986) hold as well for 
farm managers. 
Vertical integration "should be adjusted to changing 
conditions" (Harrigan, 1986). One advantage of cooperative 
vertical integration strategy is that an individual firms 
can dissolve their relationship with the cooperative more 
easily than they could divest assets associated with 
internal vertical integration. (This exit would not be 
possible with the CWB.) But the stalemate condition that the 
strategy is designed to lessen is not likely to change as 
quickly as in industries operating in the other BCG 
quadrants. 
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Along these lines it would appear that collectively 
integrated corporations "should scan outsiders frequently to 
assess whether some activities could be done by others more 
cheaply than in-house" (Harrigan, 1986). The purpose of 
cooperatives is to improve farmers' welfare, most 
importantly by maintaining market share. But if using an 
outsider would reduce costs and not reduce market share, it 
may be advisable to use the outsider. 
"Vertical integration is not a costless competitive 
strategy" (Harrigan, 1986). For example, there will be 
extra costs associated with strategic control. These costs 
must not exceed the benefits of the increased competitive 
advantages associated with vertical integration (Harrigan, 
1986). 
D. Collective Strategy 
Vertical integration as discussed in the previous 
section is viewed as an alternative to open market failures, 
as a firm's internalization of the open market functions to 
gain greater efficiency. This study is concerned with the 
small firm strategy of collective vertical integration to 
gain market power not otherwise available. It is vertical 
integration of a collection of organizations as opposed to 
vertical integration within one organization. 
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Astley (1984) argues that collective strategies, as 
viable means of competing more effectively, have been 
ignored by strategic management because the prevailing 
competitive strategy paradigm has focused on single 
organizations (i.e., with business (SBU) or corporate 
strategies), rather than on populations of organizations 
(which would lead to industrial or collective strategies). 
1. The Concept of the "Collective Strategy" 
The particular domain of strategic management is the 
management of the organization-environment relation. It is 
generally assumed that to some degree this relationship can 
in fact be managed. Throughout our previous discussions of 
industry structure, environmental hostility and vertical 
integration, there has been implicit acceptance of one of 
the basic notions of strategic management, that the 
environment is largely exogenous and to varying degrees the 
individual firm adapts its organization through "strategic 
choice" (Child, 1972). Ecological models challenge this 
basic assumption, envisioning the environment as the 
dominating determinant of organizational activity, severely 
limiting and in some cases eliminating the possibility of 
"strategic choice" (Astley and Fombrun, 1983). 
Astley (1984) argues that traditionally strategic 
management paradigm has characterized the management of 
environment-organization relations as having: 
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(a) a pioneering ethos (i.e., firms are solitary 
adventurers, circumventing threats and exploiting 
opportunities in a faceless environment); 
(b) an egocentric orientation (i.e., "act[ing] on their own 
behalf, pursuing localized interests); and 
(c) a battlefield analogy (i.e., interorganizational 
relationships are seen as ultimately competitive and 
antagonistic," e.g.. Porter's [1980] devising of a 
competitive strategy for bettering rivals.) 
Astley further elaborates by isolating the critical 
variable in organization-environment relations, implied by 
each of these characteristics: 
(a) the pioneering ethos implies constraint. i.e., the 
organization is constrained by a set of exogenous, "and 
rather intractable contingencies;" 
(b) the egocentric orientation implies autonomous choice; 
(c) the battlefield implies competition. 
Astley (1984) contends that what has been missing in 
strategic management paradigm is collaboration, or "joint 
action, by organizations on matters of strategic 
importance." Collaboration results in "collective 
strategies," which he defines as "joint formulations of 
policy and implementation of action by the members of 
interorganizational collectives" (p. 527). Astley and 
Fombrun (1983) define "collective strategy" as "the joint 
mobilization of resources and formulation of action within 
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collectives of organizations” (p. 578). Astley (1984) 
concludes by claiming that the first three characteristics 
of traditional strategic management must be de-emphasized 
somewhat in order that the discipline may come to recognize 
and appreciate "the institutionalization of these collective 
allegiances, for they play an increasingly important role in 
today's corporate society" (p. 533). 
Astley and Fombrun (1983) develop a useful framework of 
collective actions. This 2x2 matrix is based on the field 
of bioecology, the study of ways in which organisms "adapt" 
to their environments. Organisms adapt either individually 
(i.e., with somatic or genetic adaption) or communally 
(i.e., with communal or symbiotic adaption). Without 
digressing to a further elaboration of the schemata, it is 
important for the present understanding of agricultural 
cooperatives to focus on one of the four classifications of 
collectives: agglomerate collectives (i.e., communal 
adaptation). 
An agglomerate collective consists of organizations 
from the same species that have "dependence on common 
[limited supply of] resources, but that do not directly 
associate in order to cohere their respective actions." 
Agglomerate collectives approximate: 
...the conditions necessary for the economist's 
model of pure competition to apply. They 
[agglomerate collectives] are found in 
environments in which resources are widely 
dispersed and in which consequently, many small 
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organizations are able to compete and survive (p. 
581) . 
Information is the primary resource that flows through this 
network. Competition depends on the wide dissemination of 
information; "information impactedness" leads to the failure 
of competitive markets (Williamson, 1975). 
Population ecologists are most interested in 
agglomerate collectives. Populations are defined as "a set 
of homogeneous elements," each of which is very small and 
"equally vulnerable to the environment, particularly 
economic forces, and thus share a common fate." Strategic 
action by any individual member organization would appear to 
play an insignificant role. Astley and Fombrun (1983) would 
point out to the population ecologists that while the • 
importance of individual strategic action may be diminished, 
strategic action at a collective level is significant. 
Organizations can be proactive in agglomerate collectives. 
Astley and Fombrun rightly cite the U.S. farming sector as a 
case in point: 
Through collective action, groups of competing 
farmers have long succeeded in restricting 
competition by lobbying for favorable government ■ 
regulation (p. 582) 
Surprisingly, these authors fail to mention a much more 
important example of collective action: agricultural 
marketing cooperatives. 
Observing that there are a large number of 
organizations in agglomerate collectives, they go on to 
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imply the need for strategic control: "a centralized 
coordination and control mechanism is needed to monitor the 
execution of the collective strategy.” Noting that informal 
agreements are unworkable, they point out the need for more 
formalized structures. They cite illegal cartels as an 
example, and once again surprisingly fail to mention either 
agricultural marketing cooperatives or national marketing 
boards, both of which are legal and far more important North 
American examples of a collective strategy. 
2. Cooperative Strategy 
From the producer's viewpoint strategic control is much 
more important than Astley implies, and it receives a 
separate discusion in the next section. However, before 
moving on to strategic control of collective strategies, we 
need to review the scant but significant strategic 
management literature of cooperative strategies. Nielsen 
(1988) acknowledges Astley (1984) and Astley and Fombrun 
(1983), but takes a slightly different tack insofar as he 
attempts to articulate the specific strategies that 
collectives of organizations can adopt. 
Nielsen's (1988) taxonomy of cooperative strategies 
identifies four strategies: pool, exchange, de-escalate, and 
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contingency. As he points out contingency is relevant to 
agricultural policy, but I will focus here on pooling^. 
Nielsen's (1988) approach is to show how each of the four 
generic cooperative strategies works in a negative-sum 
game/declining market, zero-sum game, a positive-sum 
game/growing market, and in the situation where one wishes 
to change a game/market to a positive-sum/growth market. An 
example of the first situation is two school districts with 
declining populations, pooling their resources to provide 
essentially the same level of services. An example of the 
next situation is life insurance companies pooling data 
rather than maintaining their own private data banks. An 
example of a cooperative strategy for the third situation is 
Intelsat, an international cooperative effort that 
recognizes the efficiency of pooling the resources of many 
member countries to build, launch, and manage satellites 
cooperatively rather than each country having its own 
system. 
Ocean Spray agricultural marketing cooperative is 
Nielsen's example for that situation in which one wishes to 
"de-mature" an industry. Through "pooling," the cooperative 
has grown from sales of less than $1 million in 1930 to over 
$542 million in 1985. Nielsen has chosen a good example. 
^ The pooling strategy was discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter. The grain industry was described and 
specific reference was made to the degree to which pooling 
is used or not used in the U.S. and Canada. 
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but unfortunately his description of the pooling process is 
confused. He states a number of times that the growers 
"pooled their resources;" in fact, what they pool is their 
crop. They produce their crops individually, but they 
market them cooperatively, and they carry out market 
development cooperatively. 
3. Collective Vertical Integration as a Cooperative 
Strategy 
The focus of this study is the ability of collective 
vertical integration to transform the strategic position of 
relatively small, individual producers vis a vis the whole 
commodity market. For the largest firms, not all of the 
vertical integration need be achieved through collective 
action. For the largest firms, some functions (e.g., the 
storage and long haul transportation of their product) can 
be internalized directly, i.e., on an individual firm basis 
with capital and direction from within the firm. But for 
the smaller firms, collective vertical integration will 
g 
often be a more cost effective strategy. The net effect 
relative to surviving in a hostile environment, will likely 
be the same. 
The local has inevitably been weakened by losing the 
business of the largest farms who have chosen to bypass the 
local, but the "free rider" attitude of some member-owners 
has been at least as damaging. As one U.S. cooperative 
manager related, "The price of loyalty to the cooperative is 
about two cents a bushel." 
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Vertical integration reduces stalemate, but it also 
mitigates some of the impact of environmental hostility. 
For example. Covin and Sievin's research would suggest that 
the increased hierarchy of the vertically integrated 
organization better enabled member-owners to deal with the 
rapid, profound structural changes which occurred in the 
especially hostile environment of the past 15-18 years. The 
effective structure of the producer-member firm is 
comparable to the organic structure described by Covin and 
Slevin (1989) and others. By contrast, the mechanistic 
structure of the individual producer may perform adequately 
I 
in a more benign environment. 
Strategic posture is the other "significant independent 
predictor of firm performance" (Covin and Slevin, 1989). 
Vertical integration transforms the strategic posture of 
member firms from a more "conservative" into a more 
"entrepreneurial" orientation. The vertically integrated 
structure better enables member-firms to compete more 
aggressively. Cooperatives increase competition by giving 
members increased bargaining power. Member-firms working 
collectively can take more pro-active political and economic 
roles in the market, rather than simply reacting as a price- 
taker. Working collectively member firms will often be 
better able to implement innovative marketing practices. 
Covin and Slevin (1989) include as a fundamental 
characteristic of more entrepreneurial firms, a greater 
inclination to take business-related risks. One of the 
primary reasons for forming a cooperative is to reduce 
business risk by gaining greater market power. There are 
many sources for this market power: increased access to 
price information, greater ability to detect marketing 
opportunities, increased bargaining power, and the ability 
to utilize contingency pricing ("pooling”). 
Reducing risk is different from risk-avoidance, the 
strategic posture of the conservative firm. The 
entrepreneurial firm is not risk-seeking; however, it is 
prepared to operate in an environment which includes 
substantial risks. Rather than avoid risk situations, 
entrepreneurial firms are organized to accommodate or to 
internalize risk and to be relatively comfortable with it. 
Firms better able to deal with risk will perform better in 
hostile environments than firms which are not able to 
accommodate risk. Since benign environments by definition 
offer greater stability, the risk-avoidance strategic 
posture would not hinder performance in these less hostile 
environments. 
Galbraith (1967) divides the economy into a "planning 
sector" (large firms with market power, able to control 
their environment) and a "market sector" (smaller firms 
operating as price-takers in a competitive market). The 
goal of the members of agricultural cooperatives can be 
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restated in Galbraith's terms: to gain enough market power, 
through collective vertical integration of the individual, 
smaller firms, to move from merely surviving in the market 
sector to competing effectively with lOFs in the planning 
sector. 
Producers have demonstrated that they can increase 
their market power through the cooperative strategy of 
collective vertical integration. Several studies have shown 
that cooperatives increase the degree of competition that 
might otherwise exist in the highly concentrated industries 
of commodity marketing and food processing (Marion, 1978; 
McWilliams, 1977; Torgerson, 1977). In spite of the fact 
that lOFs continue to process and market the majority of 
food and commodities in the U.S., concern is periodically 
expressed by legislators, private competitors, and others, 
that cooperatives have been too successful in gaining market 
power (Campbell & Garland, 1979). One implication is that 
government policy may have been too supportive of 
cooperative marketing corporations and should now be 
modified. 
It may be appropriate here, somewhat as an aside, to 
ask whether or not there is any evidence that cooperatives 
have grown too powerful? Growth is of course a major goal 
of both cooperative and regular corporations, although the 
strategies for growth of the two types of firms differ 
(Chen, 1984). Agricultural cooperatives have continued to 
71 
grow in recent years but not to the extent that is sometimes 
publicized (McWilliams, 1977). Several studies have shown 
that lOF food and commodity processing and marketing firms 
continue to gain market power relative to cooperatives, and 
that concentration in these industries continues to increase 
(Rodgers & Marion, 1990). 
Collective vertical integration clearly offers some 
strategic advantages for small firms, but it also introduces 
separation of ownership from management. Whereas in the 
smaller firm, ownership and management may be so close that 
they are embodied in the same person, in the cooperative the 
member-owner is distinct from the cooperative's professional 
management. Governance and strategic control become serious 
issues whenever ownership and management become separate 
(Berle & Means, 1932). Issues of management-ownership 
issues are usually discussed in the context of lOFs, but the 
problem is at least as great for small organizations that 
collectively integrate. Indeed, "the governance and control 
features of a cooperative are the most important elements 
that distinguish the cooperative from other forms of 
business" (Agricultural Cooperative Service [ACS], 1987, p. 
20) . 
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E. Strategic Control 
1. The "Strategic Control” Concept 
"Strategic control" is that process whereby ownership 
(the principal) assures itself that management (the agent) 
is performing in accordance with the organization's 
strategic goals, and whereby top management in turn is able 
to monitor and to enforce or encourage lower levels of 
management to work toward implementing strategic plans. 
The strategic control mechanism is analogous to a 
cybernetic system. The principal, e.g., ownership, selects 
or devises one or more gauges by which the agent's 
performance is to be measured and then proceeds to monitor 
the agent activity, using the feedback to adjust activity, 
performance measures or strategic goals. Corporate measures 
are very often financial, making it convenient to include 
performance monitoring as a component of the overall 
management information system (MIS). Advantages of ease are 
often overshadowed by the disadvantages of measuring 
strategic long-term planning with short-range accounting 
measures and by the restriction of intuitive evaluations. 
Paradoxically, while strategic control systems are 
advocated in theory (see for example, Lorange et al., 1986) 
for the reasons listed below, in practice few companies 
"identify formal and explicit strategic control measures and 
build them into their control systems" (Goold and Quinn, 
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1990). Three major reasons for establishing a control 
system in a large organization are: 
1. to coordinate the efforts of all those who work 
within it (Barnard, 1938); 
2. to align the individual manager's aspirations with 
corporate goals, especially as regards the potential 
divergence between ownership and management (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Heckling, 
1974); and 
3. to identify deviations from agreed upon objectives 
■ 
and signal the need for top management intervention. 
Since this study is treating the strategic role of 
cooperative corporations from the perspective of the farm 
manager (i.e., ownership), the focus of attention here will 
be on the second reason. 
2. The Theory of the Firm and Property Rights 
The neoclassical economic theory of the firm is a good 
place to start, but as many have observed, it does not take 
us very far in the effort to understand how a firm is 
organized and how it grows and functions (Best, 1990; 
Penrose, 1959; Schumpeter, 1942). The neoclassical economic 
firm is conceptualized as a single owner/manager-operator 
technical entity. At this point in its evolution ownership, 
management, and the entrepreneurial force which initially 
brought together and organized the productive resources, are 
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all embodied in one person. Henderson and Quandt (1971) 
succinctly define the neoclassical economic firm as follows: 
A firm is a technical unit in which commodities 
are produced. Its entrepreneur (owner and 
manager) decides how much of and how one or more 
commodities will be produced, and he gains the 
profit or bears the loss which results from his 
decision. An entrepreneur transforms the inputs 
into outputs, subject to the technical rules 
specified by his production function. The 
difference between his revenue from the sale of 
outputs and the cost of his inputs is his profit, 
if positive, or loss, if negative. The 
entrepreneur's production function gives 
mathematical expression to the relationship 
between the quantities on inputs he employs and 
the quantities of outputs he produces. (52) 
What is offered here is a black box, which could be labeled 
"entrepreneurs production function," and an arrow in 
(labeled "quantities of inputs") and an arrow out 
("quantities of outputs.") Unfortunately for organizational 
and strategic studies, this is as far as mainstream 
microeconomic theory takes us. From this point forth, 
conventional microeconomics uses this theory of the firm 
simply to develop a theory of prices. Branching off from 
this root, Schumpeter (1942), Penrose (1959), and Best 
(1990) represent a tradition much more fruitful for 
understanding strategy behavior. 
But implicit in the above quotation is the social 
institution of property rights, and it will be useful to 
^ In reality, this assumption does not hold for most 
firms, but it is fairly realistic assumption for most of the 
firms (farms) that we have been using as our starting point 
in this study. 
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articulate its key assumptions. The implication in the 
above quotation, is that the resources available to the 
neoclassical firm are "pure private property resources" 
(Condon, 1987). The entrepreneur holds rights to these 
privately held resources, determines how these resources 
will be combined, carries all of the risk and receives all 
of the profit, and may transfer these rights to anyone, 
without restriction. 
Many smaller firms are organized in this manner, i.e., 
as a proprietorship; but for the most part business 
organization is far more complex. However, "all types of 
organizations may be differentiated on the basis of how 
risks are allocated among their constituents" (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990, p.75). There are three general ways of 
organizing a business entity: sole proprietorship, 
partnership, and corporation. A simple but effective means 
of distinguishing them initially is to consider how they are 
viewed for tax purposes. The sole proprietor is personally 
responsible for the consequences of the business activity 
and this individual is taxed on the net income from the 
business. A partnership allows a number of individuals to 
come together for the purposes of operating a business. 
Depending upon whether or not an individual is a general 
(i.e., risk-bearing) partner or a limited partner, he or she 
will or will not be held personally responsible. The 
partnership itself is not taxed directly; rather the gains 
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or losses are passed through to the individuals and taxed 
there according to the role of the constituent. 
A corporation's earnings, on the other hand, are taxed 
directly, almost as if the corporation were a person. 
Similarly it is the corporation which for the most part is 
held liable. Individuals who hold equity shares in the 
corporation bear some risk of losing their investment. Since 
they are not personally liable, as they would be if they 
were a general partner in a partnership, their loss is 
limited to their actual investment. However, it is this 
equity position which entitles them to a share of the 
organization's earnings. They will also, in addition to the 
corporate taxes paid, pay personal taxes on their income 
derived from their business activity in the corporation. 
Management, however, is paid a salary and is not necessarily 
entitled to the residual cash flows. 
There are two sub-categories of corporations: 
Subchapter S corporations and Subchapter T corporations 
(agricultural cooperatives). S corporations were designed 
to accommodate the needs of very small corporations (no more 
than 35 shareholders). This corporate form offers many of 
the advantages of incorporation (e.g., limited liability) as 
well as advantages of individual taxation (i.e., no double 
taxation of the business income). T corporations were 
defined after the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act (1922) 
to accommodate the way agricultural cooperatives were 
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legally entitled to operate. Whereas C and S corporations 
are investor-owned firms (lOFs), T corporations 
(cooperatives) are member-owned firms. Therefore, the 
cooperative corporation can avoid being taxed directly 
because the member-owners will pay the tax on their 
individual earnings from the corporate activities. 
The element which distinguishes each of these forms was 
implied by considering each as treated for income tax 
purposes. The differentiating principle for each type of 
economic organization is the underlying nature of the 
property rights that describe ownership of the resources and 
control of the resources employed by the organizations 
(Condon, 1987) . 
3. Agency Theory 
It is more useful to think of an economic organization 
not as a technical entity (neoclassical microeconomic theory 
of the firm) but rather as an established set of legal 
relationships between all the agents who have dealings with 
the firm (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Heckling, 1979a, 1979b; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). An economic organization is 
thus the sum of the property rights of those who contribute 
resources and who purchase the firm's goods or services; it 
is the 
...nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, 
among owners of factors of production and 
customers. These contracts or internal "rules of 
the game" specify the rights of each agent in the 
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organization, performance criteria on which agents 
are evaluated and the payoff functions they face. 
(Jensen and Heckling, 1979b, p. 170) 
The primary property rights are the residual claims and the 
allocation of the decision process among agents (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). There are two kinds of claims to the firm's 
cash inflow: fixed claims (e.g., wages, debt service, and 
taxes) and residual claims (i.e., the right to the net cash 
flow, the amount left after all fixed claims are satisfied). 
The residual claimants bear the risk (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b). There are three characteristics of residual claims 
which are important to strategic control: 
1. Ownership: Residual claims are owned; and if there 
is any restriction on this ownership, then the risk-bearing 
role is tied to some other agent (e.g., as in a 
partnership.) 
2. Alienability: Residual claims may be transferred, 
and alienability is the degree of ease that one has in 
transferring (e.g., selling) them. A completely alienable 
claim made be sold without restriction (e.g., a share that 
is traded on a stock exchange.) Some claims can only be 
transferred to other members of the organization (e.g., as 
in most cooperatives) and some may not be transferred at 
all. 
3. Ownership horizon: Residual claims have a time 
component, and the length of this time period is the 
ownership horizon. If it is unrestricted it is good for the 
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life of the organization. However, claims may be valid only 
for the time a person is an employee of the organization. 
There are two aspects to the decision process: 
1. decision control (i.e., the rights to choose the 
decision to be implemented, to measure performance, and to 
reward decision managers), and 
2. decision management (i.e., the right to initiate and 
to implement approved decisions) (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
The nature of the business relationships of the various 
participants is of primary importance. We have been viewing 
this relationship as a set of explicit and implicit 
contracts, and therefore agency theory contributes to our 
understanding. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that one should 
"incorporate an agency perspective in studies of the many 
problems having a cooperative structure." 
Agency theory clarifies the relationship between 
ownership and management by emphasizing the social 
institution of property rights. Agency theory argues that 
this separation between ownership and management is 
economically efficient, in spite of its potential for 
conflicts of interest (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
Indeed, the development of the modern corporation has been 
facilitated by the shift of residual risk from managers to 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
The primary advantage of this separation is that it 
allocates residual risks to parties who are able to bear it 
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at the least cost. Those who can diversify (i.e., 
shareholders who can hold a diversified portfolio) can 
reduce risk; managers cannot diversify their employment. 
Cooperative corporations are fundamentally different in this 
respect because the members are the holders of equity 
capital. However, they cannot readily sell their shares and 
cannot diversify their risk. 
4. The Board's Governance and Strategic Role 
Boards of directors provide a governance safeguard for 
members' equity and managerial employment contracts 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Composition of the board 
of directors will affect control, operations and perhaps 
strategy (Biggs, 1978; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
Biggs (1978) suggests that how directors perceive their jobs 
may well determine the fate of a cooperative. The 
separation of owners from professional managers is a serious 
corporate governance issue (Berle & Means, 1932). One's 
perception of the issue will in part be determined by one's 
theory of the firm. 
Professional management in both corporate forms is 
protected from risk, and individual owners may eliminate 
their risk by either selling their stock, or in the case of 
cooperatives, by discontinuing their membership. But the 
interests of investor-owners or member-owners as a group 
must be protected by governance mechanisms, such as a board 
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of directors. As firms increase in size and move to further 
specialize (to benefit from economies of scale), owners need 
protection from the potential problem arising from the 
separation of residual rights (i.e., risk-bearing) and 
decision rights. These potential problems derive from the 
fact that those who make decisions are not necessarily the 
residual claimants and will therefore not bear the 
consequences of their decisions. 
The governance issue is critical in all corporations, 
but it is pivotal to our discussion because it is the basis 
for the main differences between cooperative corporations 
and regular corporations (ACS, 1987; Condon, 1987; Condon & 
Vitaliano, 1983; Vitaliano et al., 1983). However, the role 
of elected directors of cooperative enterprise "remains an 
ignored issue in cooperative theory" (Condon, 1987, p. 22). 
This fundamental difference between the two organizational 
forms has been alluded to; it resides in the fact that in an 
lOF, unlike a cooperative, the rights to ownership and 
control are traded on the stock market. If the stock market 
can be considered a perfect market, then stock prices will 
perfectly reflect the quality of management decisions 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979b; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). By 
contrast, the cooperative ownership and control rights are 
for the most part not transferable, and there is 
consequently no market for these claims and no objective 
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market assessment generated about the performance of the 
cooperative corporation's management. 
Condon hypothesizes that this "loss of an important 
control mechanism," leads to the requirement that directors 
be member-patrons 
...to replace the control mechanism on management 
that is lost due to the effect of the property 
right that prevents useful information about 
management performance from being generated, (pp. 
25-26) 
The idea is that member-directors' direct, personal interest 
in the firm's well-being will prevent them from condoning 
managerial behavior which does not serve the interests of 
the membership. 
There are two issues here: (a) all cooperative 
directors are "inside" directors (as opposed to the lOF 
situation with a more balanced board), and (b) there are no 
generally accepted measures of cooperative performance. I 
will briefly review the work being done on the latter 
aspect, and conclude this chapter with some comments on the 
implications for board composition. 
a. Cooperative Performance: "Measurement of cooperative 
performance is extremely complex, yet very important for 
farmers, cooperative managers and directors, public policy 
makers, and the general public" (ACS, 1987). In its 
simplest terms an organization's performance is how well it 
attains its explicit, strategic goals. Cooperative 
performance should be measured by the economic survival and 
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well-being of its members (Torgerson, 1977). The objective 
of cooperatives is "to improve the economic position of 
farmers;” therefore, the focus should be the "farmer's 
bottom line, as individuals and as a class" (ACS, 1987). 
Unfortunately, "bottom line" includes a range of benefits: 
increased price for output, reduced cost or increased, 
quality of inputs, access to necessary services, increased 
competition for agribusiness, and political influence in the 
formation of agricultural policy. "Direct and singular 
measurement of cooperative performance with respect to their 
objectives is impossible" (ACS, 1987, p. 45). Therefore, 
performance measurement must be by proxy. 
An lOF's performance is usually measured in terms of 
stock price, return on owners' investment and growth. These 
have the advantage of being readily available, and they may 
be useful for a partial assessment of cooperative 
performance (ACS, 1987). VanSickle and Ladd (1983) have 
developed a model which incorporates the unique 
characteristics of cooperatives. They claim it is more 
appropriate than models used to study traditional, non- 
cooperative firms. They offer a performance measure which 
maximizes total, after-tax profits of members. Lang, Babb, 
Boynton, & Schrader (1982) take a different approach to the 
problem and are able to identify 58 "performance 
dimensions," based on perceptions of relative performance by 
cooperatives and proprietary firms. 
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In the long-run performance will be affected by the 
strategic behavior of the cooperative. Staatz (1984) 
identifies three classes of participants in producer 
cooperatives: farmer-members, board members, and 
professional management. He then develops a theoretical 
analysis of how benefits are distributed to these three 
classes and of how that distribution affects cooperative 
behavior. 
From the farmer-member's perspective, the focus of this 
study, the measure of performance must to some degree be 
I 
whether or not the cooperative provides the desired services 
at a fair, competitive price. However, are we measuring 
short-term price (i.e., a price in any specific crop year) 
or long-term return? A major conclusion of this study will 
be that price is not a sufficient measure of adequate 
performance. Others have recognized that we need to go 
beyond price considerations. "In many respects, the long¬ 
term market share is the manifestation of all facets of 
cooperative performance combined" (ACS, 1987, p. 46). But 
we need to go even beyond this improved definition of 
performance. The findings of this study suggest that a 
comparably important component of performance is the 
reduction of stress in a hostile environment. 
b. Board Composition: One's position on the 
appropriate ratio of insider to outsider directors depends 
largely on which way one believes the power flows. Some 
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theorists argue that the board's "legal authority to hire, 
fire, and compensate top management" enables it to govern 
effectively (Williamson, 1985). Others (including 
Galbraith, 1967) feel that power moves in the opposite 
direction, i.e., "astute or opportunist CEOs influence the 
inclinations of the board" (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
This latter contingent would prefer to have all of the 
directors (or at least a significant majority) be 
independent outsiders (Eisenberg, 1976). Recently, for 
example, after criticism of this type, the New York Stock 
Exchange implemented the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) proposal that it have only outside directors on its 
audit committee (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
"The board of directors should be regarded primarily as 
t 
a governance structure safeguard between the firm and owners 
of equity capital..." (Williamson, 1985). The question then 
would seem to be, will insiders or outsiders better protect 
the owners interests? lOF owners are "outsiders," and it 
would appear that they would be important that they have the 
dominant role. However, given the unique relationship of 
owner-members to the cooperative, member-owners are referred 
to as insiders, and outsiders are non-members. Cooperative 
boards are in this sense are composed almost entirely of 
insiders. 
Williamson (1985) argues that the secondary purpose of 
I 
the directors is to protect the firm-management contractual 
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agreements, and that the inside directors will be more 
useful in this secondary role. One reason they are better 
qualified comes from the fact that top managers, especially 
in more hostile environments, attempt to implement strategy 
in a complex of external and internal forces. Managers are 
often "less influencers of events... than controllers of 
certain outcomes" (Bourgeois, 1987). Inside directors will 
have more and better information with which to evaluate 
manager performance, and as a result, inside members will 
tend to rely more on subjective than on objective control 
measures. 
Changes in board composition, through changes in the 
emphasis of [types of] control, may have important strategic 
implications for the corporation" (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990). Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) make an important 
distinction between strategic and financial controls. The 
former are based on trying to evaluate the behavioral or 
decision-making processes of management and the latter are 
more oriented to financial outcomes of these decisions. 
Strategic controls require much more information, and 
inside directors, being to some degree involved in the 
decision-making, will have much greater access to relevant 
subjective information. Therefore, the inside directors 
will rely more on strategic controls and the outside 
directors more on financial controls. Baysinger and 
Hoskisson hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, outside- 
87 
dominated boards will reward management based on "objective" 
financial criteria, and inside-dominated boards will reward 
management on the basis of open and subjective evaluations 
of the decision-making process. And as a follow-up, they 
hypothesize that to the extent that outsider-dominated 
boards do emphasize financial as opposed to strategic 
controls, they will: 
1. emphasize short-run profits, 
2. avoid high risk-high return strategies, 
3. prefer diversification, and 
4. de-emphasize research and development. 
Given the somewhat different usage by cooperatives of 
the "insider" and "outsider" terminology, it is not entirely 
clear what the implications of Baysinger and Hoskisson's 
(1990) findings are for cooperative corporate governance. 
"Use of outside, non-farmer directors on cooperative boards 
has gained support" (ACS, 1987) . The argument for outsiders 
is that they bring a broader perspective, that is, expertise 
and experience from outside the realm of production 
agriculture. However, it can also be argued that they 
should not be allowed to vote because they are not members. 
Baysinger and Hoskisson's (1990) most important 
conclusions are (a) the distinction between financial and 
strategic controls, and (b) the effects of relying more 
heavily on one than on the other. It happened that lOF 
outside directors felt more comfortable with financial 
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controls and consequently tended to exhibit the above listed 
characteristics. It would appear reasonable to assume that 
cooperative directors who relied more on financial controls 
would exhibit characteristics similar to those listed above. 
However, it might be that the polarity would not be 
outsider-insider, but rather, considering the system of 
equity financing, along the line of years remaining as an 
active cooperative member. 
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CHAPTER III 
A TYPOLOGY OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
We may now summarize some of the main points by 
developing a typology of organizational possibilities. The 
framework will be particularly useful in developing and 
articulating hypotheses. The institutions represented by 
the typology reflect the structural and pricing options in 
the marketing situation faced by rational individual 
producers in a stalemate industry. Underlying this typology 
is the specific wheat marketing situation as envisioned from 
the producer's point-of-view. The typology is generic to 
the extent that it is generally applicable to all 
commodities. While some producers may utilize more than 
one organizational form, not all institutions are available 
to all U.S. and Canadian growers. 
Each producer faces a number of transaction options, to 
varying degrees market or hierarchical. Within each degree 
of integration there will be varying levels of riskiness. 
These transaction options can be illustrated in terms of a 
3x3 matrix formed by a vertical axis representing degree of 
As with any typology one hopes the benefits of the 
inevitable process of reductive abstraction will outweigh 
ignoring some specific exceptions. 
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joint integration (and strategic control) and a horizontal 
axis representing increasing levels of risk control. 
A. The Basic Model 
The two axes, each with its high, medium, and low 
ranges, form nine cells. Each cell would represent a 
specific potential competitive strategy. Not all cells will 
represent realistic options for all commodities, nor will 
U.S. and Canadian producers of the same commodity 
necessarily have the same marketing options available. It 
is instructive to fill the cells with examples of marketing 
strategies available to producers of specific commodities. 
The wheat industry provides a variety of marketing options 
which will serve to illustrate the usefulness of the 
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Figure 5; A Typology of Economic Organizations: Competitive 
Strategies for Small Firms in Stalemate 
Industries and Hostile Environments. 
B. Governance Structure 
The vertical axis represents three governance 
structural options, each with varying degrees of collective 
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vertical and horizontal integration and strategic control. 
In decreasing order of governance they are: 
(1) the government. either mandated or directly 
administered, organization (i.e., substantial joint vertical 
and complete joint horizontal integration with significant 
possible strategic control); 
(2) the member-owned cooperative (i.e., substantial degrees 
of joint vertical and limited horizontal integration with 
significant possible governance); and 
(3) the lOF (i.e., no degree of collective integration or 
strategic control). 
While there are numerous specific variations of 
organizational design within each of the three structural 
categories, it is more useful to focus on the three 
distinct, inherently different patterns of organizational 
form. Also, while particular producers may not in fact have 
all three structural options available in their locale for 
all of their crops, these structural categories are at least 
theoretical possibilities. 
Another way to distinguish between these three types of 
economic organization is to observe who exerts strategic 
control, that is, to examine who are the primary 
stakeholders in each type of organization, and then to 
The term "stakeholders” is unfortunately often used 
loosely (and ineffectively) to refer to anyone who is in any 
way a participant in an organization, that is, customers, 
owners, managers, workers, suppliers, neighbors, government, 
competitors, etc. For the purposes of this typology, we are 
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consider which of the multiple possible benefits these 
stakeholders might hope to receive, i.e., which outcomes 
they would most prefer to see realized by their 
organization. As the producer faces the three types of 
organizing options, the outward structural differences will 
be apparent; what may be less obvious is the underlying 
strategic motivations of the stakeholders. The best 
strategic option for producers will usually be the one which 
aligns their own primary strategic objective with that of 
the marketing institution. 
The most immediately obvious government "stakeholders" 
are the policy-makers, but more generally, the stakeholders 
are those citizens they represent, i.e., the commonwealth. 
The citizenry has a multitude of often conflicting goals, 
but perhaps its minimum expectation from government policy 
is political and economic stability. The third set of 
stakeholders consists of commodity producers. 
Commodity groups have a significant impact on policy, 
and their primary goal is survival. In the world market, 
which is critical to the survival of the wheat industries of 
both the U.S. and Canada, survival translates into world 
market share. Since the CWB is not a government agency per 
se, but rather a government-mandated, largely autonomous and 
completely self-supporting institution, producers have a 
concerned with the primary stakeholders. 
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great deal more strategic control at this level than do 
American producers. 
The stakeholders in cooperatives are the member-owners, 
and not unlike the stakeholders in the other categories, 
they have a number of goals and related expectations. As we 
recall from the earlier discussion of cooperative 
performance measures (pp. 82-84 above), these multiple goals 
make it difficult to determine a single, comprehensive 
quantitative measure of organization performance. Simple 
profit-maximizing may not be the goal for cooperatives. 
An important conclusion from the earlier review of the 
literature was that, "In many respects, the long-term market 
share is the manifestation of all facets of cooperative 
performance combined" (ACS, 1987, p. 46). Neoclassical 
economists prefer to think of producers as "profit- 
maximizers" because this assumption facilitates the 
development of price theory and leads to determinant price 
results. In fact, when we observe the behavior of 
agricultural producers, we notice that they usually operate 
as marginal producers, more concerned with survival than 
with profit; that is, in the long-run they are more 
concerned with retaining (or gaining) an adequate market 
share. 
Cooperatives in general have a range of goals, but 
since the dissertation is focusing on grain marketing 
cooperatives, we will limit the discussion to this type of 
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cooperative. It is not at all clear that most grain 
marketing cooperatives have market share as their primary 
goal. Most producers simply use these organizations to 
reduce some transaction costs, namely the costs associated 
with the earlier stages of grain handling and storage. For 
American producers, cooperatives are their preferred conduit 
into the cash market; for Canadian producers, the 
cooperatives (i.e., provincial wheat pools) are the 
preferred conduit into the CWB. 
The lOF situation is fairly straight forward: the 
equity owners are the stakeholders, and they expect a- 
certain rate of return, i.e., profit. Of the three 
organizational forms, this one could most easily be viewed 
as "profit-maximizing." It is a strictly market institution 
with attendant potential for opportunism. 
C. Risk Control 
The horizontal axis represents three types of 
transactions, each associated with decreasing levels of risk 
and decreasing residual property rights to the product. The 
three pricing arrangements are: 
(a) to sell in the cash or spot market (high risk, 
associated with completely retained residual rights to 
profit); 
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(b) to contract to deliver the product at a specific price 
or at least a specific minimum price, e.g., forward 
contracting, futures contracts or options for hedging 
purposes (moderate risk, medium residuals); and 
(c) to pool the product and receive final payment when the 
pool has been depleted (low risk, reduced residuals.) 
Growers who integrate collectively will be in a 
position to implement cooperative strategies, such as 
pooling. Pooling arguably reduces risk, and it has been 
implemented for virtually all wheat and barley growers in 
Canada through the Canadian Wheat Board.^ U.S. grain 
growers (except for an experimental group at HSC) have 
chosen not to pursue this cooperative strategy. Technically 
an lOF could implement a wheat pool, but success would be 
highly unlikely because of the inherent trust problem 
(opportunism) associated with private, pure market 
institutions. 
Again, as with the three structural categories, each of 
the transaction arrangements includes numerous variations. 
But the variations are variations on a basic theme, and it 
is this basic theme that we need to focus on in order to 
appreciate the logic of joint integration. 
All wheat which is produced in the prairie provinces 
and which is destined for export or domestic human 
consumption, must by law be marketed through the CWB. An 
insignificant amount of wheat is grown outside of the 
prairie provinces and very little wheat is utilized for 
livestock feed, but these relatively minuscule amounts may 
legally be marketed privately. 
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D. A Comparative Model 
A question that comes immediately to mind is, "How does 
this typology relate to the environmental hostility 
literature in strategy?" While one can recognize stalemate 
industries and hostile environments, there is relatively 
little empirical research that helps to articulate the 
relationship between organization structure and hostile 
business environments (Covin and Slevin, 1989). 
Hall (1980) considered survival strategies of firms in 
hostile environments and observed that "high performing 
firms typically reacted to increased hostility by creating 
internal administrative structures" which enabled them to 
reposition effectively and efficiently. Producers who pool 
have effectively internalized the market functions; that is, 
rather than selling individually in the market, members of a 
pool leave the sell decision to specialists who have the 
experience, the information, and the time to focus on 
marketing, and who as a result are better able "to 
reposition [more] effectively and efficiently" than 
individual producers without these resources. 
Earlier, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) found that firms in 
hostile environments placed more emphasis on control issues. 
If we think of strategic control as related to vertical 
integration, or in the case of wheat producers, joint 
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vertical integration, we can see that integrated producers 
as a group will have greater control of the market. 
Mintzberg (1979) argues that hostile environments 
demand structures which allow fast reactions. While 
individual producers who attend closely to market movements 
and producers who have integrated in order to pool (and have 
consequently delegated responsibility to marketing 
specialists), have the structural capacity for "fast 
reactions, the "bounded rationality" trait prevents 
individuals always moving as rapidly as an integrated group. 
"Fast reactions" are facilitated by the fact that the pool 
has a large known quantity of committed grain and has 
specialists who are often able to anticipate market moves. 
Joint integration is the structure that allows the pooling 
strategy and which allows for "fast reactions." 
Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
provide evidence that suggests "organic" structures provide 
firms with the ability to respond rapidly to "changing 
external forces in unpredictable environments" (Covin and 
Slevin, 1989). The terminology of "organic" versus 
"mechanistic" raises a semantic problem. Organic structures 
are conceived as "shorter" structures endowed with quick, 
easy lateral communication systems. By contrast, 
mechanistic organizations are "taller," more hierarchical 
structures, which rely on established communications paths, 
usually with directives emanating from the top and moving 
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downwards. Nothing could be more organic the a small firm 
where all decision-makers are in constant communication with 
each other. On the other hand, a cooperative, at least as 
we have defined it, is a large, somewhat unweldly, 
collective vertical integration of many independent firms. 
It would fall into the category of mechanical. I think here 
we have to recall Chandler's (1962) dictum that "structure 
follows strategy." The pooling strategy requires a 
collective effort; a jointly vertically integrated structure 
enables the individuals to pool. 
Khandwalla (1977) found that large firms which adopted 
organic structures in hostile environments achieved higher 
levels of performance. Since we are considering small firms 
which collectively adopt hierarchical structures in hostile 
environments, Khandwalla's findings might not appear 
relevant to this dissertation. However, Covin and Slevin 
(1989) generalized Khandwalla's (1977) results for small 
firms. They claim to have found that small firms in hostile 
environments which adopted organic structures in combination 
with "entrepreneurial" (i.e., "risk-seeking") strategies, 
performed better than firms with mechanical (i.e., 
hierarchical) structures and "conservative" (i.e., "risk¬ 
avoiding") strategies. There are numerous problems with 
these findings. First, we know nothing about the sample of 
firms. For example, were these firms the sole survivors of 
a larger population which adopted the organic/ 
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entrepreneurial approach. Miller (198?) found the exact 
opposite in his research of the same structure/strategy for 
small firms in Canada. Covin and Slevin do admit that their 
findings are only weakly supported. 
Covin and Slevin (1989) found that strategic posture 
(i.e., "overall competitive orientation") and firm structure 
had an interactive effect on performance. Miller (1983) 
defined strategic posture as a reflection of a firm's 
"entrepreneurial-conservative" orientation. 
"Entrepreneurial" management is characterized by an 
inclination "to take business-related risks, to 
favor...innovation..., and to compete aggressively." This 
orientation is analogous to that of Miles and Snow's (1978) 
prospector firms and Mintzberg's (1973) entrepreneurial 
organizations. By contrast, Covin and Slevin's 
"conservative"^ strategic style is most importantly risk- 
averse. 
In terms of the typology of organizations, the degree 
of risk control reflects the main aspects of this strategic 
postures dichotomy. Degrees of the two main components of 
the polar opposites, extent of aggressiveness in the market 
and attitude toward risk, are captured along the typology's 
^ There terminology is unfortunate because of the 
political connotations of "conservative." I will use this 
term to be consistent with their research, but it needs to 
be emphasized that there are no intended political 
implications. 
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horizontal dimension. Highly aggressive, high risk 
positions can be located in the cash contract market region; 
as one moves to the right hand side, the a strategic posture 
of less price aggressiveness and a lower tolerance for risk 
emerges. 
The cooperative literature views the essence of a 
cooperative strategy to be pooling. Firms which deal in 
highly undifferentiated, homogenous products or services 
will often reduce environmental hostility by the cooperative 
strategy of pooling. The many small firms which make up a 
purely competitive industry can structure their 
organizations in such a way as to be able to pool their 
product. While it is essential to be organized 
cooperatively in order to pool, it is important to remember 
that firms can be organized as a cooperative and not 
necessarily pool (e.g.. Model 2). For example, U.S. growers 
utilize cooperative marketing facilities, such as handling 
or transportation arrangements, but retain the right to 
actually sell their product on the open market. 
The pooling strategy represents a more "conservative" 
strategic posture than selling on the open market or 
contract hedging, because pooling, like mutual funds, 
reduces down-side risk (while of course usually reducing the 
chance of large up-side gains.) On average, in the long 
run, one would expect firms which pool to perform better 
than those which operate in the volatile, relatively 
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unpredictable spot market. As noted earlier, pooling 
guarantees (and pays) the producer firm a price per ton at 
harvest, and subsequently adds to this amount depending upon 
the final receipt for the crop at the end of the marketing 
season (i.e., about one year after harvest.) The pool price 
is usually better than that which an individual producer 
could obtain because the pool price is negotiated by an 
organization with market power and with a professional 
marketing department with access to more information. 
A more entrepreneurial, more individualistic stance 
would accept the inherent price risk of the cash market for 
the potential of substantially greater gain. Models 2 and 3 
represent a fairly wide range of aggressive, individualistic 
competitive strategic postures. In terms of entrepreneurial 
postures, the scope of this study is limited to the 
entrepreneurial stance represented in Model 2. 
If we superimpose the terminology of the Covin and 
Slevin (1989) typology (see Figure 2, p. 49 above) onto the 
model proposed in the previous section (see Figure 3, p. 95 
above), we have the following relationships: 
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Figure 6; A Typology of Economic Organization: Competitive 
Strategies for Small Firms in Stalemate 
Industries and Hostile Environments, with 
overlay of the Covin & Slevin (1989) 
typology. 
Covin and Slevin (1989) would theoretically predict 
better performance from the strategic postures and 
structures of the lower left area. We need to include U.S. 
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grain cooperatives in this quadrant because they are in 
large part simply used by producers to reduce transaction 
costs as they move into the cash market. By contrast the 
theoretical position taken in this dissertation would 




A. Research Question and Hypotheses 
A fundamental tenet of the strategic management 
paradigm is that a firm's organization structure, relative 
to its business environment, affects firm performance. An 
important component of the overall business environment is 
the structure of the industry in which the firm operates. 
Industrial structures may be categorized according to the 
opportunities within these industries for differentiating 
one's product or for achieving competitive advantage (i.e., 
lower cost production or greater market share from volume, 
technical advantage, etc.). "Stalemate industries" have low 
potentials for differentiation or volume strategies (Porter, 
1980; Calori and Ardisson, 1988). Stalemate closely 
approximates the conditions of "pure competition" of 
microeconomic theory. 
As noted earlier, stalemate products are well defined 
and standardized. Large, important sectors of the economy 
fall into the stalemate category; examples include cement, 
steel, basic chemicals, lumber, cardboard, and agricultural 
commodities (e.g., wheat). The many small firms in highly 
competitive industries (i.e., stalemate industries) will 
106 
generally share the same production technology, and in this 
respect they will be structured (i.e,, organized and 
managed) similarly for production purposes. Cumulative 
experience is not an advantage (i.e., lack of experience is 
not a serious barrier to entry.) The market is large enough 
for many competitors with operations of optimal size (i.e., 
large enough to realize economies of scale), and most 
competitors have reached this size. Entry of other 
producers will be relatively easy, at least from a 
technological point of view (Harrigan, 1986). Microeconomic 
theory tells us that producers in stalemate will, especially 
in the long run, tend to be "price-takers," and their profit 
margins will be extremely small. 
The wheat industry is inherently a stalemate industry. 
The producers in this industry illustrate all of the 
characteristics of the "pure competition" firms of 
microeconomic theory. 
"Environmental hostility" is a strategy concept which 
is closely related to the stalemate concept, but which 
offers a more encompassing description of the business 
environment. Covin and Slevin (1989) consider hostile 
environments, as opposed to benign environments, to be 
characterized by: 
(a) intense competition. 
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(b) harsh, overwhelming (i.e., dominating) business 
climates, 
(c) a relative lack of exploitable opportunities, and 
(d) precarious, unpredictable, risky business settings. 
By contrast, benign environments have less intensive direct 
competition, and provide a safe setting for business 
operations with many investment and marketing opportunities. 
Benign environments can be controlled and manipulated as a 
dominant firm would in an industry with little competition. 
(Covin and Slevin, 1989; Hall, 1980; Khandwalla, 1977; 
Miller and Friesen, 1983). 
What does the hostile environment concept add to the 
idea of stalemate? The notion of environmental hostility 
broadens the environmental setting to explicitly include 
specific environmental conditions, such as uncertainty and 
the intensity of the adverse characteristics of the 
industry. Stalemate or "purely competitive" industries are 
not necessarily highly uncertain or always intensely 
competitive. While wheat is a clear case example of a 
stalemate industry, its economic setting is also, like those 
of most agricultural commodities, now extremely precarious, 
highly unpredictable, often volatile, and highly risky. 
Covin and Slevin (1989) also conclude that hostile 
environments are particularly damaging to small firms due to 
their limited resource bases. Again, the thousands of small 
firms in the wheat industry eminently illustrate the 
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problem. The limited resource base, in large part due to 
the high requirements for borrowed capital and extremely 
narrow profit margins, directly contributes to the elevated 
degree of uncertainty in the wheat industry. 
In many ways this study is following the environmental 
hostility research stream initiated by Khandwalla (1977) and 
strengthened by Mintzberg (1979), Hall (1980), Miller and 
Friesen (1983), and Covin and Slevin (1988). These 
researchers categorize environments, as being either hostile 
or benign, by asking managers how they perceive their 
environment. We know without asking that the wheat industry 
is hostile; this study deliberately examines an industry 
which is a classic example of stalemate and which clearly 
suffers from environmental hostility. However, it is 
unclear to what degree U.S and Canadian producers will 
perceive conditions of stalemate and environmental 
hostility. 
The purpose of the cooperative strategies that we have 
been discussing in earlier chapters, is to reduce the effect 
of these adverse industry and business environmental 
conditions. Therefore, producers using different strategies 
should perceive their environments differently according to 
the success of the strategy adopted. To the extent that the 
cooperative strategies differ in the two countries, one 
might expect to find a significant inter-group difference 
1 
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between the perceptions of managers of U.S. and Canadian 
firms. This logic suggests two hypotheses: 
HI Producers in the two countries will differ according to 
their perception of the adverse effects of stalemate 
industry. 
H2 Producers in the two countries will differ according to 
their perception of the level of business environmental 
hostility. 
A third hypothesis emerges directly from the discussion 
in the previous chapter, "A Typology of Economic 
I 
Organization.” Covin and Slevin (1989) found that an 
entrepreneurial strategic posture of small firms with an 
organic structure (Model 2) experienced higher performance 
in hostile environments. Covin and Slevin (1989) further 
concluded that small firms with a mechanistic structure and 
exhibiting a "conservative” strategic stance (i.e.. Model 1) 
failed to perform as well in environmental hostility. These 
findings lead to the hypothesis: 
H3 Small firms following the Model 2 cooperative strategy 
will "perform” better than small firms following the 
Model 1 cooperative strategy. 
This hypothesis is important because the Covin and 
Slevin (1989) finding is somewhat surprising and may depend 
upon the industry. It may be that in stalemate industries 
their conclusion will not be easy to substantiate. 
Considering a firm's extreme vulnerability in stalemate, the 
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Covin and Slevin (1989) conclusion appears somewhat counter¬ 
intuitive, that is, one might more easily expect to 
encounter higher performance (even if we limit "performance" 
to survivability) in those firms exhibiting a "conservative" 
strategic posture with a more vertically integrated, 
hierarchical (i.e., mechanical) structure in environmental 
hostility. 
Related to this contradictory expectation. Miller and 
Friesen (1984) earlier found that the positive relationship 
between entrepreneurial strategic posture in hostile 
environments and firm performance, held in the U.S. but was 
not evident in Canada, This finding suggests that there may 
also be important underlying cultural differences in the 
U.S. and Canada. Their observations recommend the 
hypothesis that: 
H4 An entrepreneurial strategic posture (Model 2) will be 
preferred by producers in the U.S. and a "conservative" 
strategic posture (Model 1) will be preferred by 
producers in Canada. 
This hypothesis is important for two reasons. First, 
it may reveal fundamental cultural differences. Second, it 
may suggest that pooling, even if demonstrably better in 
Canada and theoretically better for U.S. firms, would not in 
practice be appropriate, given the apparent dominant 
strategic orientation of U.S. producers. 
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B. Research Design 
There are two components to the research: 
(a) a survey of producers to determine their perception of 
degree of stalemate and environmental hostility, and their 
perception of the benefits to themselves of a cooperative 
structure and an "entrepreneurial" or "conservative" 
strategic posture; and 
(b) an analysis of producer price data to attempt to 
evaluate relative performance of two fundamentally different 
structures and strategies. 
The survey design follows the approach of Covin and 
Slevin (1989) and Khandwalla (1977). The survey consists of 
a series of 26 questions, most of which are answered yes/no 
or using a five-point Likert scale to indicate the extent of 
agreement with a statement regarding industry structure, 
perceived risk, and strategic control. A copy of the entire 
survey is included as Appendix C. 
The method of inquiry is a telephone survey of 
producers in the U.S. and Canada. All respondents were sent 
a pre-survey letter explaining the purpose of the survey and 
when they would be telephoned. Copies of the letters are 
included as Appendices A and B. All of the hypotheses are 
tested by interpreting subjective responses in the survey. 
The exploratory nature of this study suggests that anecdotal 
evidence will be important to the overall interpretation. 
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In addition, the third hypothesis may be partially 
evaluated by analyzing objective financial data, namely, a 
time series of average prices received by growers in the 
U.S. and Canada. I will attempt to adjust these prices to 
make them comparable. 
C. Data Collection 
The sample for testing these hypotheses comes from a 
random selection of firms (14 U.S. and 16 Canadian wheat 
2 
growers ) which market cooperatively, either by choice or 
by government edict. The wheat industry was selected for 
three reasons: 
1. VTheat is a classic case of a stalemate industry, and 
its overall environment is clearly hostile. (While the 
variables being measured are perceptions of stalemate and 
environmental hostility, our expectations as to producer 
perceptions will be determined by the inherent nature of the 
wheat industry.) 
The samples were randomly selected by the 
organization from the member population. Intervals in each 
population (i.e., membership list) were determined by 
dividing the number of members by the number of potential 
respondents needed. 
^ Each grower was telephoned at least three times 
before being eliminated from the survey. 
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2. The wheat industry spans the Canadian-U.S. border 
and is important to both economies; it is therefore ideal 
for a cross-cultural study. 
3. Wheat is marketed cooperatively in both countries, 
but it is pooled only in Canada. 
The Canadian organization from which the Canadian 
sample comes is the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP). This 
organization, headquartered in Regina, Saskatchewan, 
operates hundreds of elevators throughout the province and 
functions as a marketing cooperative. Private firms, such 
as Cargill, compete with it for grain handling business. 
The SWP market share is about 60%. It is independent of the 
CWB, but it functions as the intermediary organization 
between the CWB and the farmer. However, it obviously works 
very closely with the CWB as all Canadian wheat and barley 
is ultimately marketed through the CWB. 
The SWP's name does not reflect the fact that this 
organization is basically an agricultural producer marketing 
cooperative analogous to an American regional cooperative. 
Members use the wheat pool as an assembler; that is, the SWP 
provides the grower with the necessary elevator, storage and 
transportation services. All Canadian producers receive the 
pool price less individual costs incurred to deliver the 
grain from their particular farm to either Vancouver or 
Thunder Bay. 
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I interviewed two people at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
headquarters to learn more about the Canadian wheat 
marketing system and to obtain a sample of Canadian growers 
to survey. I interviewed Verna Mitura, Senior Policy 
Analyst, and Ernie Harach, Executive Assistant to the 
Chairman. This organization was selected to be surveyed for 
three reasons; 
(1) it is the largest wheat pool in Canada; 
(2) it is a cooperative marketing organization of comparable 
scale to the Harvest States Cooperative, the American' 
organization being surveyed; and 
(3) Verna Mitura had surveyed the membership for other 
purposes in March 1990, and she was prepared to cooperate in 
the implementation of this survey. 
The Harvest States Cooperative (HSC), based in St. 
Paul, Minnesota, is a large interregional cooperative with 
about 500 affiliated cooperatives throughout the upper 
midwestern states. HSC agreed to provide names of producers 
who were cooperative members but who were not pooling. HSC 
is unique among American cooperatives because in 1990 it 
developed an innovative wheat pooling program. I interviewed 
Mr. Lanny Jass, Director of Marketing Programs, to learn 
more about HSC's program and to obtain the survey sample. 
He was very interested in the research because now that HSC 
has implemented pooling on a limited, experimental basis, he 
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would very much like to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
marketing strategy. 
Responses to questions were keyed directly into a Lotus 
spreadsheet while I was on the phone. Data could then be 
read directly into the ADAPS statistical computer program 
for subsequent analysis. 
D. Measurement of the Variables 
This research measures four variables: 
(a) perceived stalemate industry, i.e., the degree to which 
producers in the industry would categorize their industry as 
a stalemate industry; 
(b) perceived environmental hostility, i.e., producer, 
perception of environmental hostility; 
(c) strategic posture, i.e., the degree to which it is 
perceived as "entrepreneurial" or "conservative"; 
(d) performance, reflected in both financial data and the 
degree to which the cooperative strategy is seen to reduce 
adverse affects of stalemate or environmental hostility. 
The most serious limitation to the measurement of these 
variables, with the possible exception of financial data, is 
that they cannot be measured directly and objectively. 
The perception of stalemate considers the degree of 
marketing opportunity at the firm level and at the 
cooperative organization level. Four marketing aspects are 
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considered: product differentiation, organizational 
differentiation, market share, and locating a niche market. 
The perception of environmental hostility has two basic 
components: the degree of riskiness or predictability of the 
environment, and the degree to which producers can control 
these factors in the environment. The perception of 
strategic posture involves relating management style to 
group-orientation, pro-activeness (i.e., aggressive 
marketing), attitudes about risk, resource availability, and 
preference for marketing or production activities. 
The criteria for the performance variable is usually 
problematic in strategy research. It is more complicated 
with cooperative strategies because the goal of collective 
vertical integration may not simply be one of profit 
maximization, or in this case gross earnings maximization. 
The CWB, for example, does not justify its institutional 
existence simply on its ability to extract the highest 
possible price for the grower. The CWB's explicit goals^ 
are to provide the grower with: 
(a) the convenience of "single desk" sales 
transactions, 
(b) countervailing market power, 
(c) risk management, e.g., timing and market access, 
and 
These goals were conveyed to me in a personal 
conversation by Mr. Harvey Brooks of the CWB. 
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(d) market development. 
It is possible to measure approximate relative gross 
eairnings, but earnings will not directly measure the above 
stated goals. For the sake of argument however, we may 
initially assume that eaxnings reflect the relative success 
of a competitive strategy. 
In this study the financial performance criterion is 
average gross earnings per-ton^, as opposed to either gross 
income per acre (or per average farm) or profit (per ton or 
per acre). Gross earnings per acre vary according to yield; 
profit per ton varies with yield and especially with costs 
of production. Both yield and profit may vary widely with 
numerous exogenous variables. Marketing cooperatives are 
not designed to increase (or guarantee) yield or to reduce 
costs of production. All else equal, higher prices will 
lead to higher profitability, but the ceteris paribus 
assumption is not necessary to demonstrate the benefits of 
different mcirketing strategies. 
The recent implementation of the Export Enhancement 
Program (EEP) in the U.S. implies that the U.S. government 
has recognized the effectiveness of Ccmada*s centralized 
grain marketing approach, at least for export sales. While 
there is not yet sufficient data to confirm the marketing 
^ "Ton," the Canadiaui/British English spelling of ton, 
reflects the fact that I am comparing stcindard metric tons, 
i.e., adxDut 2,205 pounds rather than the American ton of 
2,000 pounds. 
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improvements of the EEP strategy, it is widely believed in 
both the U.S. and Canada, that the EEP will narrow any 
relative advantage Canadian growers may have been receiving 
from the CWB's pooling strategy^. 
E. Method of Analysis 
The survey data will be analyzed using the ADAPTS 
statistical computer program. All of the analysis is within 
the capacity of this program. Analysis of the survey 
results consists primarily of group and subgroup comparisons 
and two-way contingency table analysis. Histograms provide 
a graphic illustration of the group differences. 
The analysis of the comparative financial data, an 
aspect of the performance variable, is problematic and 
depends upon being able to reduce the two sets of data to a 
comparable form. If that can be accomplished, further 
analysis could consist of simple linear regression and 
scatter plots. Regression diagnostic procedures could 
explore the data for influential years or observations. 
It is important to keep in mind that this study is 
meant to be exploratory rather than confirmatory. In a 
confirmatory study sample size and formal rules to control 
variability would be critical. Whereas a confirmatory study 
^ The EEP raises other questions, such as its 
compatibility with the U.S. GATT position. However, these 
questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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is analogous to a proof, an exploratory study is a search 
for clues that might indicate possible relationships. These 
potential relationships might later be subjected to a more 
rigorous investigation to determine the exact nature of this 
relationship. 
Beyond the formal analysis, there will be the 
opportunity to interpret anecdotes, because these are in 
themselves clues to or further commentary on possible 
relationships. Although the sample is small, I will be 
listening for ways in which a respondent's earlier answers 
act as predictors for subsequent answers. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Questionnaire Design and Response 
All potential respondents were sent a pre-survey letter 
(see Appendix A). All but two respondents recalled seeing 
the letter and were, to varying degrees, expecting to hear 
from me. Sending a pre-survey letter is highly recommended 
in the literature (Dillman, 1978). I do not have conclusive 
empirical evidence to support the claim that this letter is 
critical to the success of the survey, but from my 
experience in this and a previous telephone survey, I 
suspect that a pre-survey letter contributes immensely to 
the overall cooperation of the respondents. 
One Canadian and four Americans refused to be 
interviewed. All but two respondents recalled receiving the 
letter. Two of the four Americans who refused to be 
interviewed, claimed not to have received a letter; the 
other two did not offer a reason. The one Canadian refusal 
was based on the fact that she was no longer farming. (This 
argument was of course irrelevant, but one is not in a 
strong position to disagree over the telephone.) 
One response rate problem is simply the difficulty of 
reaching managers on the telephone. The two major problems 
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are unlisted numbers and unusual business hours. I suspect 
that many farm managers rely on answering machines to screen 
their calls. The manager periodically will return those 
calls of the highest priority. Although I asked those who 
had machines to return my call by telephoning collect, only 
two did. 
I think that for an exploratory study, of greater 
importance than response rate and number is quality of 
response in a telephone as opposed to a mail survey. While 
one person refused to answer one of the questions (regarding 
level of gross income), everyone else answered every 
question. In previous mail survey efforts, I have received 
many questionnaires which were only partially completed or 
obviously misunderstood. This situation leads to a serious 
interpretation problem (Moffitt, Christiansen, and Fleming, 
1990). When one is actually talking with the respondent, 
one can carefully rephrase the question to help clarify what 
was intended by the question. Telephone interviewees appear 
to be more inclined to struggle patiently to answer the more 
difficult, more thought provoking questions. If one is 
reasonably careful, there is not a significant danger of 
answering the question for the respondents. 
I think that for this exploratory study the most 
importemt advcintage of a telephone survey was the 
opportunity provided respondents to voluntarily elaborate 
upon their answers. For excimple, I deliberately avoided 
122 
using the term "pooling” so as not to specifically raise the 
issue of pooling. None of the American respondents 
mentioned pooling during the questioning. (However, about 
half were interested in discussing it informally at the end 
of the formal interview process.) By contrast all but two 
of the Canadian respondents referred to pooling at least 
once, and most volunteered further information about pooling 
at one or more times throughout the interview. The most 
common reference was to pooling as an explanation for 
respondents feeling less concern about price volatility and 
unpredictability than they might otherwise feel, were they 
not pooling through the CWB. It is notable that while the 
pre-survey letter provided a cross-cultural context for the 
interview, Canadians did not compare their pooling system to 
the American market system; Canadians referred rather to the 
Canadian system of marketing canola. 
In designing the questionnaire I had hoped the 
resulting data would enable me to develop a profile of the 
Canadian producer and a profile of the American producer, 
especially as regards to perception of environmental 
characteristics and preferred competitive strategies, i.e., 
their preferred organizational structure and strategic 
posture, for marketing their product. 
Canola, an important rape seed commodity, and other 
minor grain commodities are traded on the open market, i.e., 
they are not pooled, as are wheat and barley. 
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The questionnaire was designed to provide a subjective 
evaluation of organizational performance which could 
supplement or be compared to the objective gross earnings 
data. Gross earnings was not considered to be the ultimate 
performance test. I wanted the measure also to reflect the 
degree to which the organization improved the overall 
welfare of the member-producer. There are two aspects to 
this subjective evaluation: the performance of the member's 
own organization, and this member's understanding of 
alternative marketing approaches. 
B. Perception of Business Environment 
1. Stalemate Industry 
2 
The first set of questions (numbers 1-8) was 
designed to help determine the extent to which managers 
understand the stalemate nature of the wheat industry. The 
responses to these questions would indicate how we should 
likely interpret hypothesis one. I expected that producers 
using different strategies would perceive their industry 
differently. Four industry characteristics are considered: 
the ability to differentiate product quality, the ability to 
differentiate the organization, the ability to gain a 
substantial market share, and the ability to develop or 
^ The questionairre is included as Appendix B; the 
results of the survey are graphically presented as Appendix 
C. 
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terms of the firm level possibilities and in terms of the 
larger organizational possibilities. 
In general, farmers in both countries are sensitive to 
the severe marketing constraints imposed on their individual 
farms by the structure of the industry. Questions 1, 3, 5, 
and 9 ask about the above four characteristic in terms of 
the individual firm, e.g., what is the likelihood that one 
could differentiate one farm's wheat from that of all other 
farms? 69% of the Canadians and 71% of the Americans think 
the chance is extremely low. Very similar levels of 
agreement between the two groups were obtained in response 
to the other three industry characteristics. Only one from 
each group thinks that there is a better than "low chance" 
that any individual firm can differentiate itself from other 
firms in the industry. All Canadians and Americans surveyed 
think that at best there is only an extremely low 
possibility for any single producer to gain a significant 
market share. 88% of Canadians and 93% of Americans agree 
that the chances of discovering a market niche on their own 
is at best low. 
If we turn to the possibility of organizations 
achieving success with these characteristics, the picture is 
quite different. In general the Canadians recognize the 
potential effectiveness of working through a marketing 
organization. One Canadian and three Americans simply do 
not know whether an organization can differentiate the 
125 
not know whether or not an organization can differentiate 
the quality of the grain it is handling and therefore gain a 
higher price. However, 81% of the Canadians, but only 36% 
of the Americans, are sure that an organization can. 
Similarly, 88% of Canadians but only half of the Americans, 
are convinced that an organization can differentiate itself 
and thus gain higher prices. Again, 81% of Canadians but 
only half of the Americans, are certain that an organization 
can discover or develop a niche market and enhance the price 
received for the grain. On the basis of the responses to 
these three questions, one can conclude that Canadians 
clearly have a better appreciation for the potential benefit 
for marketing through an organization. 
I should note however, that I found the response to the 
other organization question to be puzzling. Half of the 
Canadians and almost half of the Americans simply do not 
know if a marketing organization can gain a significant 
t 
market share. The remaining Canadians and Americans are 
quite certain that no organization can possibly attain a 
market share large enough to have any impact on the price. 
I am not surprised by the American answer, but the Canadians 
market through the CWB which has a near absolute monopoly 
and has enough monopoly power to affect price. The 
respondents may not have understood the question as I had 
intended it to be understood. 
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more effective than the non-pooling strategy, the Canadian 
growers would be more insulated from the adverse effects of 
the industry constraints. I think it is better to think of 
this hypothesis as an indicator whether or not there is a 
basically different way of thinking about marketing in 
stalemate. Two different profiles do seem to emerge. Both 
groups clearly understand the weak nature of their 
individual position relative to the whole industry. 
However, those who have adopted a pooling strategy clearly 
recognize the benefit of pooling. The other group is either 
poorly informed about the potential of organizations or has 
non-economic reasons to oppose group efforts. In either 
case, producers in the second grouping have a very weak 
sense of organizational benefits. 
The data suggests that there is a difference between 
the two groups, but not as strong a difference as I had 
originally suspected. Also, the basis of the difference is 
not what I had thought it would be. Ultimately, I think 
these questions test understanding of the industry in which 
the producer is operating, rather than the impact of adverse 
effects of stalemate on the individual producer. The 
environmental hostility questions (especially the last four 
of the six questions in the next section) are a better 
measure of the adverse impact of the business environment 
and the ability of a marketing strategy to insulate one from 
this impact. 
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and the ability of a marketing strategy to insulate one from 
this impact. 
2. Environmental Hostility 
The second set of questions (questions 9-14) is 
intended to distinguish producers according to their 
perception of environmental hostility. This set consists of 
six statements with which producers can to varying degrees 
agree or disagree. The questions address price volatility 
and predictability issues, the significance of individual 
firm initiative in a dominating environment, and risk, 
stress, and survivability issues. Here the producers are 
asked how they feel about their environment rather than what 
they think about the structure of their industry. This set 
of responses sharply differentiates the two strategies of 
pooling (Canada) and non-pooling (U.S.). 
As might have been expected farmers in both countries 
are experiencing relatively high degrees of environmental 
hostility. However, the Canadians as a group are 
experiencing hostility to a notably lower degree than are 
American producers as a group. The data suggest that the 
second hypothesis has more support than the first. 
The first set of responses, regarding the volatility of 
price, shows only a modest but nevertheless important 
difference. 44% of the pooling group think prices are 
highly volatile, whereas 71% of the non-pooling group feels 
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they are quite volatile. Another 38% of the first group 
thinks prices are somewhat volatile, whereas only 14% of the 
second group thinks prices are just somewhat volatile. In 
short, almost all producers think price volatility is at 
least substantial, but the pooling group is less aware of 
this volatility. Comments from the pooling group shed some 
light on this difference. Four explicitly stated that they 
feel cushioned from the price fluctuations. Almost all said 
that while they are generally interested in the price 
(because their ultimate pool settlement price is some 
function of the overall season price), they themselves do 
not follow the prices that closely because they do not need 
to make marketing decisions. 
Both groups are in total agreement that the price of 
grain is almost totally unpredictable. The groups may have 
different reasons for feeling this way, but the effect is 
the same: the groups cannot be distinguished by their 
response to this question. In fact, these two questions are 
not in themselves designed to distinguish between the two 
groups. What these responses establish is that both groups 
recognize that there is price volatility and 
unpredictability. 
The third question builds on the response to the 
previous two. It asks, given the existence of price 
volatility and unpredictability, are there opportunities to 
earn high profits or sustain great losses? 86% of the non- 
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pooling group say there is a very high chance, whereas only 
i 
13% of those who had the opportunity to pool, felt as 
strongly about the impact that these market conditions have 
on their firm's profitability. Exactly half of those who 
pool feel that market fluctuations have very little to do 
with their profitability; no Americans feel this way. 
Clearly the pooling strategy insulates producers from an 
important aspect of environmental hostility. 
Another major difference between the two groups is 
evident when we consider riskiness and firm survivability, 
an important component of overall environmental hostility. 
When asked if they thought the market is very risky and 
whether they agreed that a bad year could seriously threaten 
the existence of their firm, 79% of those who fail to pool 
agree in the strongest terms possible, whereas only 31% of 
those who pool agree as strongly. 63% of the Canadians 
mostly disagree or only agree somewhat with the risk 
statement. This number is in contrast to the 14% of 
Americans who feel an egual level of security. 
As might be expected, both groups agree (75% and 79%) 
that the grain market is a dominating environment and that 
individual initiative by producers counts for "very little 
against tremendous competitive, political, and technological 
forces." This question was designed to lead into the next 
question regarding stress, and the response to it is very 
interesting. When asked to what extent they agree that (a) 
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marketing grain is very stressful and (b) it is very 
difficult to stay afloat, no Canadians strongly agree but 
half of the Americans agree strongly. 93% of the Americans 
agree to some extent, while 63% of the Canadians disagree to 
some extent. Clearly the pooling strategy has substantial 
I 
ability to provide a degree of insulation from stress. 
C. Performance Variables Comparison 
1. Market Price Data 
Neither the CWB nor the ERS/USDA collect data or 
maintain a data base which shows directly comparable prices 
received by U.S. and Canadian farmers. It is possible, 
however, to adjust the available data to reflect more 
closely relative differences between prices in the two 
countries. World wheat prices were fairly stable until the 
late 1960s. At that time, coinciding with the increased 
competition the U.S. and Canada received from Australia's 
entry into the market, prices became increasingly volatile. 
By the early 1970's prices had become so volatile that they 
could change by over 100% between years. As a result U.S. 
and Canadian farmgate prices from 1965 to the present are of 
most interest. 
The Canadian farmgate price is taken to be the 
difference between the pool price (i.e., the price all 
Canadian farmers receive for grain delivered to Vancouver or 
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Thunder Bay) and the average price of delivering the grain 
from the farm to one of these two terminals. Both of these 
figures (i.e., pool price [Table XXIV] and transaction 
payments [Table 23], CWB, various years) are maintained 
independently by the CWB. Pool prices are available for the 
relevant time period; deductions are available from 1979 
onwards and may be interpolated for earlier years. The "Net 
CWB payment" to the farmer (in Table 4) is the pool price, 
less the deduction. 
The USDA has collected price data on the average 
American farmgate price for northern plains red spring wheat 
from 1973 to the present. The Minnesota Department of 
Agriculture has maintained average farmgate prices for red 
spring wheat during the relevant time period. One would 
expect these figures to be very similar to the national red 
spring wheat average; in fact, during the overlapping 
period, they are within a few cents.^ Given this 
similarity, I have used them to supplement the USDA data. 
Finally, the data must be normalized, i.e., the 
Canadian prices must be converted to U.S. dollars and 
American bushels must be converted to metric tons. The Bank 
of Canada calculates an average exchange rate (U.S. dollars 
required to purchase Canadian dollars) for each year. This 
exchange rate conversion factor multiplied times the 
^ The small difference can be attributed to the fact 
that the state figures include small amounts of Durum wheat, 
for which growers receive slightly higher payments. 
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adjusted Canadian pool price provides that year's average 
Canadian fanngate price per ton in U.S. dollars. The 
average American bushel price is multiplied by the metric 
conversion factor (36.743710) to provide an average American 
price per ton. The results of these calculations are listed 
in Tables 4 and 5: 
Table 4 Calculation of Net CWB Price to Farmer 
Calculation on Net CWB price to farmer. 
ewe Poo/ Ave. Farm Net CWB 
Payment Transport = Price for 
CROP to Farmer: Paid by Wheat to 
YEAR Farmer: Farmer: 
65/66 $73.38 $4.40 $68.98 
66/67 73.01 4.55 68.46 
67/68 66.65 4.70 61.95 
68/69 62.46 4.85 57.61 
69/70 61.72 5.00 56.72 
70/71 61.40 5.10 56.30 
71/72 58.64 5.25 53.39 
72/73 79.14 5.50 73.64 
73/74 168.21 7.80 160.41 
74/75 164.39 8.20 156.19 
75/76 146.28 8.60 137.68 
76/77 117.15 9.00 108.15 
77/78 120.30 9.40 110.90 
78/79 160.53 9.70 150.83 
79/80 196.43 10.13 186.30 
80/81 222.12 11.07 211.05 
81/82 199.62 11.52 188.10 
82/83 192.34 12.12 180.22 
83/84 193.98 12.62 181.36 
84/85 186.37 14.80 171.57 
85/86 160.00 13.46 146.54 
86/87 130.00 13.64 116.36 
87/88 134.02 13.99 120.03 
88/89 197.14 15.90 181.24 
89/90 0.00 
SOURCE: 
CWB Annual Reports; "Schedule for CWB Payments" 
& "Weighted Average Deductions for Farmers" 
Table 5 Comparative U.S. And Canadian Average Farm Prices 
for Spring Wheat 
U.S.A. CANADA: Difference: 
CROP Net CWB Exchange (Canada over US) 
YEAR $/bu $/tonne C$/tonne Rate: $/bu $/tonne $/bu $/tonne 
65/66 1.49 54.75 68.98 1.000 1.88 68.98 0.39 14.23 
66/67 1.76 64.67 68.46 1.000 1.86 68.46 0.10 3.79 
67/68 1.52 55.85 61.95 1.000 1.69 61.95 0.17 6.,10 
68/69 1.39 51.07 57.61 1.000 1.57 57.61 0.18 6.54 
69/70 1.46 53.65 56.72 1.000 1.54 56.72 0.08 3.07 
70/71 1.59 58.42 56.30 1.000 1.53 56.30 -0.06 -2.12 
71/72 1.37 50.34 53.39 0.950 1.38 50.74 0.01 0.40 
72/73 1.94 71.28 73.64 1.096 2.20 80.71 0.26 9.43 
73/74 4.42 162.41 160.41 0.960 4.19 153.98 -0.23 -8.43 
74/75 4.52 166.08 156.19 1.025 4.36 160.09 -0.16 -5.99 
75/76 4.00 146.97 137.68 0.991 3.71 136.44 -0.29 -10.53 
76/77 2.90 106.56 108.15 1.020 3.00 110.31 0.10 3.76 
77/78 2.50 91.86 110.90 0.940 2.84 104.28 0.34 12.42 
78/79 2.84 104.35 150.83 0.877 3.60 132.28 0.76 27.93 
79/80 3.65 134.11 186.30 0.854 4.33 159.03 0.68 24.91 
80/81 4.12 151.38 211.05 0.855 4.91 180.53 0.79 29.15 
81/82 3.73 137.05 188.10 0.834 4.27 156.88 0.54 19.82 
82/83 3.56 130.81 180.22 0.816 4.00 147.06 0.44 16.25 
83/84 3.71 136.32 181.36 0.811 4.00 147.16 0.29 10.84 
84/85 3.54 130.07 171.57 0.772 3.61 132.50 0.07 2.43 
85/86 3.42 125.66 146.54 0.733 2.92 107.34 -0.50 -18.32 
86/87 2.56 94.06 116.36 0.719 2.28 83.71 -0.28 -10.35 
87/88 2.65 97.37 120.03 0.754 2.46 90.54 -0.19 -6.83 
88/89 3.80 139.63 181.24 0.812 4.01 147.24 0.21 7.61 
89/90 0.00 0.00 0.845 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AVERAGE $0.15 $5.67 
NOTES: 
The "Net CWB" price/tonne is the CWB pool price less the average cost to transport grain to 
Vancouver or Thunder Bay (in Canadian dollars), for the year of concern. 
1 bushel = 60 lbs; 1 metric tonne = 36.743710 bushels (2,204.6226 lbs.) 
SOURCES: 
Canadian prices: The Canadian Wheat Board "Annual Reports:" Payments & Deductions 
U.S. prices: 1965-1973: Minnesota Department of Agriculture, Statistics Division. 
1973-1989: "Wheat: Situation and Outlook Reports." Economic Research Service, USDA. 
Exchange rates: Bank of Canada statistics (provided by CWB). 
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The Canadian price appears on average to be higher than 
the U.S. price. At first glance, this fact might argue for 
the greater effectiveness of the Canadian marketing 
strategy. However, it is difficult to infer this 
conclusively, based solely on price data, because the data 
are not truly comparable. While the Canadian price appears 
to be slightly higher, this situation is not totally 
unexpected. There are possible alternative explanations for 
a higher Canadian grain price. Canadian grain is cleaner 
and brings a higher price on the world market. Presenting a 
higher quality grain is a form of product differentiation, 
and this wheat marketing strategy is easier to implement 
through a centralized marketing board approach. However, 
there is an indirect cost associated with this processing. 
2. Average versus Weighted Average Prices 
A pool price is essentially a weighted average price. 
A certain amount of grain is placed in a pool, and 
throughout the term of the pool, various amounts are sold at 
various prices. At the termination of the pool all the 
grain will have been sold. The pool price is determined by 
dividing the total dollar amount received (less a relatively 
insignificant amount for overhead) by the total number of 
bushels sold. All Canadian growers receive the identical 
^ Similarly, the CWB's monopoly power in the domestic 
market enhances the overall price to farmers. 
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price per bushel (ignoring small individual adjustments for 
transportation). Therefore, if we want to compare marketing 
strategies by comparing the CWB pool price per bushel to the 
price per bushel received by American farmers, we must 
compare it to a weighted average. Even then we will only be 
able to say that on average, the American price was higher 
or lower than the Canadian. We will be able to conclude 
very little about any specific American grower. 
A weighted average price is really the figure we need 
for comparison, not simply the average cash price for the 
year or month, the only agricultural data currently 
monitored. In order to determine the relative benefit of 
one strategy over another, we need to know how much wheat 
was sold a what price, that is, we need to compare weighted 
average prices. This data is simply not available. 
The difference between a pool price and the fluctuating 
cash market price, is illustrated by a graph devised by 
Harvest States Cooperative (see Figure 7). The purpose of 
the graph is to demonstrate the potential benefits of 
pooling. When plotted against price per bushel on the 
vertical axis and time (i.e., term of pool) on the 
horizontal axis, the final pool price will of course be a 
horizontal line at some particular price level. The daily 
cash price can then be overlaid to reveal those days on 
which a more aggressive, less cooperative strategy would 
have outperformed the pooling strategy. 
MCCANNA. ND - SPRING WHEAT 
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Ficmre 7. Comparison of HSC Wheat Pool Settlement Price and 
the Net Cash Value for Elevator Stored Spring Wheat 
in McCanna, ND (2/26/90 - 7/27/90). HSC, 1990. 
However, in order to determine how well a particular non¬ 
pooling strategy would have performed, one must know how 
many bushels were in fact sold on which days. 
3. Market Distortions 
Even if it were possible to construct U.S. weighted 
average prices received, the enormous amount of other 
payments to producers, i.e., government subsidies in one 
form or another, in both countries precludes meaningful 
The "net cash value" (NCV) is calculated each day of 
the pool period for each location. The NCV is defined as the 
cash market price a producer can receive minus the cost of 
carrying the grain since the start of the pool period. 
For elevator stored grain, the costs are interest and 
storage. (For farm stored grain, the major cost is interest. 
HSC also deducts a nominal aunount from the farm storage NCV 
to reflect the cost of shrink or quality deterioration.) 
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price comparisons. The operations of the CWB are financed 
completely from grain sales (refer back to Table 3) and 
should not be thought of as a subsidy^. This direct 
marketing cost is deducted to calculate the "net price 
received” (see Table 4). The comparison problem arises as 
one tries to include non-market producer income. 
t 
If one knew that each year the total amounts of the 
subsidies were approximately equal in the two countries 
while at the same time the prices received differed greatly, 
one might reasonably conclude that the system which offered 
the higher price was likely the more effective. However, 
the subsidy levels are rarely the same in the two countries 
and the prices on average are close. From year to year the 
nature and the total amounts of the subsidies in the two 
countries vary, often dramatically. Therefore, one cannot 
ignore government support costs in comparing costs and 
benefits to growers using differing marketing strategies. 
If the free trade goals of the U.S. proposals to the 
recently concluded round of GATT talks were to have been 
implemented, the subsidy complications would eventually be 
eliminated and prices henceforth would become comparable. 
In rare cases the initial CWB payment to producers 
will be higher than the final pool settlement price. This 
initial price is guaranteed, regardless of the settlement 
price. Therefore, the difference between the initial 
payment and a lower settlement price, would have to be 
considered a subsidy. 
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The U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (FTA)^ envisions 
"free trade" somewhat more broadly, i.e., subsidies need not 
be eliminated but they do have to be equal in the two 
countries. The agricultural chapter of the FTA includes a 
provision on market access for grain and grain products. 
Canada protects its grain industry by requiring import 
permits for wheat, barley, and oats. The FTA requires 
Canada to eliminate its import permits when the U.S. level 
of government support becomes equal to or less than 
Canada's. Canada now no longer requires import permits for 
oats and oat products because U.S. support for oats was 
lower than Canada's in 1989. (GAO, 1990) 
In short, one-way market access is available to the 
country with the lower level of subsidy. Current 
calculations indicate that Canada's total 1990 subsidies for 
wheat and barley are slightly lower (about 1% lower). 
Therefore, Canada could, if it so desired, freely export 
grain into the American domestic market. However, given the 
extremely low cash market price, there is currently little 
incentive for Canada to export into the U.S. By contrast, 
potential U.S. grain exports into the Canadian domestic 
market are of greater interest to both parties. The 
^ On January 2, 1988 the U.S. and Canada entered into 
the Free Trade Agreement. The countries negotiated the 
agreement, which became effective January 1, 1989, with the 
intent to eventually eliminate trade barriers in order to 
improve market access to each country's goods and services. 
The agreed upon goal was to eliminate all tariffs within ten 
years. 
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monopoly power generated by the CWB arrangement and the 
protective tariff, keeps the Canadian domestic market price 
firm relative to the world wheat price. Obviously, Canada 
would like to retain control of this market, and the U.S. 
would like the opportunity to compete in this market. 
The economic importance of the Canadian market leads to 
considerable discussion of how the government support levels 
should be calculated. This concern is particularly evident 
in a year, such as 1990, when (a) the world wheat market is 
depressed, and (b) the support levels are extremely close, 
with a high possibility that the relative positions of the 
two countries might switch. 
There is the obvious problem of agreeing upon what in 
fact constitutes a subsidy. The FTA specifically identifies 
the sources of data and the formulas used to derive each 
country's level of government support. If one simply 
examines the U.S. support calculations, a total of 25 
elements in 13 major categories of direct and indirect 
support must be considered. The 1987 U.S. "policy 
transfers" to wheat producers are reported (in millions of 
dollars) in Table 6: 
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Table 6. U.S. Government Support (in millions of dollars) for Wheat in 1987 (from GAO, 1990). 
A. DIRECT PAYMENTS: $3,129.09 
1. Payments of the Commodity Credit Corporation: 3,279.06 
a. Deficiency payments 3,279.06 
b. Disaster payments 0.00 
c. Diversion payments 0.00 
2. CCC storage payments 144.75 
3. Conservation Reserve Program 102.47 
4. Acreage Reduction Program -479.54 
5. Certificate premiums & discounts 82.35 
B. OTHER SUPPORT: 2,178.27 
6. CCC loan forfeiture benefits 105.51 
7. Price enhancement 1,433.00 
8. Advance payments benefits 9.65 
9. Crop Insurance 1.64 
10. Government service programs: 103.56 
a. Federal grain inspection 0.35 
b. Research & extension 44.05 
c. Irrigation 4.18 
d. Inland waterways freight 17.60 
e. Conservation 27.34 
f. Rail freight 0.79 
g. Low interest loans for rail 1.62 
h. Cooperator export programs 1.07 
i. Marketing services 0.64 
j. Plant disease & pest control 4.59 
k. Targeted export assistance 1.34 
11. CCC commodity loans 308.47 
12. State budget outlays 106.00 
13. Farm credit programs 110.43 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT $5,307.37 
The year to year accounting process is further complicated 
by the volatility of the subsidy amounts, and by the fact 
that subsidies can move in different directions in the two 
countries. 
The percent of a grower's income that comes from 
government support is calculated by dividing total 
government support by the adjusted producer value. 
"Adjusted producer value" is simply the sum of the actual 
value of wheat production and the direct transfer payments. 
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TABLE 7. Calculation of U.S. Wheat Percent Level of 1987 U.S. Government Support (from 
GAO, 1990). 
A. VALUE OF PRODUCTION: 
Level of production (MT^) 57.36 
X Producer price ($/ton) $95.84 
= Value of production (x $1 billion) $5,497 
B. GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS TO PRODUCERS (x $ billion): 
Direct payments 3.129 
+ Indirect payments 2.178 
= Total government payments $5,307 
C. ADJUSTED PRODUCER VALUE: 
Value of wheat production (A) 5.497 
+ Direct payments (from B) 3.129 
= "Adjusted producer value" $8,626 
D. PERCENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT: 
Total government payments (B) $5,307 
/ Adjusted producer value (C) 8.626 
X 100 .615 
= Percent level of support 61.5% 
During the same year, equivalent calculations showed 
that Canadian wheat producers derived only 46.7% of their 
income from government support. Therefore, the Canadian 
domestic wheat market would clearly not have been open to 
American competition in that year. However, similar 
calculations for 1990 indicate the percent levels of support 
are 45.80% for the U.S. and 44.83% for Canada, a difference 
of less than 1%. At these levels the U.S. would remain 
excluded, but the calculations become more critical and 
controversial. 
One conclusion from the foregoing analysis is that 
"producer price ($/ton)" is probably not as useful an 
8 
Expressed in millions of metric tons (MT) 
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indicator of performance as it might first appear to be. 
The necessary adjustments to price received are 
substantially more complicated than multiplying the Canadian 
prices by the annual exchange rates and making deductions 
for the annual CWB overhead and related expenses. 
Allowances must be made for non-market payments, but until 
the FTA reguired these calculations, they were not made in a 
standardized, rigorous manner.^ While we can conclude from 
the data available, that actual cash price for wheat in the 
two countries is similar, it is impossible to determine the 
precise, effective price differentials. It is therefore 
impossible either to support or to reject hypothesis 3 on 
the basis of price alone. Since price advantage is 
indeterminate, we need another indicator of performance. 
4. Non-price Performance Measures 
In light of the enormous obstacles to comparing 
benefits of pooling and non-pooling strategies in terms of 
price enhancements, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
U.S. and Canadian pool administrators who I interviewed 
never mentioned higher price per bushel as a strategic goal. 
Even with today's more accurate cost accounting, it 
would be difficult to establish comparable prices received 
in the two countries. The FtA calculations use the average 
of two previous years as a proxy for the current year's 
government support level, and growers often do not know what 
their final payment will be for 18 months after harvest. 
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Pool managers cited a number of benefits to all participants 
or components of the industry. 
For example, these executives point out that pooling 
leads to a more rational flow of grain through the market. 
It is easier to coordinate rail and water transportation 
needs. It is easier to meet the enormous grain storage 
needs with the limited terminal storage capacity. When 
Canadians discuss pooling, they compare the marketing of 
wheat, the main commodity pooled, not with the American 
system of marketing wheat (as I had expected they would), 
but rather with the marketing of canola, the main commodity 
marketed without benefit of a pooling strategy. Terminal 
storage is needed for both commodities, but due to the more 
orderly flow of wheat, wheat utilizes existing storage three 
to four times more efficiently than does canola. Pooling 
results in a better through flow, and in this manner pooling 
reduces transaction costs for all participants. 
Pooling gives managers of marketing organizations 
control over larger amounts of grain and therefore greater 
flexibility in arranging larger grain deals more quickly. 
In Canada this leads to the ability to offer buyers "one 
desk" shopping. This feature is especially attractive to 
large buyers, such as Russia. Again, the strategy enables 
seller and buyer to reduces transaction costs. Canadians 
This observation was made during my interview of Ms. 
Mitura and Mr. Harach of the SWP (October 1990). 
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are thus able to compete on service rather than solely on 
price. Similarly, since the CWB has control of the total 
national supply of wheat, a grain quality program (e.g., 
cleanliness and graded protein content) can be implemented 
with the intention of differentiating Canadian grain. 
Again, this leads to non-price competition. Without total 
supply control, transaction costs would be too high to make 
such a program feasible. 
As with the other market participants, the main benefit 
of pooling to individual producers is that transaction costs 
are reduced. Managers do not speak specifically in terms of 
transaction cost benefits, such as reducing some of the 
limitations imposed by the "bounded rationality" of 
individual producers. But in effect this is what pool 
managers and producers mean when they observe that fewer of 
the producer firm's limited resources must be devoted to 
monitoring the market, attempting to anticipate its 
movements, and deciding on when to sell grain. Almost all 
producers in both countries (83%) claim in the survey to be 
primarily interested in production (question 19). They also 
feel that they receive a better return on those resources 
devoted to production (question 20). In short, they clearly 
believe that their comparative advantage is in production as 
opposed to marketing. (The question that comes immediately 
to mind is that if farmers in both countries feel this way, 
why do Americans devote so many resources to marketing?) 
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Lanny Jass of Harvest States stated that the main 
service the cooperative's pools offer is to "pull the 
trigger" for the grower. If one refers back to Figure 5, it 
is evident that timing of sales is critical to success in 
the cash market. Timing is the single greatest source of 
risk and stress. When the pool's marketing specialists 
assume the responsibility for timing (i.e., "pull the" 
trigger"), they also reduce the stress associated with the 
marketing decision. 
It is not necessary to stretch the term "transaction 
costs" to include stress. The transaction cost which is 
reduced is the cost of gathering enough information to make 
a rational marketing decision. By transferring the firm's 
marketing decisions to a jointly integrated organization, 
price variability is reduced, and a by-product is lower 
stress. There will be times when there may not be any 
attractive prices in the market. For example, current wheat 
prices, which earlier were volatile and unpredictable -but 
overall high, are now moving in a steady downward direction 
with little likelihood of increasing over the next year. 
Growers will not necessarily be truly satisfied with the 
price received either in the cash market or with the pool 
settlement price. However, those who delegate 
responsibility to the pool will lower transaction costs, 
will experience less stress, and most likely will receive a 
higher overall price than those who fail to pool. Many, 
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perhaps most, of those who are not pooling their grain are 
currently holding their grain in storage. 
The survey reveals a substantially lower level of 
stress among those who pool (refer back to the discussion of 
question 14). The telephone interview conversations with 
producers corroborate these relatively different degrees of 
stress. Both American and Canadian producers were 
remarkably open and cooperative during the telephone 
interviews. The most overriding difference was in apparent 
levels of stress regarding the market. All are concerned 
with the dramatic decline in the market and with the low 
prospects for recovery in the near future. However, the 
Canadian producers as a group express considerably less 
anxiety and reveal a greater distancing from the day-to-day 
marketing decisions. 
A number of American growers had failed to sell any of 
their grain at the time of the interview (fall 1990). They 
are now in the position of either (a) selling at the lowest 
price this year or (b) holding their grain, and as a 
consequence, continuing to pay a monthly fee (about three 
cents per bushel per month), not having use of the sale 
proceeds, and hoping against very high odds that the market 
price will at some point increase by more than their storage 
costs and interest foregone. 
An anecdote from an American survey respondent 
illustrates the problem well. Earlier in the year this 
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grower encountered the cooperative manager at the gasoline 
station. The elevator manager told the grower that the 
cooperative had contracts for wheat at $3.36 per bushel. 
While the price had a few times earlier in the season been 
slightly higher, the cooperative manager did not feel the 
price would go any higher this year. Recall that the USDA 
had projected that the 1990 wheat crop prices would be in 
the $2.90 to $3.30 range. The farmer said he would try to 
come by that afternoon, if he could finish servicing his 
truck in time. He did not find the time that day, but he 
did go down to the elevator first thing the next morning. 
Unfortunately by that time, the price had dropped twenty 
cents per bushel, the entire profit margin that this grower 
could have expected. 
I asked him what he did. He answered that he kept the 
grain in storage (at three cents per bushel per month) and 
had watched with frustration as the price continued to fall 
to its current level of $2.51 per bushel. He has now 
"sealed” his grain (i.e., is using it as collateral for a 
Commodity Credit Corporation [CCC] loan) and used the $1.90 
CCC loan to pay some of his operating expenses. However, 
his total cost of production is substantially over $2.51. 
If he sells now, he will not cover his variable costs. Yet 
in order to operate for another crop year, he must pay the 
already incurred operating expenses. His alternative is to 
"roll- over" his operating loan into a term loan, a 
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procedure not favored by bankers. I asked him, "If you had 
known at the beginning of the growing season that you would 
not receive more than $2.50 per bushel, would you have 
borrowed money and exerted the effort to plant, grow, and 
harvest the crop?" His answer was an unqualified, "No 
way!"” Two things struck me: first, the openness with 
which he told me, a stranger on the telephone, this moving 
story; and secondly, his tone of deep, overwhelming 
depression, his sense of being individually powerless, and 
his obviously high stress level. 
Conversations with Canadian producers provide a sharp 
contrast. All Canadian responses can easily be placed into 
one of two categories: focus on production or focus on 
marketing. Only one producer can be placed in the second 
category. All producers but one identify their primary 
interests and competitive advantage as production rather 
than marketing. Most volunteered that they follow the 
market somewhat but only out of curiosity because their 
final pool price to some degree reflects the general trend. 
As noted earlier, they all recognize that the wheat market 
price is volatile and unpredictable. 
All but one Canadian and all but one American agree 
that the business of producing grain places severe demands 
Ironically, he could have purchased a futures 
contract or a put option where by he could have sold all or 
a large part of his crop at a guaranteed price well above 
his break-even point. 
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on their available resources (question 17). Furthermore, 
71% of the Americans claim not to have adequate resources 
left over to do an adequate job of marketing (question 18). 
Canadians generally do not consider this an issue because 
they pool. (So once again, the question comes to mind, why 
are the Americans marketing their grain individually in the 
cash market?) 
While a few Canadians expressed concerns about the 
governance of the provincial wheat pool and/or the CWB, 88% 
of those who had the option to pool are satisfied or highly 
satisfied with their marketing system (question 22) and 88% 
are relatively satisfied with their financial return from 
this system (question 23). By contrast, no American 
surveyed is highly satisfied with either the system or the 
returns. 
In summary, the survey results suggest that it is 
possible to develop a non-price measure of relative 
performance of marketing strategies. The preferred strategy 
should be the strategy which results in a greater reduction 
in stress and which increases firm survivability, in short, 
the strategy which better reduces the impact of 
environmental hostility. The wheat market is inherently 
difficult. Structurally it is a stalemate industry and it 
exists within a hostile environment. While it is not 
evident which strategy, if any, has a price performance 
advantage, clearly the collective strategy of pooling 
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performs better in terms of reducing transaction costs and 
in particular, on the firm level, reducing stress and 
increasing survivability. 
Again, an anecdote is representative of the overall 
effect of joint vertical integration, of producing at ‘the 
local level but integrating to carry out marketing at a 
higher level. I interviewed one respondent over the 
telephone while he was working in his machine shop. At the 
end of the formal survey questioning, I thanked him for his 
time and specifically apologized for taking time from his 
repair or maintenance of his farm machinery. He said that 
he had enjoyed talking, and in any case he was not working 
on his machinery but rather on completing his conversion of 
a bus into a mobile home for a trip this winter. He was 
planning to take his wife, his two young daughters, and 
himself on a trip to Mexico where there would be "lots of 
sun and cheap tequila." He felt it would cost him less to 
make this trip and it would be more fun for his family, than 
it would be to over-winter in northern Saskatchewan. 
Most interesting for this study, he felt there was 
nothing he could do to improve the pool settlement price he 
would eventually receive. He would like to earn a greater 
profit, but he has a longer-term perspective, with survival 
of his farming operation and his family's well-being as a 
higher priority than simple short-run "profit-maximizing." 
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Perhaps most importantly, he, like the other Canadian 
respondents, expressed a significantly lower level of 
anxiety than those in the American group. 
As a conclusion to this section, it is worth noting 
that while pooling is the preferred marketing strategy in 
Canada, it is not the only effective Canadian marketing 
strategy available to producers. The single Canadian 
respondent who claimed to be more interested in marketing 
than production, is clearly different from all other 
respondents. When I reached him on the telephone, he .was in 
his office. He warned me that he was not typical and that I 
might not want to interview him. I of course said that I 
would like to include him in the survey, and he agreed to 
cooperate. Although he did use some of the SWP services 
(and this is why his name happened to be included in the 
random list), he did not sell any grain through the CWB. 
He markets all of his grain on his own. He owns a 
small feed mill, and he processes much of his wheat and 
barley production into livestock feed. He markets most of 
this feed by feeding it to sheep. He sells the rest to 
livestock producers. If the price is high enough, he 
diverts some of his grain to a local ethanol plant. As the 
price of oil continues to rise, more of his grain will be 
diverted from feed to fuel production. He has considered 
the organic grain market, but at this time he feels the 
extra production costs and lower yields would not justify 
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diverting resources from his feed production. This producer 
is an enthusiastic entrepreneur who has adopted a very 
different strategy from his fellow producers, namely t;o 
integrate vertically as an individual rather than jointly. 
Other Canadian and American producers either do not perceive 
similar opportunities or do not have similar inclinations. 
Although this particular producer does not appreciate 
the benefits of pooling, most of the other Canadian 
respondents specifically recognize the importance of the 
pooling strategy. This fact is significant because I 
intentionally avoided using the term "pooling," either 
explicitly or implicitly. All Canadians who specifically 
mentioned the importance of pooling, did so voluntarily. No 
Americans referred to pooling. A number of Americans, but 
no Canadians, volunteered that they were "at wit's end" as 
to what to do about their predicament. Some wanted to know 
if this survey was in part intended to help figure out some 
marketing alternatives. At this point I asked, "Are you 
aware of the HSC pooling experiment?" Most had heard about 
it but were unclear as to how it would work. In general, 
Canadian producers utilize a pooling marketing strategy to 
reduce transaction costs, and American producers have high 
transaction costs, in part due to "bounded rationality" and 
"asset specificity." The superior performance of the 




D. Cultural Differences 
It seems clear from the responses to the survey that 
there is a detectable difference between the effectiveness 
of the two strategies. But is there a difference between 
the strategic posture of the Canadians and Americans? The 
final hypothesis concerns the possibility that group 
differences in preferred strategic posture can be attributed 
to Canadian and American cultural differences. Lipset 
(1990) argues that the two cultures differ fundamentally in 
terms of their attitudes toward individualism and 
cooperative efforts. He traces the origin of this 
difference to Colonial America's revolutionary spirit, as 
opposed to the loyalist counter-revolutionary spirit of 
Canada. The paradox Lipset confronts is that the fervor of 
American individualism, which leads to America's 
indefatigable optimism and enormous economic development, is 
also its greatest potential weakness, its Achilles heel, at 
once the source of its vigor and its tragic flaw. We can 
acknowledge the virtues of the country's intense 
individualism, but we need also to recognize that this 
attitude does not easily translate into the good society. 
Contemporary Americans somehow develop an ironic stance 
which allows them to accommodate an unusual degree of 
ambiguity. That is, even as one recognizes the artistic, 
scientific, technological and economic achievements that 
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might have been less likely without this revolutionary 
individualism, one must also be able to accommodate the 
crime, drug abuse, and homelessness, the inadequate health 
care system, the exploitation and abuse of the environment, 
the excessive degree of corruption in government, the 
religious fanaticism, and the stagnant public education 
system. As Lipset reminds us, America chose the opportunity 
for "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" rather 
than Canada's goal of "peace, order, and good government." 
The contrasting attitudes toward government, in 
particular government's potential role to develop a better 
society, further define the cultural difference between the 
two countries. Whereas Americans have categorically 
distrusted government since before there was an American 
national state, Canadians have recognized the capacity of a 
stable government to achieve cooperatively what might not 
otherwise be achievable. The Canadian national health 
service is a good, non-agricultural example. The successful 
Canadian health insurance system stands in sharp contrast to 
the inadequate system currently available to American 
citizens. The American approach has historically been to 
leave health care to the private sector. Admittedly, 
Canada's geographic expanse relative to its sparse 
population gave the government and cooperative efforts a 
greater role and to some extent explains the different 
approach. But the underlying difference between the two 
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countries is the pervasive attitudes of the different 
populations to the role of government in the good society. 
In Lipset's words: 
If one society leans toward communitarianism — 
the public mobilization of resources to fulfill 
group objectives — the other sees individualism - 
- private endeavor — as the way an 'unseen hand" 
produces optimum, socially beneficial results. 
(132) 
The Canadian Wheat Board was organized by the Canadian 
government. It is not a government agency although it 
receives its mandate from the government, reports to the 
government, and receives economic direction from the 
government. Wheat marketing is considered too important to 
be left to an "unseen hand," and the vast majority of 
Canadian producers accept this view. 
The two samples of producers surveyed appear to have a 
similar appreciation of the stalemate characteristics 'of the 
wheat industry (HI). The Canadians as a group perceive 
somewhat less environmental hostility than the Americans, 
probably because, as one Canadian expressed it, "the CWB 
cushions the Canadian producers"(H2). However, these two 
conclusions do not indicate cultural differences per se. 
The area in which the groups seem to differ fundamentally is 
in their manifest strategic posture, that is, in their 
attitude toward cooperative group effort, as opposed to 
individual initiative, and in their attitudes toward risk. 
These differences are not absolute, but there do seem to be 
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significant underlying group tendencies in one direction or 
the other. Questions 15 through 23 were intended to reveal 
deeper differences regarding strategic posture and perhaps 
cultural group differences. 
The clearest distinction in the responses to this set 
of questions is the response to question 16. All but one 
American feel their marketing goals are better achieved as 
individuals, whereas all but one Canadian believe their 
strategic interests are better served by group action. 
Perhaps as important as the individual/group choice is the 
way they answer. The Canadians are much more sure of 
themselves in their responses. There is no hesitation in or 
qualification of their answers. The one Canadian who 
answered that individual action was better for him is the 
person described in the previous section. He quite 
correctly described himself as somewhat of an anomaly; he 
has a strongly entrepreneurial outlook and is predominantly 
a marketing rather than a production person. (In fact, even 
he is somewhat group-oriented, or perhaps "team-oriented” 
would be a better term, in that his business is a five 
person partnership.) 
By contrast, the Americans as a group are almost as 
strongly oriented to individual action as Canadians are to 
group action. Again, the way in which the question is 
answered is revealing. Some of the Americans lack 
conviction regarding a preference for individual action but 
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they are also uncertain as to what a better way might be. 
These producers recognize to varying degrees that their 
marketing goals are not being realized well as individuals 
and that perhaps they would be better off working 
collectively. After wavering in providing an answer, most 
retain their initial preference for individual action, 
primarily it seems because they do not think one can 
organize farmers to work cooperatively. The one respondent 
who chose group action, is also one of the most dissatisfied 
with the marketing system and with his returns for his 
product. 
The phrasing of question 21 seemed to cause 
considerable confusion. In some ways it is quite similar to 
16, and I had expected similar responses to both. A number 
of Canadians hesitated on this one and answered in 
contradiction to their answer to 16. The problem seems to 
have been the phrase "Take full responsibility for you 
marketing decision." Even though they are group oriented, 
they feel that they take responsibility for their actions. 
I think they meant that they in general are responsible, 
whereas I had meant specifically in terms of day-to-day 
marketing. The repeated misunderstanding suggests that, for 
the purposes of this survey, the responses to this question 
should probably be ignored. If the survey were to be 
repeated, the question should be rewritten. 
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Is it fair to claim that growers choose their marketing 
system? Historically, as noted earlier, Canadian and 
American farmers did consciously chose to organize their 
wheat marketing systems. The current institutions in 
essence closely resemble the forms developed in the mid- 
1930's. The national differences suggest an underlying, 
fundamental cultural difference. The current participants 
obviously were not involved in this initial decision, and 
therefore one cannot claim that the present day farmers have 
actually adopted this strategy by choice. Furthermore the 
marketing systems have been institutionalized to the extent 
that they will not easily be radically altered. However, in 
the survey the respondents were given the opportunity to 
express their attitude toward the marketing system of which 
they were a part. 
The Canadians express a much higher level of 
satisfaction with their marketing system. In one case the 
respondent strongly approves of the concept but vehemently 
objects to the way it is being administered. In a few cases 
the support for the group marketing strategy is 
enthusiastic. Along these lines as noted earlier, the point 
of comparison is not with the American system, as I had 
expected it would be, but rather with the system of 
marketing canola in Canada. Canola, an important commodity 
in Canada, is grown as an alternative to wheat and barley, 
but the CWB does market it. One grower, who had produced 
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canola successfully, stated that he no longer grows canola 
because he cannot tolerate the stress of trying to market 
canola in the cash market. 
The Americans as a group are not as satisfied with 
their marketing system or their financial returns. Unlike 
their Canadian counterparts, none are "very satisfied" with 
the marketing system. Farmers in both groups are 
dissatisfied with their financial returns, but most 
Canadians feel less dissatisfied, in part because they feel 
that their returns are probably as good as can be expected 
considering the weak world market. 
Three observations may be worth making in regards to 
the responses to questions 22 and 23. First, Canadians 
volunteered that they like the fact that everyone receives 
the same price per bushel of wheat. Their reasons for 
preferring this arrangement may include the fact that 
equalizing price shifts the emphasis from marketing to 
production, the area producers favor. An equally plausible 
reason for preferring equal prices is that equal prices 
reduce direct competition within the group. 
A second observation is that the Americans' more 
negative responses may further reflect the overall tone of 
depression and frustration that their system is not working 
well, rather than any fundamental disenchantment with an 
individualistic strategic posture. 
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Finally, the American respondents seem not to see any 
viable alternatives. While they do recognize that there are 
obvious benefits to being organized, such as greater market 
power, they do not think farmer's can organize or be 
organized effectively. In one of the few direct references 
to Americans by Canadians, three Canadians saw their 
greatest hope to gaining a stronger world wheat price in 
developing a cartel-like cooperation with the Americans. 
This point-of-view perhaps reflects a desire to return to 
the situation in the late 1960's when the two countries 
operated as a duopoly. It is particularly interesting that 
the all three Canadians also thought it would be hopeless to 
try to organize the Americans. Although I did not 
specifically ask, it was evident that none of the American 
respondents utilize the risk-reducing features of the ' 
futures or options markets. Failure to utilize the options 
market seems irrational to me , but perhaps it further 
reflects a preference for the riskiness of the cash market. 
Question 15 was the most explicit probe of the 
producer's strategic posture. Agreement with the first 
expression of attitude indicated an aggressive, risk-seeking 
entrepreneurial strategic posture. This option is not as 
popular with American producers as I had initially 
The 1990 market, unlike some years offered an 
excellent year to hedge. Futures prices were high in the 
spring and a grower could have locked in a minimum price 
well above the current market price. 
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anticipated, but nevertheless a substantial number of 
Americans (36%) do prefer it. Significantly, no Canadian 
prefers this stance. All but one of the remaining Americans 
(57%) choose the second option. The one American who 
selected the third strategic posture is also the one who is 
total dissatisfied both with the marketing system and with 
the financial return from the American marketing system. 
44% of the Canadians choose this third strategic stance as 
the one which best represents their perspective. 
One is always concerned whether or not the question is 
measuring what was intended, especially when the response 
differs somewhat from what one had anticipated and when over 
half of the Americans and Canadians overlap (i.e., choose 
option 2). In this regard it is perhaps worthwhile relating 
an anecdote which illustrates why I feel relatively 
confident that the responses are representative. The above 
mentioned American grower, the single American to choose the 
third (i.e., most conservative) strategic stance, had the 
same last name as another respondent, although a different 
address and telephone number. After I had interviewed the 
second person by that name, I inquired of this second person 
if he was related to the first. He said they were brothers 
and that they farmed together, although they marketed their 
shares of the grain separately. He then asked, "How did my 
brother answer the questions?" While the survey was 
confidential, this seemed like a reasonable request. Since 
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his brother's answers were entered directly above his own on 
the Lotus spreadsheet, the responses were easy to compare. 
I told him that he and his brother had answered all the 
questions identically except for three. The first 
difference was unimportant (a "don't know" to question 2) 
because I think he simply misunderstood the question. The 
second difference was on number 15; the second brother had 
chosen option 2 whereas the first brother had chosen option 
3, the more conservative strategic stance. The second 
brother, the one I was talking with, exclaimed, "Boy, does 
that ever fit! We are always arguing about that one issue, 
and that is why we can produce together but must market 
separately. I keep telling him he has to be more aggressive 
in his marketing, but he always says he doesn't care about 
making the most money possible, he just wants to survive, to 
make sure the farm continues." The third item on which the 
two differed was number 22, satisfaction with the marketing 
system. The first brother expressed the greatest degree of 
dissatisfaction of any American respondent, whereas the 
second had chosen "mostly satisfied." Again, the second 
brother concurred with the difference. He said his brother 
"is definitely down on the way in which we must market." 
Both were equally dissatisfied ("very dissatisfied") with 
their financial returns. 
In regards to hypothesis four, the evidence from this 
survey indicates that there does appear to be a fundamental 
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cultural difference between the two groups. Each group 
includes at least one who is more representative of the 
other group, but as a whole the groups reflect different 
sets of characteristics. Canadian producers do appear to 
strongly prefer the more so-called "conservative" strategic 
posture (Model 1 strategic behavior in the typology) and 
American producers appear to prefer the more 
"entrepreneurial" strategic posture (Model 2 behavior in the 
typology). There is clearly an attitude difference between 
the two groups, especially regarding individual and 
cooperative marketing strategies. 
However, one may ask, "Is it clear that this difference 
is a cultural difference or simply a group of pragmatic 
farmers who are able to recognize when a system is working 
or not?" I suspect the causes for the difference are 
intertwined; the mere fact that two very different 
institutions of capitalism arose suggests that they emerged 
from culturally different environments. 
At the same time I do not think the Americans are 
predestined to endless individualistic behavior and to being 
incapable of implementing a pooling system. The extreme 
environmental hostility in combination with a somewhat 
dampened enthusiasm for individualism, may provide the 
context for a fundamental structural change. Ocean Spray is 
a U.S. cranberry cooperative which pools. It is an 
extraordinarily successful organization which the strategic 
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management literature on cooperative strategy always points 
to. It is a voluntary (i.e., not state mandated) 
organization, and its membership includes over 90% of all 
cranberry producers. However, in sharp contrast to the 
situation for wheat, 95% of the cranberry crop is produced 
by a few hundred growers in Massachusetts and Wisconsin. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the likelihood 
that marketing strategy in the wheat industry will be 
radically altered. The relationships revealed by the survey 
do suggest that conditions for change exist. However, the 
essential intermediary for change will be a different 
vision of a marketing strategy. The structure, following 
Chandler's paradigm, will then change to accommodate the 
strategic needs. 
E. Conclusions 
The four main conclusions of this study can be briefly 
summarized as follows. 
1. Wheat producers as a whole are acutely aware of the 
constraints the stalemate industry structure imposes on 
their individual firm's marketing possibilities. However, 
while some producers are generally overwhelmed by the 
industry structure, others see some potential to reduce the 
impact of these constraints through a collective strategy of 
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joint vertical integration. In general, producers who 
market through the CWB fall into the latter category. 
2. The price volatility and unpredictability in the 
international wheat market, caused by a high supply of wheat 
relative to the total demand and by a complex set of other 
factors, imposes severe environmental hostility for wheat 
producers. While all wheat producers are sensitive to 
environmental hostility, those who have adopted a pooling 
marketing strategy (i.e., Canadians in this survey) are 
significantly more insulated from the adverse effects of a 
hostile environment, and they experience substantially less 
stress from the overall business environment. 
3. While it is intuitive to assume producers who pool 
will on average receive a higher price for their product 
than those who fail to pool, this assumption cannot be 
verified conclusively with existing data. The efforts to 
demonstrate that a pooling strategy yields a higher average 
price is further complicated in a cross-cultural study. 
While we must conclude that the price difference is 
indeterminate, there are more important criteria for 
evaluating performance. One of these criteria is the 
ability of a strategy to reduce risk and the associated 
stress. 
4. It is possible to categorize a producer's marketing 
strategy as either more or less aggressive, and more or less 
cooperative. Canadians as a group appear to be more 
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predisposed, than are Americans, to less aggressive, less 
risky, more cooperative marketing efforts. These 
observations would be consistent with observations by social 
scientists, such as Lipset (1990). 
F. Limitations and Future Research 
There are three major limitations to the interpretation 
of these results: 
1. Given the limited number of producers interviewed, 
the study should be regarded as exploratory and the 
conclusions subject to further verification. This is not to 
say that this research cannot lead to legitimate hypotheses. 
Indeed, a major purpose of this study is to use these 
investigations to point to areas that need further research. 
I hope to pursue some of the questions raised by the 
. . . 13 
interviews . 
2. As has already been indicated, performance is 
extremely difficult to measure directly. It would be very 
useful to have a variable that would reflect the goals of 
cooperative strategies better than gross earnings and which 
Ms. Ruth Reardon, the CWB librarian, in a telephone 
conversation indicated that she is unaware of any other 
studies which focus on competitive strategy from the 
producer's point of view. She is understandably puzzled by 
this since the CWB is ostensibly the producers' 
organization. 
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would be readily quantifiable and relatively easy for 
government statisticians to monitor over time. 
3. It may be that fundamental cultural differences 
between Canada and the U.S. make direct comparisons of 
strategy effectiveness inappropriate. Lipset (1990) refers 
to this underlying difference between the two cultures as 
"the Continental Divide;" he observed that Canadians and 
Americans relate differently to the role of government in 
business. There appears to be a distinct difference between 
the more individualistic American and the Canadian who does 
not find it anathema to work closely with a more collective 
institution. Lipset's perspective, the idea of studying one 
culture to understand another, proves to be an 
extraordinarily effective means of focusing clearly on the 
strategy problems addressed in this study. 
An further example of how complicate comparative 
strategic studies can be is the Miller and Friesen (1983) 
study which attempted to compare the environmental 
hostility-entrepreneurial behavior relationship to high 
performance in firms in the U.S. and Canada. They found a 
negative correlation in Canada and a positive correlation in 
the U.S.; that is, a highly entrepreneurial, innovative 
strategic posture in a highly hostile environment in Canada 
did not lead to higher performance in Canadian firms, but 
did lead to better performance in U.S. firms. This 
unexpected situation suggests that the paradigm being used 
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was inadequate, or that there may be a third (cultural) 
interactive variable involved. It was not clear in this 
study how organization structure differed. 
One direction for further research might be to add a 
more traditional intra-country comparison to the 
international comparison of this study. The characteristics 
of Americans who are not pooling could be compared with 
Americans who are involved in the HSC pooling experiment. 
Similarly, a comparison of Saskatchewan growers with growers 
in Alberta, may reveal strategic differences. In a recent 
(spring 1990) SWB survey, it was found that western 
Canadians were less supportive of the CWB approach than were 
growers from the two eastern prairie provinces. 
AFTERWORD 
As I conclude this exploratory study it may be 
worthwhile to step back for a moment to trace briefly how I 
came to be interested in this area of research, to highlight 
a few of the things I learned from writing this 
dissertation, and to speculate on the directions in which I 
may take this line of inquiry. I have long been interested 
in the smaller firm, that most basic of organizational forms 
which is almost synonymous with the entrepreneur, and 
especially in how these firms come to be organized in the 
way they are, in how they function, in how decisions, 
chiefly strategic decisions, are made, and in what it is 
that motivates the firm's manager (often the entrepreneur 
who organized the firm). 
For a while I thought the answers to these and other 
related questions were to be found in the study of 
economics. I remember thinking I was on the verge of great 
insights when one day, in my agricultural economics Master's 
level microeconomics theory seminar, we finally turned to 
the theory of the firm. That day's seminar concluded before 
we could proceed as far as I had hoped we might, but I went 
up to the professor after class and expressed my delight 
with our beginnings and my great anticipation for our next 
meeting. I was dismayed to learn that, as far as he was 
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concerned, we had covered all that was important about the 
firm, and that really, the theory of the firm was only of 
interest insofar as it helped in the development of a theory 
of prices. 
At Madison I was also introduced to institutional 
economics. The concepts of economic organization expressed 
in this branch of economics would eventually prove more 
fruitful for my interests. 
During the subsequent four or five years I worked 
closely with managers of small firms, mostly in the 
agricultural sector, and continuously observed that these 
real firms bore little resemblance to the neoclassical 
theoretical firm. Ultimately I concluded that my 
microtheory professor had in a way been correct: the firm of 
neoclassical microeconomic theory did not have a great deal 
more to offer than he had indicated. 
Management studies, and strategic management in 
particular, appeared to take the firm far more seriously. I 
turned my attention here and to industrial organization 
economics, and hoped that my change in focus would lead to a 
synthesis which would be far more useful in my applied 
economic work. I was not disappointed. From the outset 
readings, such as Allison, March and Simon, Williamson, 
Porter, and later Berle and Means, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
Best, and others, revealed that many had been and were 
confronting the complexities of the firm. However, I was 
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struck by the fact that whole sectors of the economy (i.e., 
those sectors which consisted of so-called "stalemate" 
industries), were largely ignored. During a strategic 
management seminar I was given the opportunity to present a 
seminar, and I chose to focus on strategic management 
problems in this area. This dissertation in part evolved 
from that seminar presentation. 
The "strategy -> structure -> performance" paradigm, 
fundamental to studies in both strategic management aiid 
industrial organization economics, is a useful organizing 
construct and was the starting point for this study. 
However, as my work progressed I became increasingly aware 
of a serious limitation inherent in this paradigm, a 
limitation with implications I previously, perhaps naively, 
had not fully appreciated. I was back to my need for an 
adequate theory of the firm. One's theory of the firm, 
especially one's underlying assumptions about the nature of 
decision-makers, predisposes one's use of this paradigm and 
consequently affects one's research findings. 
The standard assumptions of the neo-classical 
microeconomic theory of the firm may effectively lead to a 
theory of prices. However, the view that the entrepreneur's 
sole or at least primary pursuit is profit-maximization, 
fails to reveal how most firms actually function. 
Transactional cost theory expands the horizons of the 
standard theory, and in so doing addresses some of its 
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limitations. Transactional cost economic analysis seems 
particularly useful in explaining why producers in some 
industries may want to develop cooperative strategies and to 
organize vertically in order to reduce transaction costs. 
The extended research of this exploratory study has 
taken me further along this path. I now believe that in 
order to explain why firms are organized and operate in a 
certain way, we must examine more carefully the firm's 
implicit or explicit underlying motivations or goals. This 
research suggests that it may be especially important to 
adopt this perspective if we are to understand how firms 
operate within stalemate industries and hostile 
environments. 
If we simply assume that the firm's goal is to maximize 
profits, we can then conclude which strategy and structure 
is best by simply comparing the financial performance of the 
various approaches. As I discovered in this study, such a 
comparison, especially a cross-cultural comparison, poses 
insurmountable problems and does not allow a determinant 
conclusion. Equally important, we may be comparing the 
performance of firms with substantially different goals. 
When we can go beyond this simplistic approach, that is 
to consider that the firm's strategy and structure may be 
determined to a greater extent by its effort to reduce 
transaction costs, we are in a better position to discover 
how firms organize and function. It may not however be any 
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easier to quantify performance for valid comparisons of 
strategy and structure. Others who have struggled with this 
problem have suggested that in such comparisons, it is more 
useful to focus on attaining market share rather than on 
profitability. 
The telephone interviews led me to conclude that to a 
large extent, the greatest concern of producers who are 
experiencing high degrees of environmental hostility, is 
market riskiness and the risk of losing their firm. Their 
primary goal, although not always directly expressed as 
such, is usually to reduce the stress associated with the 
constraints of their stalemate industry and the 
unpredictability of their hostile business environment. 
Thus, a third approach to measuring performance is to 
evaluate the degree to which stress appears to be reduced 
(a) by a particular strategy and (b) by the structure 
adopted to implement this strategy. 
Pooling is a marketing strategy which is available to 
producers and which can be implemented through various 
cooperative organizational structures. Initially my 
research direction was to determine whether or not pooling 
led to higher producer prices. My inclination was that it 
would lead to higher prices, at least on average. I, like 
others before me, was unable to demonstrate this difference 
conclusively. This inability to demonstrate a price 
advantage perhaps explains why, as I discovered, neither 
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producers nor managers of marketing organizations argue that 
pooling leads to higher prices, even on average. Concerns 
with profit-maximization were generally not evident at 
either firm or cooperative level. 
Pooling offers an opportunity to reduce transaction 
costs. Producers who pool and organizations which offer the 
pooling option, emphasize the advantages of reducing 
transaction costs through the convenience of (a) "one stop" 
(or "single desk") selling for the producer and (b) "one 
stop" shopping for the larger international buyers. For 
some firms this advantage alone may justify adopting the 
pooling strategy. The larger the pool, the greater the 
market share. In the case of the domestic Canadian wheat 
market, producers through their organization, have nearly 
achieved a 100% market share. Internationally their 
organization is the single largest player. 
However, reducing market risk and reducing the stress 
associated with the risk of not surviving, may ultimately be 
the strongest motivation for implementing the pooling 
strategy. Again, it is extremely difficult to measure the 
strategy's performance quantitatively. I found the best 
measure was to determine through the interview process, to 
what degree producers felt reduced stress with different 
strategies. The results of the interviews in this study 
indicate that those who, for whatever reason, adopted a 
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pooling strategy, experienced a significantly lower level of 
stress in a hostile environment. 
These observations are not to suggest that this third 
motivation or performance measure is a radically new 
approach. I see it rather as an extension of transaction 
cost economic analysis. But it moves in a direction that 
might not have been readily apparent without this 
exploratory study. I now think that cooperative strategies, 
such as the one considered in this study, need to be 
analyzed and evaluated in terms of the stress and the 
survivability issues. Cooperative strategies can help firms 
better adapt to hostile environments, but in attempting to 
explain how they adapt and to predict under what conditions 
they will most effectively adapt, one needs to have a 
relevant, sound theory of the firm. 
I was surprised to see how little the Canadians and the 
Americans understood about the marketing activities of their 
counterparts. While I would not advocate that one group 
begin to investigate the other simply in order to copy their 
approach or even to pick up some pointers, I did find that 
understanding the Canadian approach helped me to better 
understand the overall American approach and the potential 
for improvement. Constant review and innovation is 
essential for organizations in both systems, and cross- 
cultural research can facilitate this renewal process. 
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I think the research findings of this study will, 
presented in a different form, be of interest to U.S. and 
Canadian producers and cooperative organizations. The 
findings are not limited to wheat production; the principles 
can be applied to some extent to all commodities. 
Managerial economists in Russia currently struggling with 
developing appropriate "market-oriented” organizational 
forms for production and marketing of commodities, may find 
this research of interest. 
The U.S. producers I interviewed appeared substantially 
more stressed than their Canadian counterparts and genuinely 
seemed to be at a loss regarding their strategic options. I 
think that with cooperative initiatives, similar to the 
impressive leadership already demonstrated by Harvest States 
Cooperative, we could see a dramatic increase in the 
adoption rate of pooling strategies by U.S. wheat producers. 
My exploratory research confirms Lipset's observations about 
national characters, in this case, that American producers, 
as compared to Canadian producers, tend to be less inclined 
to cooperate extensively. At the same time, pooling is a 
more rational marketing strategy, and presented effectively 
the logic of the argument should in many instances overcome 
an inherent resistance. Without taking an advocacy role, I 
hope my current and subsequent research will help articulate 
the circumstcmces in which we would expect to see specific 
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marketing strategies emerge and how we would expect to see 
firms improve performance. 
This study has been a multicultural and 
multidisciplinary effort. I believe this multidimensional 
approach has led to insights that would have been less 
likely to surface had the research been contained within the 
stricter confines of a single discipline or country. 
Perhaps as important, at least for me, is that writing 
within this mode has been a truly delightful experience. In 
one's PhD program, the dissertation is often anticipated 
with some apprehension. In fact, the approach that I have 
been able to take seems to have transformed the dreaded 
ordeal into a remarkably pleasant, integrating event. 
Written in this way, this study has allowed me to bring a 
wide range of studies and experience to bear on an important 
problem. 
APPENDIX A 
PRE-SURVEY LETTERS TO PRODUCERS 
INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN 
TRADE AND ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst, MA 01003 November 19, 1990 
(413) 545-3253 
FAX: 413-545-2969 
BITNET: INATE @ UMASS 
Mr. Kenneth Ferguson 
General Delivery 
Dinsmore, Saskatchewan 
Canada SOL OTO 
Dear Mr. Ferguson: 
The University of Massachusetts Institute for North American 
Trade and Economics is working in cooperation with the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool to survey a small sample of Saskatchewan 
farmers. Your farm has been selected randomly as one of those to 
be surveyed by telephone during the week of November 19th. The 
phone call will take less than 10 minutes. 
The purpose of the survey is to learn more about how farm 
managers view their grain marketing, especially in terms of their 
attitudes toward risk and toward the current marketing 
environment. Ultimately, we are interested to see if marketing 
structures affect these attitudes. Since only about 60 farm 
managers (about 30 in Saskatchewan and a total of about 30 from 
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana) are being surveyed, your 
input is extremely important to the success of the overall 
research effort. 
The questions are straight forward, and the multiple choice 
answers are simple and brief, usually a "yes or no" or an "agree- 
disagree" scale of 1 to 5. We will not ask any personal 
questions, and all the answers will be strictly confidential. As 
a participant the final results in aggregate will be directly 
available to you. 
Of course, your participation in this effort is completely 
voluntary, and we appreciate that your time is valuable, but we 
very much hope that you will choose to give 10 minutes of your 
time to be interviewed on the telephone. 
Sincerely, 
Kent Fleming v 
Research Associate & 
Agricultural Economist 
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INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN 
TRADE AND ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst, MA 01003 
(413) 545-3253 
FAX: 413-545-2969 
BITNET: INATE @ UMASS 
November 13, 1990 
1" 
Dear 2": 
The Institute is working with Harvest States Cooperative to 
survey a small sample of members. Your farm has been selected 
randomly as one of those to be surveyed by telephone during the 
week of November 17-23. The phone call will take less than 10 
minutes. 
The purpose of the survey is to learn more about how farm 
managers view their grain marketing. Since relatively few people 
are being surveyed, your input is extremely important to the 
success of this research effort. The questions are straight 
forward, and the answers are simple, multiple choice selections. 
We will not ask any personal questions, and all the answers will 
be strictly confidential. As a participant the final results in 
aggregate will be directly available to you. 
The goal of this project is to improve the grain marketing 
services available to the farming community. All farmers will 
benefit from a stronger, more responsive Cooperative. Of course, 
your participation in this effort is completely voluntary, and we 
appreciate that your time is valuable, but we very much hope that 
you will choose to give 10 minutes of your time to be interviewed 
on the telephone. 
Sincerely, 
Kent Fleming 




PRODUCER ATTITUDES TOWARD INDUSTRY STALEMATE & ENVIRONMENTAL HOSTILITY 
IN THE NORTH AMERICAN GRAIN MARKET: 
A Telephone Survey of 30 U.S. & Canadian Wheat Producers 
Grain market focus of this survey: 
The complex set of processes and actions involved in grain farming can be roughly 
categorized into three activity groups: resource assembly (e.g., obtaining land, labor and capital 
resources: obtaining required production inputs, such as seed, fertilizers, etc.; developing 
management expertise): production (e.g., preparing the seed bed and planting: responding 
appropriately to physical environmental conditions: harvesting and drying the crop): marketing 
(e.g., storing grain and transporting it to a buyer; deciding which level of price risk one is 
prepared to accept; deciding when and in which market to sell; developing better grain 
markets). 
All aspects of the process are important, but in this survey we wish to focus on the grain 
marketing component. Gross income is simply yield times price. Yield is primarily a function of 
the production component, but price is largely determined by the market in which one operates. 
Therefore, in this survey we will focus on price, and risk will refer to price risk, as opposed to 
production risk (e.g., weather) or input risk (e.g., rising interest rates, wage rates, or fuel costs). 
Farms which produce wheat may produce other commodities. For the purposes of this 
survey we are specifically interested in the wheat (and barley) enterprise. 
Stalemate hypothesis: 
1. To what extent would you say the wheat industry is characterized by opportunities for you 
(or any individual farm) to differentiate the quality of your grain from that of other producers or 
countries, and thus to receive a higher price? 
1 2 3 4 5 
EXTREMELY LOW LOW MODERATE HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH 
2. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become 
involved) which can differentiate grain qualities in the market and can therefore extract higher 
prices for these better quality grains? 
NO YES DON’T KNOW 
182 
3. To what extent would you say the wheat industry is characterized by opportunities for you 
(or any individual farm) to differentiate your farm from those of other producers (or countries), 
and thus to receive a higher price? What is the likelihood that you could, for example, develop a 
reputation for timely deliveries that would inspire brand-name loyalty. 
1 2 3 4 5 
EXTREMELY LOW LOW MODERATE HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH 
4. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become 
involved) which does or could differentiate itself in terms of services offered and therefore is able 
to or could extract higher prices for its grain products? 
NO YES DON’T KNOW 
5. To what extent would you say the wheat industry is characterized by opportunities for you 
(or any individual) to take control of a large enough market segment so that by withholding 
supply, you could affect the overall market price? 
1 2 3 4 5 
EXTREMELY LOW LOW MODERATE HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH 
6. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become 
involved) which can take control of a large enough market segment so that by withholding 
supply. It could affect the overall market price? 
NO YES DON’T KNOW 
7. How great is the opportunity for you (or any individual) to directly supply a buyer (either a 
processor or an end-user), for example, a bakery, flour mill, or ethnic group, with a significant 
portion of your crop; that is, how great is the opportunity for you to develop or locate a niche 
market to supply? 
1 2 3 4 5 
EXTREMELY LOW LOW MODERATE HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH 
8. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become 
involved) which could develop or locate a niche market to supply? 
NO YES DON’T KNOW 
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Environmental hostility hypothesis: 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following six statements: 
9. Prices in the cash grain market for wheat are quite volatile. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
10. Price movements in the cash grain market for wheat are highly unpredictable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
11. The volatility and unpredictability of the grain market provides one with many opportunities 
to earn substantial profits or to sustain great losses. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
12. The grain market is very risky; a bad year could threaten my firm’s survival. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
13. The grain market is a dominating environment in which my firm’s initiatives count for very 
little against tremendous competitive, political, or technological forces. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
14. I find marketing grain very stressful and exacting; I find It very difficult to stay afloat. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
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Strategic posture hypothesis: 
15. Which ONE of the foiiowing best characterizes your actuai or desired grain marketing 
approach; 
A. To be very aggressive in hopes of achieving the highest possibie price, even at 
substantiai risk of uitimateiy achieving a iower overaii price. 
B. To be somewhat iess aggressive, reducing the potentiai for gaining the highest price 
but also reducing the risk of achieving a lower overall price. 
C. To be relatively more cautious ("conservative"), substantially reducing the chance of 
hitting the market highs or lows, i.e., reducing the variability. 
16. Whichever is your preferred grain marketing approach and goal, do you feel you are better 
able to achieve your goal on your own or within a group? 
INDIVIDUAL GROUP 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the foiiowing two statements: 
17. The grain farming business places extraordinary demands on the limited resources (time, 
money, knowledge, current information, access to records, etc.) necessary to make sound 
economic decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
18. Given my marketing approach, I have adequate resources available within my firm to do a 
satisfactory job of marketing? 
1 2 3 4 5 
STRONGLY MOSTLY AGREE MOSTLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE DISAGREE 
19. Do your main interests lie in production or marketing? 
PRODUCTION MARKETING 




21. Do you take full Individual responsibility for your marketing decisions, as opposed to 
working 
cooperatively with other growers and/or paid marketing specialists? 
NO YES 
22. How satisfied are you with your current wheat marketing system? 
1 2 3 4 5 
VERY MOSTLY SOMEWHAT MOSTLY VERY 
SATISFIED SATISFIED SATISFIED DISSATISFIED DISSATISFIED 
23. How satisfied are you with the financial return on your personal efforts and farm resources 
devoted to wheat marketing? 
1 2 3 4 5 
VERY MOSTLY SOMEWHAT MOSTLY VERY 
SATISFIED SATISFIED SATISFIED DISSATISFIED DISSATISFIED 
Farm characteristics: 
24. What proportion of your gross earnings would you estimate are derived from the direct sale 













26. Approximately what is your age? 
<30 years old 
30-45 years old 
46-60 years old 
>60 years old 
APPENDIX C 
SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Differentiate grain quality 







Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
2, Differentiate grain quality 
through an organization? 
100% 
No Yes Doni Know 
100% 
3. Differentiate firm (brand name) 






Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
4. Differentiate firm (brand name) 







No Yes Doni Know 
5. Gain large market share 








Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
6. Gain large market share 







No Yes Don't Know 
7. Opportunity to develop niche market 
at farm level? 
100% 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
8. Opportunity to develop niche market 














9. Cash market prices are 
quite volatiie. 
Srongly A^m Morty Agr** Agr** SomMi*iat Mosfy Spangly Diaagra* 
10. Cash market prices are 
highly unpredictable. 
11. Grain market provides opportunities 
for high profit or loss. 
100% 
OOongty A^m Ma«ty Agrv* AgrM SonwwM Moaly Dm^m OiugrM 
12. Grain market is very risky; 
a bad year could threaten survival. 
100% 
Ma«0y Agra* ■Tangly Agra* Agra* ■onwthi Mo*ly OiM^** ■Tangly OiMT** 
13. Grain market is dominating; 
firm’s initiatives count for iittie. 
Srongly Agra* Moaty Agraa Agraa So«naaM Moafy Diaagraa S^ongly Diaagraa 
14. Grain marketing is very stressfui; 
it is difficuit to stay afioat. 
100X 
atangty A^aa lybaty Agiaa Agraa BowiawhM Moaty OtMgraa Spangly Diaagraa 
15. Which strategic posture best 
characterizes your marketing approach? 
100% 
Entrepreneurial Mcxierate “Conservative' 
16. Are you better able to market 
on your own or in a group? 
100% 
Ind^idual Group 
17. Grain business places extraordinary 






Svongly Mocty Agr** Agr** SommiM Moaty Otoagra* Saongiy Oiaagraa 
18. I have adequate resources to do a 
satisfactory job of marketing. 
100% 
Saof^Agraa MoatyAgraa Agraa 8omaa4tal Moaty CNaagraa aacngly Paagraa 
19. Do your main interests lie in 
production or marketing? 
20. Do you receive greater return from 
production or marketing? 
100% 
Production Marketing Doni Krx)w 
22. How satisfied are you with your 
current wheat marketing system? 
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100% 
VarySil MoatlySat Somawtwt Sot MocOyDlMat. V*ryDiMat. 
23. How satisfied are you with your 
financial return from marketing? 
100% 
Vary SaL Moatty Sat Soawwttat Sat MoaUy Dtaat Vary Diaaat 
24. What proportion of gross earnings 
are from direct sale of spring wheat? 
100% 
Al Mo« About W Mnor 
25. What are your annual gross sales 











<S50.000 S60-100,000 >6100,000 
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